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Introduction 
From 6 October 2001, the United States and its allies 
deployed military personnel and airplanes in former Soviet 
Central Asia in the campaign against global terrorism. The 
countries concerned were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The Western military activity and presence in 
these states was considerable in connection with Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, especially in the most 
intensive military phase of the operation through March 
2002. 1 On 24 September 2001 Russia's president, Vladimir 
Pntin, stated that each of the post-Soviet countries had full 
freedom to decide whether to allow American bases on their 
territory. Putin's support for the operation in Afghanistan and 
in the war against international terrorism emphasised how 
relations between the United States and Russia had improved 
after 11 September 2001. 
Operation Enduring Freedom underlined how Russia and 
the United States shared one important aim in Central Asia -
reducing the threat from the Taliban in Afghanistan. This had 
at last become possible and in this respect, Operation 
1 Operations in Afghanistan include Operation Enduring Freedom and the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Operation Enduring 
Freedom was the military response to the attack of 9111 and started on 6 
October 2001. It was led by the United States with support from the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the Afghan Northern Alliance 
as wcIJ as other states allied with the United States in a coalition of the 
willing. Operation Enduring Freedom continues with military 
operations as of writing. Howc\'cr, the last large military offensive, 
Operation Anaconda, ended on 18 March 2002, and at that point 
Operation Enduring Freedom entered into a phase of consolidation and 
stabilisation of Afghanistan under its new leadership. In accordance 
with the Bonn conference, ISAF was established following the fall of the 
Taliban on 6 December 2001 with headquarters in Kabul. Its 
participants include several NATO member·states and cooperating 
states. NATO assumed command of ISAF on 1 August 2003. 
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Enduring Freedom enhanced stability in the region. Removing 
the Taliban from power in Afghanistan was just as important 
to Moscow as it had become to Washington after 9/11. The 
coalition's Central Asian bases considerably eased the logistics 
of achieving this aim. But Russian and American views 
diverged on the issue of Western military deployment in 
Central Asia in the longer term. To the United States, the 
coalition bases were instruments in the war on terrorism.2 It 
was therefore difficult to discuss, even consider, a strict time 
frame for their existence. To a considerable section of the 
Russian political elite, on the other hand, a strict and short 
time frame for the Western military presence in Central Asia 
was a central prerequisite for supporting it. 
Putin's support for the US-led coalition's use of Central 
Asian airbases and his encouragement to the Central Asian 
presidents to grant the coalition access to both bases and 
airspace remained divisive issues among Moscow elites. The 
bases were seen as vehicles for promoting American strategic 
interests in the region, not least access to the Caspian Basin's 
energy resources. One of Russia's goals in Central Asia was to 
prevent outside powers from gaining influence in the region, 
and American strategic interests were therefore perceived as a 
threat. Objections on these grounds were especially 
pronounced within the military and security branches and 
extended even to the top brass. Establishing a Russian airbase 
close to the Western base in Kyrgyzstan in October 2003 was 
2 In this study, I will use the war on terrorism to denote this concept's 
place in American policy, as well as the international campaign against 
terrorism led by the United States. In a study where Russian~Arncrican 
relations play a role, it seems appropriate to apply the term in most 
frequent use in both Russia and the US. Russian policymakcrs accepted 
the term with ease, as it complemented well the term established in 1999 
- international terrorism (l11ezhdtlllflrodl1yi terroTizm). The war on 
terrorism is translated as voilla protiv terrora/terrorizma or borba proti/! 
terrorals terrorizmom. Sec for example Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir 
Flikke, "Copy That ... ": A Rllssian "Bush Doctrine" ill tbe CIS? in the 
series Nllpi-rapporl (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 
200.1), p. 17. 
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seen as a move to balance the Western presence. The Central 
Asian issue had apparently turned into one of several 
problematic issues on the Russian-American agenda. 
Research design 
This study has two major analytical aims. The first is to 
answer the question of what influences Russian policy in 
Central Asia after 9/11. To answer the question, the study 
contains a thorough investigation of the Russian reactions to 
the establishment and presence of Western bases in Central 
Asia. The second analytical aim is to discuss an important set 
of implications of the findings from the investigation: how did 
the Russian response to the establishment of Western bases in 
Central Asia impact on the bilateral relationship between 
Russia and the United States? 
The investigation of Russia's reactions to the establishment 
of the Western bases is carried out on three levels: 
• Russian official statements aimed towards the United 
States, NATO and the West 
• The domestic Russian political debate on the relationship to 
Central Asia and the Western bases there 
• Russian policy in Central Asia. In this study, the core of this 
policy is understood to be Russian political signals towards 
Central Asian states with American bases and Western mili-
tary activity during Operation Enduring Freedom, i.e. 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, as well as the way in 
which concrete steps, especially military steps, have fol-
lowed political signals. 
From the initial period commencing on 11 September 2001 to 
the Crawford summit between Putin and George W. Bush on 
13-14 November 2001, Russia's reactions to the bases are 
followed at all three levels together. This period is studied in 
chapter 2. From November 2001, each level of the Russian 
reactions to the Western bases in Central Asia is examined on 
its own in chapters 3-5. 
Choosing November 2001 as a benchmark is motivated by 
two factors. Firstly, in the domestic Russian debate it is 
difficult to distinguish between the debate on Putin's choice 
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after 9/11 of a strategic alignment with the West, and the 
debate on how Russia should respond to the establishment of 
the Western bases in Central Asia. Secondly, in international 
politics, the first two months after 9/11 were characterised by 
an emergency situation and increased uncertainty about the 
future. Even relatively insignificant and outlying statements in 
a domestic political debate such as the one which took place 
in Russia were afforded considerable attention on an 
international level. Therefore, the first few weeks after 9111 
were different from the period that followed. 
The three levels of Russia's response are studied from 11 
September 2001 to the end of 2003. By late 2003, the main 
tenets of Russia's reactions had already been well-established. 
At the same time, the issue of the Western bases in Central 
Asia was less prominent in Russia's domestic political debate 
as well as in Russian-American relations. A few issues are 
followed through 2004. These pertain mainly to Russian 
policy in Central Asia. The Western bases, as well as Russia's 
reactions to them, were central to this policy even in 2004. 
The analytical implications of the investigation of the three 
elements of the Russian response to the US presence in the 
region are summed up in chapter 6. The chapter also prepares 
the ground for the next chapter's discussion of the question of 
what influences Russian policy in Central Asia. This is ensured 
particularly through a systematic comparison and discussion 
of the three levels of the Russian response, and the exploration 
of the relationship between them. Methodically, the three 
levels of the Russian response to the establishment of Western 
bases in Central Asia are approached as different sides of one 
case. This design stresses the correspondences and connections 
between the three aspects, instead of emphasising their 
differences. One question in the analysis will be whether 
Russian ambitions in Central Asia are presented differently 
towards the West than in the actual Russian policy towards 
the Central Asian states. Such an approach may shed light on 
how Russian foreign policy aims in the relationships with the 
West and with members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) agree, or disagree. 3 
"A CRUCIAL SPHERE FOR O[jR SECURIH" 15 
In chapter 7 I discuss three possible SOurces of influence on 
Russian policy in Central Asia after 9/11 based on the findings 
in the previous chapter. Domestic Russian politics, the 
bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States, 
and Russia's strategic interests in Central Asia are discussed as 
potential motivations. 
Chapter 8 contains the discussion of the second analytical 
question. What were the implications of the Russian response 
to the Western bases in Central Asia for the bilateral 
relationship with the United States? How important was this 
response to the overall relationship, and how do Russian-
American relations in Central Asia relate to Russian-American 
relations outside this region? What are the prospects for a 
strategic partnership between Russia and the United States? A 
strategic partnership is here understood as an enduring 
relationship based on shared strategic interests between two 
states. A strategic partnership is more durable and rooted in a 
wider range of strategic interests than an alignment on one 
issue. At the same time it has fewer notions of shared security 
and is less formal than an alliance. A strategic partnership is 
not necessarily based on shared values. 
Readers will note that some approaches from discourse 
analysis have aided me in the work on this study. This 
especially applies to the narrative on the internal Russian 
political debate in chapter 4. As in discourse analysis, chapter 
4 is partly concerned with analysing language in a societal 
context. However, the chapter is not an analysis of discourse. 
Similar to discourse analysis, language and concepts are at the 
centre of the investigation. However, the study is not an 
analysis of a discourse aimed at discussing how the "ideas and 
concepts produced in this context interpret and shape societal 
reality".4 The ultimate task here is more traditional, i.e. to 
3 The Commonwealth of Independent States includes the states of the 
former Soviet Union with the exception of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
4 Wcrner Christie Mathisen, "'Diskutsanaiyse for statsvitere: Hva, hvorfor 
og hvordan" [Discourse Analysis for Political Scientists: What, Why~ and 
How1, Research paper flO. 1/1997 (Oslo: Department of Jlolieical 
Science, University of Oslo, 1997). 
16 FORSVARSSTUDIER 3/2005 
analyse how concepts and language are shaped by reality. In 
effect, the causaliry is the opposite of what is aimed at in 
discourse analysis. Throughout the study, this will be evident 
from the discussion of how the domestic Russian debate 
connects to and compares with other aspects of a Russian 
response to the establishment of Western bases in Central 
Asia. 
This introduction is followed by a chapter on the 
background and context of the study. 
Recent research on Russia and Central Asia 
In writing this study, I have drawn on the work of several 
other a uthors, as will be seen in the references. A few very 
recent works, all of which appeared during my work on this 
study, have been of particular interest. I might mention recent 
studies by Lena Jonson and Roy Allison, whose research in the 
field of Central Asia and Russian policy has long been an 
inspiration to others. I have borrowed the expression 'strategic 
reassertion' for the development of policy after 9/11 from 
Allison's article on Russian policy in Central Asia.5 Jonson's 
most recent book gave me considerable background 
knowledge and valuable insights, and her discussion of the 
shifts in Russian policy towards Central Asia in 1999 and 
2001 is most illuminating.6 While writing up this study over 
the past few months I have also enjoyed reading the recent 
work of Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, whose conclusions 
on Russian policy in Central Asia and the relationship to the 
United States are supported by the findings here? While all 
these works are relevant to the findings here, my approach is 
somewhat different. In the investigation, I focus not only on 
Russian political signals and concrete steps in Central Asia, 
but also on the domestic debate about this policy and how to 
react to the US military presence in Central Asia, and on the 
5 Roy Allison, "Strategic rea!>scnion in Russia's Central Asia policy", 
Intemotional Affairs, vo!. 80, no. 2 (March 2004): 277-293. 
6 Lena joosoo, V/adill1fT JlHlifl a/1d CC11lrai Asia. The Shaping of Russiall 
Foreigll Policy (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 
7 Wilhclmsen and Flikke, "COP)' That ... " 
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official policy towards the West. When making my 
conclusions, I discuss the motivations hehind the Russian 
reassertion in Central Asia. Therefore, I hope that this work 
will also add to our knowledge about the motivations for 
Russian policy in Central Asia and this policy's relationship to 
the Russian political elite. 
Sources 
The sources used here are mainly Russian and Western. 
Sources from Central Asia are used to complement the 
primary selection of sources and to provide some insight into 
the receiving end of Russian policy in Central Asia. A 
methodological problem is the question of how to interpret 
sources relating to the different aspects of the Russian 
response to the Western bases in Central Asia. How can one 
relate a statement to a part of the domestic Russian debate, 
the official response to the West, or policy towards Central 
Asia? Is it the sender, the immediate receivers, the medium of 
the message, or is it time and place? For most sources, a 
combination of all these circumstances makes it relatively easy 
to determine where a statement belongs. However, the reader 
will notice that some statements are repeated and related to 
different contexts in different chapters. 
One final problem is the risk of overstating the differences 
between the three aspects of the Russian response to the 
\Vestern bases in Central Asia. Some topics are simply more 
relevant in some settings than in others. For example, while 
Putin may naturally have preferred emphasising Russia's 
strategic decisions in favour of the West when addressing 
Western leaders, the advantages of the strategic decision for 
Russia was a more relevant topic in Russia, and the shared 
responsibilities of fighting terrorism in Central Asia seemed a 
more logical choice when meeting Central Asian leaders. Being 
aware of risks such as this makes it possible to manage them. 
Readers, too, will profit from taking this into consideration. 
18 FORSVARSSTUDJER 312005 
"A CRUCIAL Sl'HERE FOR OUR SECURIIY" 19 
Chapter 1 
Backgrou1I1d and context 
This chapter considers the background for the investigation 
and analysis. The topics considered are: 
• Russian policy in Central Asia before 9111; 
• the strategic and domestic contexts of Putin's decision to 
align with the West in the war on terrorism; 
• the development of the United States' strategic aims in Cen-
tral Asia and Central Asia in a strategic context. 
The chapter has no conclusion as such. Instead, this is an 
overall sketch of the situation surrounding Russia, Central 
Asia and the US before 11 September 2001 and functions as a 
brief introduction to Central Asia's wider strategic 
enVIronment. 
Russian policy in Central Asia before 9/11 
During the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was a 
conspicuous lack of Russian interest in the former Central 
Asian union republics. Other issues were more urgent. There 
was considerable confusion over what constituted Russian 
interests in Central Asia and how they should be implemented. 
When translating priorities into action, Russia could offer the 
Central Asian states relatively little compared with other 
possible actors because of Russia's limited economic and 
military resources. This tendency was exacerbated by a 
"powerful reluctance in Moscow to make material sacrifices 
for the sake of its CIS parrners".8 During the last years of the 
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Soviet Union, Moscow viewed Central Asia with its corrupt 
leaders as a burden. The Russian political elite was happier 
concentrating on Russia's own economy. An expectation that 
it would be easy to maintain Russia's influence in tbe region 
added to the general ambivalence. Nevertheless, Moscow 
viewed Central Asia as a region where Russia still had "special 
rights and obligations".9 As the ambivalence of the early 
1990s gave way to increasing interest in Moscow for Central 
Asia and its strategic position, there were persistent efforts 
leading to a Russian reengagement in the region. Initially, 
these efforts appeared a success, but faced with the growing 
competition for influence from other powers such as the 
United States and China, the foundations of Russia's position 
as a security guarantor were eroded. At the end of the 1990s, 
Russia's policy in Central Asia was characterised as one of 
involuntary disengagement.lO Russia's influence in Central 
Asia was waning relative to that of other powers, although it 
remained the strongest external power. Circumstances beyond 
Russian control, like other powers' engagement, were 
compounded by a Russian inability to formulate a policy 
attractive to the Central Asian states. 
The Central Asian governments, on their side, balanced 
Russia's influence with that of otber powers. Their 
possibilities for doing so increased greatly as plans for 
exploiting the oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Basin 
attracted Western and Asian governments and companies, 
especially from the United States and China, to Central Asia. 
No longer dependent solely on Russia for their security and 
economic development, Central Asia's leaders looked to other 
powers to diffuse Russian influence. The lack of Russian 
interest only served to create disillusionment with Moscow in 
the Central Asian capitals. 
8 Neil Malcolm and Alcx Pr:lvd:l, "Introduction," in Iltternal Factors ill 
Russian Foreign Polic)', Neil Malcolm et al (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/RIlA, 1996), pp. 1-32, 8. 
9 jaman, Vladimir Plltin and Central Asia, p. 44. 
10 Lcna laman, Russia and Central Asia. A New Web of Relalions 
(London: RIIA, 1998). 
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At the end of the 1990s, Russia's military engagement in 
Central Asia was concentrated in Tajikistan. There was a joint 
Russian-Tajik border guard service on the non-CIS borders of 
Tajikistan. l1 Also, the Russian 201" Motorised Rifle Division 
had its headquarters in Dushanbe, with detachments in Kuliab 
and Kurgan-Tiube. The Russian military engagement 
preserved political stability in Tajikistan, and was therefore 
important to the regime of President Imomali Rakhmonov. 
Tajikistan, the weakest of the Central Asian states, was in 
effect Russia's closest ally in the region. This was in itself an 
indication of Russia's weakness.12 
The first two years of Putin's presidency saw considerable 
changes in Russia's policy towards the Central Asian states. 
His first visit to a Central Asian country after his election as 
president waS to Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, in 
May 2000, which was in fact a follow-up to a highly profiled 
visit by then Prime Minister Putin to Tashkent in December 
1999. In the 1990s, Uzbekistan had pursued a foreign policy 
that was rather independent of Moscow. It was perceived as a 
relatively strong counterbalance to Russia within the CIS, 
especially where Central Asian affairs were concerned. Putin's 
visit to Tashkent was indicative of three elements in the new 
approach to Central Asia. Firstly, it no longer sufficed to have 
just Tajikistan as a close ally and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
as more ambivalent partners. To develop closer and more 
advantageous relations with Central Asia, it was necessary to 
pursue closer bilateral ties with all of the Central Asian states. 
Secondly, as a consequence of this, it was no longer a question 
of pursuing a blanket Central Asian policy through the 
framework of the CIS, as had been the case in the Yeltsin 
period. Putin preferred a combination of bilateral contacts and 
multilateral approaches specific to Central Asia. On the 
multilateral side, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty (CST) are 
11 I.e., on the borders with Afghanistan and China. 
11 Lcna 10nsoo, "Russia and Central Asia" in Central Asian Sect{rit)~ The 
New Illternational COl/text, edited by Ray AIIison and Lena Jonson 
(London: RIlA, 2(01), pp. 95-126, 109. 
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particularly applicable.13 On the bilateral side, close 
relationships and frequent meetings between the hcads of state 
became a staple feature of Russian-Central Asian bilateral 
relationships. In addition, Putin used multilateral summits to 
discuss bilateral relations, and made a point of meeting the 
Central Asian leaders separately on the sidelines of these 
summits. Thirdly, Putin used the terrorist threat as a rationale 
for security integration within the CIS, particularly so in 
Central Asia, and thus 'securitised' relations with the Central 
Asian states.14 
Putin's strategic decision 
By 2001, it was clear that on the strategic scene, Russia had 
two main goals in Central Asia: "to maintain regional 
stability, and to prevent 'outsiders' from gaining influence in 
the Central Asian states." 15 The decision to welcome US-
initiated bases in Central Asia represented a considerable step 
aside from this goal. However, one should not overestimate 
the degree to which Russia was in a position to prevent the 
Americans from deploying in Central Asia. As Bobo La points 
out, "Russian influence on the Central Asian states, though 
considerable, was not so great as to forestall an action that 
was manifestly in their best security interests.,,16 In supporting 
the establishment of Western bases in Central Asia, Putin 
made a virtue of necessity. 
In the context of a closer strategic relationship between 
Russia and the United States, Putin's decision served Russian 
interests rather well. It brought substance to the still new 
alignment with the US in the war on international terrorism. 
The relationship with the US remains the most important 
13 Armenia, Bclarus, Russia, Kazakhsran, Kyrgyzstan and Tnjikistan are 
the eST signatories. The treaty is also referred to as rhe Tashkcnt Treaty, 
as it was signed in Tashkcnt in 1992. Uzbckistan was one of the original 
signuwries but withdrew from the Treaty in 1999. 
14 jon500, Vladimir Putill and Central Asia, pp. 63-70; Wilhclmsen and 
F1ikke, "Copy That ... ", p~ 25. 
15 jansan, "Russia and Central Asia", p. 114. 
16 Lo, Vladill1iT Puli" and the EI'o/utiOll of Russian Foreign Policy, p. 82. 
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bilateral relationship of Russian foreign policy, and the 
decision thus made good sense. This applied even if the 
decision entailed downplaying Russian ambitions in Central 
Asia for the time being. I agree with Bobo La that Putin "did 
not so much make a 'strategic choice' in favour of the West, 
but took advantage of an extraordinary set of circumstances 
to pursue objectives that were already in place." One could 
even argue that from Putin's point of view, it was "America 
that was joining him in the fight against international 
terrorism.,,17 However, the Russian political elite viewed this 
strategic decision as a shift in emphasis, where priorities in 
Central Asia were explicitly being subordinated to the 
objective of developing a closer relationship with the United 
States. This is the background for using 'strategic decision' 
here to refer to Putin's ability to take advantage of the 
cirCUll1stances. 
Arguably, the decision to support Western bases in Central 
Asia could also be explained by Russia's goal of maintaining 
regional stability. Stability was constantly under threat by 
developments in Afghanistan, especially by the advance of the 
Taliban. Russia's repeated efforts, the last in May 2000, to 
attract support from the Central Asian states for air raids on 
Afghanistan, had failed. IS If the US-led coalition could oust 
the Taliban, nothing could serve Russian interests in Central 
Asia better. Indeed, if this meant that Russia in the futnre 
could spend its limited resources on its allies instead of its 
enemies, Russia's presence in the region could be boosted. 
However, Russia's other goal in Central Asia - excluding-
was also to a certain extent preserved in the new 
circumstances. Putin realised that the Americans would be 
coming to Central Asia no matter what he said. Islam 
Karimov's repeated offers of assistance to the Americans in 
the weeks before Operation Enduring Freedom could not be 
misread. With his explicit support for Western bases in 
17 Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and anti"terrorism", in What Russia sees, cd. 
Dov Lynch (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no. 74, 
2005), pp. 99-114, 104. 
18 See Jonson, "Russia and Central Asia", p.l13. 
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Central Asia Putin was making it clear that Russia was 
claiming a leading role in Central Asia. This meant that Russia 
would have to be consulted on security issues in the future as 
well. Instead of letting Russia be overrun by the developments, 
Putin's decision brought Russia closer to being recognised in 
the future as a key power in Central Asia. 
Putin's decision in the Russian context 
Central Asia had not been a very prominent topic in 
discussions about Russian foreign policy before 2001. Policy 
toward the region was largely the preserve of military and 
security officials. Correspondingly, public interest rested 
mainly with what I shall refer to as a "military-security 
constituency". This military-security constituency consists of 
several groups, the most obvious group being the members 
and veterans of the armed services. Those affiliated with the 
defence-industrial complex also have a considerable interest in 
foreign policy. The term 'security' has also been included 
because under Putin members of the security services have 
become increasingly included in the political elite and as 
policymakers, with interests in foreign policy close to those of 
the military elites.19 To the extent that there was any 
discussion about Central Asia, it was largely framed within a 
geopolitical worldview, in which the former Soviet Union, for 
most of the 1990s the "near abroad", was seen as a Russian 
sphere of influence. This was consistent with the emphasis 
placed on the former Soviet Union within the world view of 
pragmatists and conservatives in Russia, and consistent with 
the emphasis placed on geopolitics in the world view of the 
military-security constituency. Conservatives are here seen as 
being favourably disposed towards a strong Russian influence 
in the CIS, while pragmatists are in favour of developing 
Russia's ties with its neighbours if this has a positive influence 
on Russia itself. This distinguished their view on foreign 
policy from that of liberal westernisers, who focused on 
19 Olga Kryshranovskaia, AlIiltomiia rossiiskoi eJity [Anatomy of the 
Russian Elite] (Moscow: Zakharov, 2005 (2004)), pp. 264-279. 
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integration with the West. Westernisers were not interested in 
the former Soviet Union as a special case in Russian foreign 
policy, and advocated that the CIS states should occupy rather 
little space in overall Russian foreign policy.2D In this way, 
Russia's relations with the former Soviet Union were a topic 
that divided the political elite from the outset. 
Increasingly throughout the 1990s, policymaking in the CIS 
was left to those who supported the idea of a Russian sphere 
of interests in the CIS. Under Putin, disagreements on foreign 
policy, similar to other disagreements, were not as vocal or 
politicised as had been the case under Boris Yeltsin. In Putin's 
first period as president, a pragmatic foreign policy line meant 
that one could speak of a consensus around the need for better 
relations with the West and a more active policy in the CIS. 
Nevertheless, the basic disagreements between those who 
favoured closer relations with the West and those who 
prioritised relations with the CIS remained unresolved. It 
remained one of the basic, latent, foreign policy disagreements 
within the Russian political elite.21 Accordingly, when Putin 
chose a strategic alignment with the West in the campaign 
against terror, this was a potentially controversial decision to 
the Russian political elite. 
us strategic goals in Central Asia 
American policy in Central Asia from the mid-1990s 
developed out of a set of ambitious goals that were all 
connected to the promotion of the independence of the 
Central Asian states as well as their integration into the 
international political community and the world economy.22 
However, considerations connected to the important energy 
20 Adapted from Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Thinking'" in flltcmo/ 
Factors;1I Russia1l Foreign Polic)" Neil Malcolm et ai, pp. 33-100. 
These concepts are still useful. Although conservatism, pragmatism and 
the liberal westernisecs in foreign policy in Russia have developed since 
the 1990s, the heritage of this period is clearly discernible in the debate 
even today. 
21 Cf. Hobo Lo, Rllssiml Foreign Polic), in the Post-Soviet Era. Realit)'. 
IlIusio1l and Mytbmakil1g (London: Palgravc Macmillan. 2002). pp. 21-
23. 
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resources of the Caspian Basin shaped how policy was 
conducted. Towards the end of the 1990s, involvement in the 
exploitation and transport of these resources in itself became 
an US policy objective. The American energy engagement in 
practise received a higher priority than the other US goals in 
the region. By the end of the century, the US had a substantial 
engagement in Central Asia, with a clearly strategic profile. 
However, it was not clear how this engagement would 
develop in the future. For one thing, in spite of the substantial 
engagement, there was also a pronounced gap between 
objectives and rhetoric on the one side, and a lack of focus 
and commitment towards the region on the other. A decrease 
in US engagement seemed just as likely a development as a 
strengthening of the American presence in the region. 
The events of 11 September 2001 radically changed the 
American approach to Central Asia. The significant increase 
in the US engagement even extended to underwriting regional 
security structures. The emphasis on Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan as the primary axes for conducting American 
policy in the region was on the one hand broadened through 
a more active relationship with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
while the focus in the war on terrorism now concentrated on 
Uzbekistan, which was already a main US collaborator on 
terrorism from 1998 onwards. The tendency towards a 
strategic view of the region had in fact been pronounced in 
American policymaking before 2001, but from 2001 onwards, 
22 Sec Robert Lcgvold, "V.S. Poljcy Toward Kazakhsran n in Thillking 
Stmtegical/y. The AIajor Powers, Ka:wkbstan. and the CC11lral Asian 
Nexus, cd. Robert Lcgvold (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences/MIT Press, 2003), pp. 67-106, 83. Lcgvold quotes the 
following sources of US policy in Central Asia (in fn. 21): James Collins, 
"The United States and the Caucasus States: Working Together Toward 
Constructive Cooperative Development". Dispatcb. vol. 7, no. 45 {4 
November 1996J; Strobe Talbott, "A Farewell to F1asnman: American 
Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia", Dispatch, vo!. 8, no. 6 (21 
July 1997); Stephen Sestanovich, "Testimony Before the International 
Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress", and Donald Pressley, 
"Testimony Before the International Relations Committee of the V.S. 
Congress", both 30 April 1998; Step hen Sestanovich, "'Testimony Before 
the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the International Relations Committee 
of the V.S. Congress", 17 March 1999. 
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there was even more emphasis on the military and security 
sides of US policy23 Arguably, the American focus on Central 
Asia also narrowed. While the primary objectives of American 
policy in the region by 2001 had been increasingly shaped, 
and partially overshadowed, by the energy considerations in 
the Caspian Basin, the war on terrorism once again changed 
the weighting of us priorities. This could be seen in the 
particular emphasis given to energy security from 2001 
onwards. While this concept had been central to US policy in 
Central Asia before, after 9/11 it was seen as a part of the war 
. '4 on terronsm.~ 
The basis of the American engagement in Central Asia 
from September 2001 was a comprehensive military presence. 
The most visible aspect of this presence was the two bases, 
one American in Uzbekistan, and one coalition base in 
Kyrgyzstan. In addition, airstrips in Tajikistan were used for 
refuelling aircraft, and airspace in all countries except 
Turkmenistan was used in the humanitarian side of the 
operation. This came in addition to the military cooperation 
with the West prior to 9/11, e.g. the Central Asian Battalion's 
(Centrasbat) exercises under NATO's auspices, and American 
military assistance to the Central Asian countries. In addition, 
US aid to all the Central Asian states and to regional 
programmes increased substantially in 2001 and 2002.25 Via 
the increase in military presence, the US presence, policy and 
plans in Central Asia had acquired a thoroughly strategic 
character. 
23 On the period up to 2001 Scc also Stcphen Blank, "'The United States 
and Central Asia" in Celltral Asian SeC1lrit)~ cds. AlIison and Jonson, pp. 
127-151. 
24 On the use of 'energy security' in connection with American policies in 
the region before 9/11, sec Lcgvold, "U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan", 
p. 86. For the place of energy security within the US National Security 
Strategy, sec "The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America", September 2002, pp. 19-20. 
25 Total us assistance to all the Central Asian countries was in the fiscal 
year of 2002408 miJlion US dollars, while in the fiscal year of 2001 it 
was 244.2 million US dollars. For a breakdown and details, see "U.S. 
Assistance to the Countries of Central Asia (Taken Question)", available 
onlinc. 
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Central Asia in a strategic context 
For Central Asia's leaders, the challenges of balancing foreign 
policy changed with 9/11. Before 9/11, the problems of 
maintaining a balance between Russia and China and also 
between these two powers and the United States resulted in 
quite different strategic choices among the region's leaders. 
Kazakhstan tried to seek security from Russia and China. In 
addition, Kazakhstan maintained active membership in several 
international organisations with Russian and/or Chinese 
participation, in what seemed to be a strategy to diffuse the 
power of the two external powers.26 The rationale was that if 
regional security was an issue mainly in multilateral settings, 
neither Russia nor China could act unilaterally or overrun the 
interests of the Central Asian states. Kazakhsran's president, 
Nursultan Nazarhaev, also saw the existence of regional 
organisations with a broad membership as a mechanism to 
minimise the potential for rivalry between Russia and China 
in Central Asia. Turkmenistan chose the opposite and isolated 
itself in inflexible neutrality. After the end of the civil war in 
1997 Tajikistan was wholly dependent on Russia and its 
military presence there for its internal stability and external 
security. Kyrgyzstan was largely dependent on Russia for its 
security in the 1990s, and maintained close relations with 
Russia even after 2000. The Kyrgyz relationship to Russia 
under Askar Akaev was epitomised by the expression "Russia 
was given to us by God and by history" .27 President Akaev, 
aiming at avoiding confrontation, also kept a friendly, 
forthcoming line towards China. This was for example evident 
in late 2002, when the Kyrgyz government transferred 
approximately 950 square kilometres of territory to China to 
resolve a long-running border dispute.28 In the 1990s, only 
26 Lcgvold, "U.S. I10licy Toward Kazakhstan", p. 89. 
27 Askar Akaev, Trudllaia doroga k dcmokratii (Pamiatnoc desiatiletie) 
[The Difficult Rond to Democracy (A Memorable DccadeJI (Mu~l;uw: 
Me:rbdunarodnyc otnoshcniia, 2002). 
28 Tajikistan also transferred approximately 1000 square kilometres of 
rerritory to China under pressure from Beijing in May 2002. John C. K. 
Daly, "Sino-Kyrgyz relations after the Tulip Revolution", Asiall 
Research China Brief, 7 June 2005. 
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Uzbekistan chose in favour of the United States, with 
participation in the group of CIS states that acted 
independently of Russia, GUUAM, the Transport Corridor 
Europe-Caucasus-Central-Asia (TRACECA) and in close 
military cooperation with the US.29 
In the late 1990s, Central Asia's leaders increasingly looked 
to Moscow as Vladimir Putin developed a more active Russian 
policy, while the United States seemed to be decreasing its 
engagement in Central Asia. This changed with 9111. The 
aftermath of 9111 improved the strategic possibilities of 
Central Asia's leaders. All the Central Asian states, with the 
exception of Turkmenistan, enjoyed a closer relationship with 
the US in the war on terrorism, and with the Russian-
American alignment in this campaign, the danger of 
antagonising Russia decreased. China was negative to the 
Western bases in Central Asia, but as long as the Chinese 
leadership agreed on the need to fight terrorism, the Central 
Asian leaders could balance their strategic choices more freely. 
The main positive consequence of the war on terrorism, the 
fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, was duly appreciated by the 
region's leaders, as epitomised in Islam Karimov's statement: 
"The United States did for us what our partners in the CIS 
could not do" .30 Operation Enduring Freedom radically 
improved the security situation and the potential for stability 
in the region. Apart from this, the American engagement first 
and foremost brought economic advantages. This highlighted 
how difficult it was for Russia ro compete economically with 
the United States on investment and economic support to the 
Central Asian states. In addition, the US positioned itself as a 
credible, and perhaps more effective, security guarantor than 
Russia immediately after 9/11. This was realised in Russia as 
well as in Central Asia.31 When it came to competing with the 
United States for influence in Central Asia, large parts of the 
29 Uzhekistan was a member of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, U7.bekistan. 
Azcrbaijan, Moldova) from 1999 to June 2002, when it suspended its 
membership in the organisation. 
30 Viktoriia Panfilova and Armen Khanbabian, "'Pucrushcv, Totskii i 
Ramsfeld sovershaiur palomnichestvo" [Patrushev, Totskii and 
Rumsfeld carry out a pilgrimage], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 April 2002. 
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Russian elite were convinced that once other powers, meaning 
the United States, had been "let in", a lack of resources would 
limit Russia's possibilities to maintain a sphere of influence in 
Central Asia, indeed in the CIS as a whole.32 Western interest 
in principle also entailed more pressure to democratise, 
observe human rights and open up for foreign influence. But 
in practise, the renewed attention from Moscow, and 
Washington's prioritisation of the war on terrorism, gave 
Central Asia's leaders considerable leeway and shielded them 
from unwanted scrutiny. 
To the two other external powers with important interests 
in Central Asia, Russia and China, the considerable increase in 
the Western military presence after 9/11 was a source of 
concern. The most worrying aspect of it was that it was 
dominated and led by the United States. The uncertainties 
surrounding the US presence - its duration, American strategic 
aims, and its bearings on regional patterns of conflict and 
cooperation - were particularly problematic in Moscow and 
Beijing. The American official positions on these issues were 
intentionally unspeciiied, because the war on terrorism was an 
open-ended, global campaign, against a "particularly elusive 
enemy" .33 The American vagueness waS also connected to the 
prominence of the war on terrorism in US security policy. As 
long as the war on terrorism was the prism through which 
foreign policy was cond ucted, other objectives in Central Asia 
were put on hold. It was therefore difficult to conceive of how 
31 See Irina D. Z\'iagelskaia and Dmitrii V. Makarov, "Vospriiatie Rossiei 
politiki Zapada v Tscntralnoi Azii" [Russia's Perception of Western 
Policy in Central Asia] in /uzbll)'i (lollg SNG. Tselltralllaia A:dia - Kaspii 
- Kavkaz: Voz1/lozlmosti i LI)'ZOUy dUa Rossii [The Southern Flank of the 
CIS. Central Asia - the Caspian Sea - the Caucasus: Possibilities and 
Challenges for Russia], cds. Mikhail M. Narinskii and Artcm V. Malgin 
(Moscow: Logos, 2003), pp. 103-127, 115-116. 
32 Cf. Vasilii Streltsov, "Gwziia, kotoruiu my poreriali'" [Georgia that wc 
lost], Nezaoisimaia gazeta, 20 February 2002; Artem Vcrnidub, "Putin 
pozhelal udachi amerikantsam v Gruzij'" [Putin wished the Americans 
luck in Georgia], Gazeta.m, 1 March 2002; Mikhail Khodarenok, 
"'Starshego brata' sdali za milliard dollarov'" [They sold their cider 
brother for a billion dollars], NeZDl'isimoe IloemlOe obozrwle, 8 
February 2002. 
33 "The National Security Strategy ... ", p. 5. 
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such objectives would be interpreted and prioritised in the 
future. US, and by extension, Western military presence in 
Central Asia was required as long as it was needed to stabilise 
Afghanistan and perhaps for longer if this was considered 
necessary. In the war on terrorism, Russia was seen as a 
"partner". The view of China as a "strategic competitor", 
while somewhat downplayed in the campaign, was still 
valid.34 Accordingly, Moscow did not exclud the possibility 
that that the US military presence in Central Asia could be 
used at some stage to deter China. Because the American 
military presence was added to the already strong US energy 
interests in the region, neither did Russian observers exclude 
the possibility of a heightened level of friction with Russia. 
The concernS around how the US would relate to potential 
conflicts and the future development of the region were acute 
in Russia as well as in China. No matter how the relationship 
between the major external powers developed, their long-term 
objectives for the development of the region were bound to 
differ. 
34 Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest", Foreign Affairs, 
79, 1 Uanuary/February 2000): 45-62, 56; Gcorgc W. Bush, "Remarks 
by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United Stares 
Military Academy (West Poim, New York)", 1 June 2002; "'The 
National Security Strategy ... ", pp. 26-17. 
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Chapter 2 
The first weeks after 9/11 
In the period from 9111 to the Crawford summit in November 
2001, many Russian foreign policy choices had to be made 
quickly. No choice was minor, because the Russian and 
international interest around the further course of Russian 
foreign policy was high. Russian comments and statements on 
this policy attracted interest as well. Except for the defence 
and foreign ministers, government members were reluctant to 
make statements before tbe president had outlined the Russian 
engagement in the campaign. General denouncements of 
international terrorism were of course an exception, and such 
denouncements naturally resembled each other. The official 
response to the changed international situation, and in 
particular the prospect of Western bases in Central Asia, was 
in the process of being formed. 
During the first few days after 11 September 2001, the 
basic lines of Russia's official response to the new 
international situation emerged in speeches and statements 
from Putin and a few other key Russian officials. Like most 
world leaders, Putin commented on the attacks on New York 
and Washington with sympathy for the victims and support 
for the American people. The Russian response was especially 
welcomed in the West at the time. It was swift enough to set 
the tone for other leaders, not least the leaders of the CIS 
states. The message was simple, with offers of assistance to 
find and punish those responsible for the attacks. This 
response came on 11 September, first in a telegram to George 
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W. Bush, and then in a telephone conversation with the 
national security adviser, Condolcczza Rice. The quick 
reaction underlined the sincerity of Putin's statement. Russia 
and the United States now shared a strategic goal in the 
campaign against international terrorism, and this brought a 
new dimension into the bilateral relationship. 
Russia's initial response to 9/11 
The central topics of Russia's early response were 
• Offers of sympathy and support for the United States, both 
in the United States (aid, emergency assistance), and on an 
international scale. This last point concerned both assist-
ance to find and punish those responsible, and Russian sup-
port for international cooperation against terrorism; 
• The global nature of international terrorism. This topic had 
two elements. Firstly, Russian statements stressed the need 
for cooperative and internationally recognised retaliation of 
the attacks. Secondly, Russian statements explicitly linked 
the war in Chechnya to international terrorism. Links 
between Chechen separatist groups and the AI-Qaida net-
work were played up. 
• The common strategic goals of Russia and the West, namely 
to fight international terrorism. 
These topics reflected the general line in Putin's foreign policy. 
A good relationship with the West had a high priority, and the 
cornerstone here was a constructive approach to the United 
States. At the same time, Russia did not favour unilateral 
action by the United States, neither in the retaliation after 11 
September nor in other issues, for example National Missile 
Defense (NMD). The emphasis Putin placed on common 
strategic goals, as well as on the need for a UN-led retaliation, 
were connected to this distrust of American unilateralism. The 
link between international terrorism and the war in Chechnya 
reflected one of the priorities of Russia's foreign policy since 
the start of the second war in Chechnya - avoiding or 
softening international criticism of the war. And indeed, as 
Russia aligned with the West in the war on terrorism, criticism 
from the West did become more muted. 
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Putin took the leading role in communicating Russia's 
position in the changed international situation. However, 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov 
and various other Russian officials also made statements 
similar to Putin's in the first few days after the attacks. The 
Russian response was not only directed towards the United 
States, but towards the West as a whole. Russia proposed a 
joint resolution in the Permanent Joint Council of NATO and 
Russia condemning the attacks and declaring the 
determination of both NATO and Russia not to let those 
responsible for the attacks go unpunished. This resolution was 
adopted on 13 September. 
Participants in the Russian debate on foreign policy 
commented on the attacks on New York and Washington 
with shock and sympathy, but also with some uncertainty 
about the future that displayed considerable anxiety about the 
American retaliation. Their comments also reflected some of 
Putin's priorities, especially caution about American 
unilateralism, and links to the war in Chechnya.35 This 
indicated that Putin had domestic support for some elements 
of his policy towards the West. But Russia's alignment with 
the West in the war on terrorism attracted varied comments. 
The issue was contentious. It remained to be seen whether the 
Russian elites had been convinced by Putin's alignment with 
the West, and whether they would support this policy in the 
longer run.36 
35 This included allegations: by the general procurator, VJaclimir Ustinov, 
that Moscow possessed convincing evidence of Chccbcn rebels going 
through military training in Afghan camps financed by Osama bin 
Laden, and similar statements by other official sources. See Armen 
Khanbabian and Igor Rotar, "Vas bornbiJi, \'Y i voiuite" [You were 
bombed, so you should go to war], Nczal!isimaia ga:::.cta, 18 September 
2001; RFE/RL Ncwslinc, 20 September 2001. 
36 Scc Dmitri Trcnin, '"Through Russian Eyes and Minds. Post-9/11 
Percep,ions of America and its Policies" in Visions of America alld 
Europe, eds. Christina V. Balis and Simon Scrfaty (Washington DC: CSIS 
Press, Significant Issues Series, 2004). 
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US bases in Central Asia 
The issue of Central Asia's place in the operation to retaliate 
against AI-Qaida entered into the Russian-American 
relationship very SOon after the attacks. The New York Post 
on 14 September reported that former Soviet military bases in 
Central Asia could be used for the American retaliatory 
operations against AI-Qaida.3? Similar reports soon appeared 
in other Western and Russian media. Also on 14 September, 
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov ruled out this 
possibility, referring to the Central Asian states' obligations 
towards the Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent Treaty).38 
The treaty would allegedly make NATO operations in Central 
Asia impossible.39 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) on the other hand denied that any information about 
the use of bases in Central Asia had been received.40 But 
Washington did not deny that it had approached Moscow and 
some of the Central Asian governments with requests to use 
the bases. Sergei Ivanov's statement, combined with the 
apparent Russian unwillingness to let the US deploy in Central 
Asia, compared unfavourably with Putin's initial reaction. It 
also cast doubt on Russia's support for the campaign that was 
beginning to take shape. 
Statements by officials in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
indicated that the Americans first and foremost wanted access 
to bases and airspace in those countries. On 14 September, 
Tajikistan's prime minister, Oqil Oqilov, stated that any US 
requests for its airspace or territory would be discussed with 
Moscow before responding.41 But the prime minister was 
37 See Niles Lathem, "U.$. May Sock Bin Laden From Russian Bases"', 
Ne/{) York Post, 14 September 2001. 
38 The defence minister failed to mention that this applied only to 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, as Uzbckistan was not a party 
to the Collective Security Treaty. 
39 "Sergei h'anov on'erg vozmozhnost apreatsii NATO oa tcrritorii 
srcdncaziatskikh gosudarstv SNG" [Scrgei Ivanov rejects the possibility 
of NATO operations on the territories of the Central Asian states of 
CIS), strana.ru, 14 September 2001. 
40 Dmitri Safonov, "Soglasie molchat" [Consenting to silence], Izllcstiia, 
16 September 2001. 
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positive to the prospect of Tajik assistance to a war On 
terrorism.42 This was generally received as a confinnation that 
a request had indeed been received in Dushanbe. Later 
statements from Dushanbe were more equivocal on the issue 
of whether a request had been received. For example, the 
Tajik MFA first vehemently denied that a request had been 
received, but later stated that its previous statement was not 
meant as a 'no' to all assistance to the campaign43 
Uzbekistan's reaction was less hesitant. A spokesman for 
Uzbekistan's foreign ministry on 17 September said that 
Uzbekistan would consider making its bases available to the 
United States if asked. Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov 
repeated this.44 Tashkent followed this line in the next days, 
but generally refused ro comment on landings of US airplanes 
until the start of operations on 6 October. In mid-September, 
official comments from Kyrgyzstan's government concerned 
fears for destabilisation in Central Asia, as well as offers of 
general support and assistance in providing intelligence to the 
United States.45 At this point, the issue of support and 
assistance from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the coming 
operations in Afghanistan was much higher on the American 
agenda than assistance from Kyrgyzstan. 
Russian reactions to US plans in Central Asia 
Between 14 and 23 September, Russian officials issued 
conflicting statements about Western use of Central Asian 
airbases. It was clear that the issue of how to approach the 
American request to use Central Asian bases and airspace was 
41 RFE/RL Ncwslille, 17 September 1001. 
42 "Arab na Arneriku. Mncniia: Ral Tsenrralnoi Azii" [Attack on 
America. Opinions: the role of Central Asia], Radio Svoboda, 20 
September 200!. 
43 RFElRL Nelllslillc, 18 September 2001; Lidia lsamova, "Tajikistan: 
Won't Allow Afghan Attacks", AP, 16 September 2001; "Tadzhikistall 
vvrazil gotovoost sotrudnichar s SShA v batbe s tcrrori'lmom" 
[Tajikisran expresses readiness to cooperate with the US in the war 
against terrorism], stralW.ru, 17 September 2001. 
44 RFE/RL Newslille, 18 September 2001; "Arab na Amcriku ... " 
45 RFE/RL Newslille, 18 and 19 September 2001. 
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being considered, and that Russian policymakers disagreed 
among themselves. Sergei Ivanov's statement on 14 September 
clearly reflected that he was against letting the Americans use 
Central Asian bases in operations against AI-Qaida. It could 
also be seen as a warning to the Central Asian states and the 
US to consult Russia before any decision was made. If this was 
the case, one likely aim was for Moscow to become a 
mediator between the Central Asian states and the US through 
Russia's military agreements and treaties with the countries. 
Any such hopes were crushed as the United States' 
government preferred to rely on direct contact with the 
Central Asian states in the days that followed. Ivanov's 
statement was in line with a widespread opinion within the 
Russian military bureaucracy. However, with the volatile 
international situation at this moment, the statement was seen 
abroad as a sign that the Russian government could not decide 
how to approach the prospect of Western bases in Central 
Asia. 
From 15 to 17 September there were few official Russian 
comments on the issue of American use of bases in Central 
Asia. The Moscow press speculated that the Russian 
government would exercise a veto over NATO or American 
use of Central Asian bases, especially in Tajikistan.46 One 
indication that this could indeed be the case was a visit to the 
Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) by the Security 
Council secretary, Vladimir Rushailo, on 18-21 September.47 
During his meetings with the presidents and other officials in 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it seems Rushailo tried 
to convince them that allowing the United States to use their 
bases for operarions against Afghanistan was tantamount to 
exposing themselves to being bombed by the Taliban. 
Rushailo further underlined that Russia, unlike the United 
States, would unfailingly protect the Central Asian states for a 
46 RFE/RL News/hIe, 20 September 2001; Khanbabian and Rotar, "Vas 
bombili ... "; Arkadii Duhnov, "Bazovyi vopras" [The base question], 
\Tremia l1ovostei, 18 September 2001. 
47 Some observers even suggested that Rushailo's visit to Central Asia was 
prompted by the readiness displayed by Uzbckistan's government to 
support the ami-terrorist coalition, sce" Ataka na Amcriku ... " 
"A CRUCIAl, SPHERE FOR OUR SECURITY" 39 
long time, and not only for the duration of a single military 
campaign.48 Following Rushailo's visit, Tajikistan's 
government withdrew its offer of airspace and bases to the 
United States, while Uzbekistan's government stated that it 
had not yet committed itself.49 
This and other official statements indicated that Tashkent's 
decision depended more on its own president and 
government's assessment of the situation than on Moscow's 
views. Formally as well, Uzbekistan was not obliged towards 
Russia to the same extent as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, due to 
its non-participation in the Collective Security Treaty. 
Uzbekistan may even have tried to use the volatile 
international situation to improve its own position in Central 
Asia.50 Tajikistan was clearly not able to make any decision 
about support for the anti-terrorist coalition independently of 
Moscow, because stability in the country depended on 
Moscow's political and military support.51 Meanwhile, 
Kyrgyzstan's authorities were still waiting to see how the 
situation would develop. 
'Yes' without ambiguity 
On 18 September the Russian foreign minister went to 
Washington to discuss the war on terrorism with President 
Bush, the secretary of state, Colin Powell, and the national 
security adviser. The first result from these talks came on 19 
September when Igor Ivanov said that every member state in 
the CIS was free to decide for itself whether to make their 
bases available for third countries or alliances.52 This was the 
first official Russian statement to this effect, and was 
undoubtedly issued on Putin's instructions. The next day, at a 
48 lurii Chemogacv, "Vladimir Rushailo zamiril Tscntralnuiu Aziiu" 
[Vladimir Rushailo pacifies Central Asia], Kommersal1t, 22 September 
2001. 
49 Chernogacv, "Vladimir Rushailo zamiril ... "; RFE/RL Newslinc, 21 
September 2001; "Ataka na Arncriku ... " 
50 "Ataka on Amcriku ... " 
51 1bid. 
52 RFEIRL NcU'siinc, 20 September 2001. 
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meeting with George W. Bush, Ivanov was informed that the 
United States only needed Russia's cooperation, not its active 
participation in the anti-terrorist operations.53 
Putin consulted intensively with his closest securiry advisers 
before and after Ivanov's statement. That the states in the 
former Soviet Union were indeed free to decide for themselves 
whether to allow US bases on their territory was confirmed by 
Putin on 21 September, in an interview with German 
television.54 At last, the president himself had clarified 
Russia's position regarding US bases in Central Asia. In the 
next few days, he emphasised and elaborated Russia's position 
on this issue, and repeatedly discussed it with President Bush 
and the presidents of the Central Asian states.S5 He also held 
a full-day meeting, only interrupted by a phone conversation 
with the American president, with key government officials on 
22 September at his residence in Sochi.56 The meeting was 
unprecedented in the number and breadth of participating 
securiry officials and the extent of consultation was 
uncharacteristic of Putin's policymaking style. The 
extraordinary character of the decisions to be made at this 
point was further underlined the following Monday when 
Putin, before appearing before the Russian public on television 
with the Russian programme in the anti-terrorist campaign, 
53 RFElRL NCUlS/i1tC, 21 September 1001. 
S4 RFElRL News/illc, 24 September 2001. 
55 Yuri Zarakhovich, "Russia Joins Coalition"', Time, 23 September 2001. 
56 The participants were Vladimir Rushailo, Sergei lvanov, Minister for 
Internal Affairs Boris Gryzlov, Minister for Emergency Situations Serge; 
Shoigu, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai 
Parmshev, General Procurator VJadimir Ustinov, the general director of 
the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information 
(FAPSI), Vladimir Matiukhin, deputy head of the General Staff, Valentin 
Korabclnikov, first deputy head of the General Staff, Iurii Baluevskii, 
Federal Border Service Director Konstanrin Totskii, the director of the 
Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergei Lebedev, and First Deputy Foreign 
Minister Viacheslav Trubnikov. The head of the General Staff, Anatalii 
Kvashnin, and the head of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre, Valerii 
Vcrchagin, were in Dushanbe at the time, meeting not only Tajikisran's 
president, Imomali Rakhmonav, but also with the new military leader of 
the Afghan Northern Alliance, Mohammad Fakhimkhan. 
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consulted the members of the State Council, the heads of 
chamhers in the Federal Assembly, and the Duma's faction 
leaders. 
In Sochi, only a small minority of the participants 
supported Putin's alignment with the West and consent to 
Western military bases in Central Asia. Bnt Pntin maintained 
his line, The resulting compromise between the Russian 
policymakers stopped short of Rnssian military participation 
in the Afghan campaign - an important point for the top 
military policymakers - and of offensive US operations out of 
Central Asia - a point emphasised by Central Asian leaders.s7 
The five points of the Russian programme as outlined by Pntin 
in a nationwide broadcast on 24 September were: 
1 Active international cooperation among intelligence agen-
cies. Russia has made available and will continue to offer 
the information it possesses about the terrorists' infrastruc-
ture, whereabouts and their training bases; 
2 [T]he opening of Russian airspace to airplanes with human-
itarian cargo to the area of the anti-terror operation; 
3 We have coordinated our position with our Central Asian 
allies. They share our view, and are ready to open their air-
bases to the coalition; 
4 Russian participation, if necessary, in international search 
and rescue operations in Afghanistan; 
5 We are broadening our cooperation with the Afghan Rab-
bani government [the Northern Alliance's government], and 
will contribute additional militaIT aid to his forces, includ-
ing weapons and arms supplies.s 
Putin also underlined that other forms of participation could 
be considered at a later point, and once more emphasised that 
the war in Chechnya was part of the international campaign 
against terror. 
The phrasing of the third point placed in a positive light the 
extent to which Moscow had influenced the decisions of the 
Central Asian governments. It gave Moscow an active role in 
57 Cf.lonson, Vladimir Plttin and Celttral Asia, p. 84-86. 
58 Vladimir Purin, "Zaiavlenie Prczidcnta Rossii" [Statement of the 
President of Russia], 24 September 2001. 
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persuading the Central Asian governments to cooperate with 
the coalition. It gave no indication that the Central Asian 
governments could have chosen to do so independently of 
Moscow. The rather vague phrase concerning the Central 
Asian bases was nevertheless the most remarkable part of the 
programme. In the period that followed, it became the only 
one of the five points above that was widely disputed in 
Russian society and in the Russian political elite. 
A serious and long term presence 
The governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan allowed the US 
Air Force the use of their territories on 24 September, and 
Kyrgyzstan opened its airspace to the coalition a day later. As 
early as 22 September, two US cargo airplanes and 100 
military personnel had landed near Tashkent, although 
Uzbekistan's government officially denied this.59 The landing 
would hardly have taken place without President Putin 
knowing and accepting it, although he would not have been 
asked for approval, as Uzbekistan was not a signatory to the 
Collective Security Treaty. 
The US and Western engagement in Central Asia grew in 
October and November. This was accompanied by extensive 
Russian-American cooperation on intelligence in Afghanistan. 
By early December, the Western presence was extensive, and it 
reached its peak in mid-2002. The coalition used airspace in 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. There were significant 
humanitarian and support operations out of Tajikistan from 
October 2001 to April 2002, and the US secured landing 
rights in the country60 In Uzbekistan, the coalition was 
allowed to use and develop an airbase at Kokaidy and a larger 
base at Khanabad (the Khanabad-Karshy, or K2 Base). The 
Khanabad Base was established under the US Central 
Command (CENTCOM). In early December, the coalition 
was allowed to use Manas airport outside the Kyrgyz capital 
59 RFEIRL NCflISliIlC, 24 and 25 September 2001. For an account of the 
official Uzbck secrecy surrounding the arrival on 6 October 2001 of US 
troops in Uzbekistan, sce Lutz KJcvcman, The New Great Game. Blood 
and Oil ilt Central Asia (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 165. 
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(the Manas or Ganci Base). The Manas Base was developed 
for coalition use in December and January. The Western 
presence on the ground was complemented by a US overflight 
agreement with Kazakhstan. In early 2002 there were about 
1500 US military personnel in Uzbekistan. At the Manas Base, 
there were around 2000 troops. These were mostly 
Americans, but there were also troops from Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, South Korea, Spain and Turkey.61 
The US military deployment on the grollnd in Central Asia 
was accompanied by a commitment to engage. This was 
emphasised by the assistant secretary of state for European 
and Eurasian Affairs, Elizaherh Jones, in a testimDny befDre 
the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 December 
2001 where she said, "We are en~aging - seriously and for the 
long term - with Central Asia". - 'Seriollsly and for the long 
term' consequently became a catch phrase in the Russian 
debate about the Western military deployment in Central 
Asia. It also had repercussions in the Russian-American 
relationship, and influenced Russian policies in Central Asia. 
60 This included eight US Air Force 5-130 military cargo airplanes 
stationed in Dushanhe by early 2002, see Pavel Pushkin, "'Tajikisran 
begins cooperation with NATO", \VPS Dc{cllse and Security Report, no. 
191,8 March 2002. There were also operations out of Kuliab, but it 
was decided not to set up a Western base there because the former Soviet 
base was in a poor condition, sce Wasbington Post 9 February 2002; 
quoted in Henry Pbrcr-Zybcrk, K)'rgyzston - FoCtlsillg Oil Sewrity 
(Camber Icy: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, 2003). Other airfields, e.g. Khujand and Kurgan~ 
Tiube, were evaluated for use in November 2001, but were not put to 
use in Operation Enduring Freedom. This was probably due to their 
being in a state of disrepair. Around 300 Western troops participated in 
the operations by February 2002. 
61 The Manas Base housed in mid~2002 12 F~ 18 Hornet, 6 Mirage 2000D, 
aiHo-nir refuelers and strategic airlift. See I)later~Zyberk, Kyrgyzstan -
Focllsillg 011 Sect/rit)" p. 11, who quotes strana.nl 5 December 2002 and 
APMC en /igne, 14 November 2002. In 1005, the Manas Base had been 
reduced to around 800 US troops and 100 Spanish troops. The base at 
Khanabad was leased to the US for a period of 25 years. 
62 A. Elizabeth Jones, "Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus", 13 
December 2001. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of the 
formation of Russia's response to the changed international 
situation, and especially to the establishment of a Western 
military presence in Central Asia. I have emphasised how 
there were considerable doubts in the political elite before an 
unambiguous strategic alignment was established between 
Russia and the United States. This is important to the 
discussion. Substantial parts of the political elite remained 
unconvinced abour the strategic alignment even after it had 
been established. As regards Russian policy in Central Asia, it 
was clear that the United States would deploy in the region 
regardless of Russia's position on the issue. However, Russia's 
signals were listened to in Central Asia, as was evident from 
the conflicting statements made by Central Asia's governments 
during the last two weeks of September 2001 on the possible 
Western deployment in Central Asia. 
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Chapter 3 
Russia's reactions to the West 
From Putin's televised speech on 24 September, Russia and the 
United States were unequivocally aligned in the war on 
terrorism. On 26 September 2001, Putin made a speech in the 
German Bundestag that paved the way for a closer alignment 
between Russia and the West in general, including NATO.63 
The most important consequence of this alignment was the 
founding of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002. Another 
consequence, perhaps the main concession from the US to 
Russia in the war on terrorism, was a marked down playing 
from the Bush administration on the rhetoric over the war in 
Chechnya. The White House adopted Putin's interpretation of 
Chechnya as a part of an international war against 
terrorism.64 
When the US Air Force started to bomb targets in 
Afghanistan on 6 October, Putin had been informed about the 
attacks beforehand. He welcomed them and supported them 
in a Russian public broadcast on 8 October. Sergei Ivanov, 
Vladimir Rushailo and other officials also supported the 
strikes and made positive statements about Russian-American 
6'3 Vladimir Putin, "Vystuplenie v Bundesrage FRG" [Speech in the 
German Bunclcstag], 25 September 200l. 
64 Russian effortS in this regard before 11 September 1001 had largely been 
unsuccessful. Scc Wilhelmscn and Flikke, "Copy Tbat ... ", p. 9-10. For 
the Bush administration's change of rhetoric from before 9/11, see James 
M. Goldgeier and Michacl McFaul, Power alld Purpose. U.S. Polic), 
toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution I1ress, 2003), pp. 316-319. 
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relations during October and Novem ber. This prepared the 
ground for a cordial summit between the presidents of Russia 
and the United States on 13-14 November. 
In this chapter, I shall go through Russia's response to the 
establishment of Western bases in Central Asia as reflected in 
official statements towards the United States and the West. 
The chapter's overall structure is chronological. Some 
statements and issues will be the same as in the previous 
chapter, but they will be interpreted here as belonging to 
official Russian policy towards the West. At the end of the 
chapter, I shall sum up the main features of the development 
of the Russian response. 
The Crawford summit and after 
At the summit in Crawford, Texas, Putin emphasised that the 
events since the 11 September tragedy gave Russia and the US 
"an opportunity to make our bilateral relations long-term and 
really friendly" .65 Statements of this kind underlined that 
Putin's decision on extensive cooperation with the West was a 
strategic decision, not a tactical move. There were no Russian 
demands for American security guarantees or concessions. 
Putin repeated the long-standing Russian foreign policy goals 
for which he now, as before, wanted to attract American 
support: accession to the World Trade Organisation, foreign 
capital investments in Russia, a better relationship with 
NATO and a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan that 
would also be acceptable to Russia. However, these 
statements were not presented as demands and not received as 
such. 
At this point, the presence of US and NATO troops and 
airplanes in Central Asia was an unproblematic issue in the 
bilateral relationship. The Taliban had still not been 
conclusively defeated, although it was apparent that this 
would happen soon. In Russia, there was some impatience 
with what the West could offer in return for what was seen in 
Moscow as concessions. An echo of this impatience appeared 
65 RFEJRL Ncws/iIlC, 15 November 1001. 
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when Sergei Ivanov met NATO's secretary general, Lord 
George Robertson, in Moscow on 22 November. The defence 
minister said that Russia was ready to cooperate with NATO 
but at the level of equals and for mutual gains.66 Putin's 
statement when he met Roberrson the next day was more 
positive - Russia was prepared to develop its relations with 
NATO as far as the alliance itself was prepared to go.67 When 
meeting Greek journalists in early December, he repeated that 
the recent improvement in relations with the United States was 
"not a tactical move, but a strategic policy". Russia was not 
worried about the United States' development of closer ties 
with Central Asian states or the American presence in the 
region.68 
After the Taliban's fall in Afghanistan, there were no 
fundamental changes to Russia's alignment with the West in 
the war on terrorism. The good relations enjoyed in the 
autumn endured. Especially with regard to the war in 
Afghanistan, where cooperation between Russia and the US 
waS seen as a success, both presidents were very positive on 
several occasions.69 However, after the end of the main 
military operations, intelligence and other direct cooperation 
between US and Russian agencies in the war on terrorism 
seem to have decreased substantially'?o The high point of 
Russia-NATO relations came in May 2002, when the new 
NATO-Russia Council was founded. The founding of the 
council was accompanied by the signing of the 'binding' 
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Treaty of Moscow) 
between Russia and the United States.71 Potentially 
6'6 "Sergei Ivanov: 'Rossiia gotova k sOtrudnichestvu s NATO na 
ravnopravnoi osnovc'" [Sergei Ivanov: Russia is ready for cooperation 
with l'JATO on the basis of equals], stralla.m, 12 November 2001. 
67 RFEJRL News/illc, 26 November 200l. 
68 RFEfRL News/ine, 6 December 200!. 
69 Scc Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 322. 
70 James Goldgcicr, "Relations with US wither". la/w's Intelligence 
ReI,few, July 2005: 56-57. 
71 The binding provisions of the treaty are contradicted by a provision that 
each party may withdraw with three months written notice, Lo, 
Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Polic)" p. 79 and 
151 (n. 17). See also Goldgeier and McFaul, Power lind Purpose, p. 323. 
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contentious issues either did not affect the relationship, or 
were discussed constructively. However, on occasions 
statements made by high-ranking Russian representatives cast 
doubt on the future of the Russian-American relationship. In 
the longer term, the Russian-American relationship again 
faced the challenge of how to develop closer and more diverse 
ties as the war on terrorism went into a period of 
consolidation and change. 
Seriously and for the long term? 
In Russia, the question of the duration of the Western military 
deployment in Central Asia became a source of apprehension 
after Elizabeth Jones' testimony on 13 December 2001. In the 
testimony, she had made assurances that the US was engaging 
"seriously and for the long term" with Central Asia. 72 The 
expression soon became a catch phrase in the domestic Russian 
debate on the Western bases in Central Asia. Apprehension 
grew as preparations for the arrival of US and NATO military 
personnel and airplanes at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan 
started in December 2001. In January 2002, Russian 
politicians' concerns appeared in the bilateral relationship. 
This prompted repeated assurances from the United States 
that the Western deployment would not be permanent. 
General Tommy Franks, the US general in charge of the 
campaign in Afghanistan said on 23 January 2002 that "the 
US does not intend to have permanent bases in the region", 
although it would continue to be involved in the region as the 
campaign to eliminate terrorism continued?3 This was the 
most authoritative statement about the US plans for the bases 
in the first half of 2002. 
On 24 January a Russian MFA spokesman, Aleksandr 
Iakovenko, stated that Russia had no reason not to believe 
this and previous American statements?4 One day later, 
Putin's security advisor, Marshal Igor Sergeev, who was also a 
71 Jones, "'Testimony Before .... ,., 
73 "Central Asia: Franks Says No Permanent U.S. Bases In Region", RFEI 
RL, 23 January 2002. 
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former defence minister, met US Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage in Washington. After their meetings, 
Sergeev stated that Armitage had assured him that the US 
would indeed withdraw its troops from the Central Asian 
countries following the end of the anti-terrorist operations in 
Afghanistan, and there was "no reason not to believe it." 75 
The issue was also on the agenda when the US-Russia 
Working Group on Afghanistan met in Washington in early 
Fehruary. In the joint statement released by the co-chairmen, 
Armitage and the Russian first deputy foreign minister, 
Viacheslav Trubnikov, stated that the United States had no 
intention of creating permanent military bases in Central 
Asia.76 Only a couple of days later, Putin stated that he was 
confident that Russia and the United States could be 
partners. 77 
A statement released by the Russian MFA on 13 February 
offered a contrast to this amicable state of affairs. The 
statement expressed concern that the effect of 11 September 
was wearing off, and that "those who preached the ideas of 
cold war and ~eopolitical confrontation are rearing their 
heads again." It Was difficult to say what had prompted this 
statement; it could he and indeed was seen as a reaction to 
American unilateralism. At the time, it also seemed connected 
to the continued omission of Chechen terrorists from the list 
of terrorist organizations kept by the US State Department. 
74 "MID RF: v Moskvc veriat zaiavleniiam Vashingtona 0 vrcmcnnom 
kharaktcre vocnnogo prisutstviia SShA v Tscntralnoi Azii" [Russian 
MFA: Moscow believes Washington's statements on the temporary 
character of the US military presence in Central Asia]. stral1a.Ttlr 24 
January 2002. 
75 "Zamestirel Gossekrctaria SShA nazval sJukhi ob amcrikamkikh 
planakh sokhranit bazy v Tscntralnoi Azii IOl.hnymi" [The US deputy 
secretary of state called the rumours of American plans to keep the 
Central Asian bases lies}, straltfl.m, 26 January 2002. 
76 RFEIRL NCUJsIiIlC, 11 February 2002. 
77 "Rossiia strait svoiu politiku v Tscntralnoi Azii iskhodia iz realii" 
[Russia formulates its policy in Central Asia on the basis of realities], 
strallfl.rtt, 11 February 2002. 
78 "Mezhdunarodnyi terrorizm: pozitsiia Rossii'" [International Terrorism: 
Russia's Position], 13 February 2002; RFEIRL NewsJinc, 14 February 
1002. 
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The statement did not mention the American military 
deployment in Central Asia, but the ambiguous phrase 
"geopolitical confrontation" seemed to refer to it. 
Another ambiguous statement came from Igor Ivanov on 2 
March. In an interview with the Italian daily Corriere della 
Sera, he said that the support for the anti-terrorist coalition 
from countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had been 
"perfectly normal". However, he continued to say that as the 
war had almost ended, "[tlhere are those who think that the 
USA wants to use the fight against terrorism as a pretext for 
strengthening its position in Central Asia, where there are 
strong geostrategic and oil interests. Are they right? The 
an swer m ust come from the USA." 79 The issue of the Western 
military presence in Central Asia seemed increasingly sore for 
the Russian government, and this was apparent in the level of 
relations with the West. 
Conflicting signals from the Russian government 
Far from all official Russian statements were negative towards 
the United States in Central Asia. In mid-March, Sergei Ivanov 
in an interview with The New York Times said that Russia 
and the United States did not only have different strategic 
interests in Central Asia - they also had common interests and 
that Russia was ready for cooperation.80 When Igor Ivanov 
gave a speech at Stanford University in early May, he 
maintained a positive view of Russian-American relations, 
including the war on terrorism. But he also voiced concern 
about American unilateralism, saying that it was received with 
"disquiet around the world, including Russia", and that such 
an approach to the international order had no "historical 
perspective".81 On the issue of US military deployment in 
Central Asia, he warned only a couple of weeks later that 
"Russia will demand from the United States transparency in 
79 "Russian minister calls on USA to put cards on table over Central Asia"', 
ITAR·TASS, 2 March 2002. 
80 "Scrgei Ivanov: "Rossiia i SShA mogut sotrudnichac v Tscntralnoi Azii'" 
[Russia and the US can cooperate in Central Asia], stral1a.m, 13 March 
2002. 
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the transportation and presence of a foreign military 
contingent in Central Asia." However, he applauded Russian-
American cooperation in the fight against terrorism, 
observing, "We have almost done away with the threat to 
Russia and other CIS member countries through the defeat of 
terrorists on the territory of Afghanistan." The foreign 
minister also called for multilateral mechanisms to ensure 
security in Central Asia, and in this respect referred to the 
Collective Security Treaty, which was in the process of being 
upgraded to a Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and to the 
SCO.82 
In an interview in June with the Chinese newspaper The 
People's Daily President Putin commented on the American 
military presence in Central Asia. His comments amounted to 
a sort of clarification of the official Russian position. He 
emphasised that the CIS was a sphere of Russian influence, 
but that he was "not concerned" about the stationing of 
Western forces in Central Asia. He warned, however, that the 
presence of outside forces should not "inflame local or 
interstate frictions, or destabilise the situation." Neverthless, 
he would not characterise the relations of Moscow and 
Washington in the CIS as competition, but rather as 
cooperation.83 
Disagreement over Iraq 
From autumn 2002, and especially in the beginning of 2003, 
the relations between Russia and the United States in the war 
on terrorism rook a turn for the worse. This was connected 
particularly to the disagreements between the two 
governments on the need to invade Iraq. Both the United 
81 Igor Ivano\', "Stcnogramma vystuplcniia Minis-tra inostrannykh del 
Rossiiskoi Fcdcratsii 1.5. Ivanova v Stenfordskom universitctc v San-
Framsisko 6 maia 2002 goda" [Shorthand report of the speech of the 
Russian foreign ministcr, I.S. lvanov, at the Stanford University in San 
Fransisco,6 May 2002], 6 May 2002. 
82 RFE/RL Newsfillc, 21 May 2002. 
83 "'Interviu kiraiskoi gazete 'Zhcnmin zhibao'" [Interview witb the 
Chinese newspaper 'Zhenmin zhibao'], Kremlill, 4 June 2002. 
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States and Russia tried to keep the disagreements over Iraq 
from having a negative impact on the bilateral relationship in 
the long term. By and large, they were successful. But 
disagreements over priorities in the campaign against terror 
inevitably influenced the relations concerning Central Asia. 
This emphasised the degree to which the continued Western 
deployment in Central Asia was a problem for policy makers 
in Moscow. 
From the Russian point of view, the American position on 
Iraq once again underlined that the US was a superpower that 
could act unilaterally in international politics, while Russia 
was no longer a great power. The leverage Russia had in 
international security politics rested in its pern1anent chair and 
veto in the UN Security Council. Whenever the American and 
Russian administrations' views diverged, Russian 
policymakers became acutely aware of their lack of leverage 
outside the Security Council. As Russia's international 
position was continuously compared in Russia to that of the 
United States, international crises tended to strengthen a latent 
Russian tendency to resent the United States and distrust its 
aims in international politics. This influenced Russian 
attitudes towards US policies. Central Asia was seen as one 
more area of traditional Russian influence to which the US 
and NATO had come closer during the last few years, 
especially after 11 September 2001. In Central Asia in 
particular, the Western presence had radically increased over a 
short period of time. As the Western presence in Central Asia 
was overwhelmingly a military one, and therefore infringed on 
Russia's security interests, this was perceived as particularly 
problematic. 
This resentment towards the United States was first and 
foremost present in the internal Russian debate. However, in 
2003 in particular, this resentment was occasionally reflected 
in statements directed towards the international community. 
This first happened in February, when Igor Ivanov in an 
Internet press conference with The People's Daily stated that 
Russia would like the UN Security Council to set up a time 
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frame for the presence of Western forces in Central Asia, and 
underlined that their presence should be linked to the mission 
of the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. 
"A crucial sphere for our security" 
In early October 2003, Sergei Ivanov held a speech in the 
presence of Putin and other important military policymakers 
in Moscow. The speech was widely regarded as a modification 
of the 2000 Military Doctrine. Ivanov emphasised the 
potential for instability in the CIS as a possible threat to 
Russian security. This and other cross-border threats could 
justify preventive strikes against other states and nuclear 
weapons as a combat weapon. 84 The speech also alluded to 
the potential enemy§ which observers interpreted as being 
NATO and the US. 5 The defence minister emphasised 
uncertainty as a new factor in military strategy, and tied this 
specifically (but not exclusively) to a sphere of interests in "the 
CIS and regions neighbouring the CIS".86 One observer saw 
in this and other parts of the speech effectively a declaration 
that Russia might reconsider its military strategy if NATO 
remained a "military-offensive alliance". 87 
The speech was significant enough to prompt a telephone 
call from NATO's secretary general Lord Robertson to 
Ivanov, in which the secretary general asked for clarifications. 
Ivanov promised to elaborate at an upcoming meeting in 
Colorado Springs of the defence ministers of NATO and 
Russia. 88 In Colorado Springs, Ivanov presented a new, more 
insistent version of the familiar statement that the Western 
forces should stay in Central Asia only for as long as was 
84 Serge! Ivanov, "Vystuplcnic na sovcshcbanii v Ministcrstvc oborony 
RF" [Speech at Conference in the Russian Ministry of Defence]. 2 
October 2003. 
85 Sergei Scdelnikov, Elcna Shishkunova and Baris Sapozhnikov, "My 
briatsacm oruzhicm" [\Vc are rattling our sabres], gazeta.ru, 2 October 
2003. 
86 S. Ivanov, "Vystuplcnie na sovcshchanii ... '" 
87 EJena Shishkunova, "BOlz NATO bolshe ne nado" [The NATO bases are 
no longer necessary], gazeta.m, 10 October 2003. 
88 Ibid. 
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necessary for the operations in Afghanistan. The defence 
minister said that Russia intended to boost its military 
presence in the CIS, especially in Central Asia, and that it 
would insist upon the ultimate withdrawal of the military 
bases established by the US-led coalition.89 !vanov also 
emphasised that the bases should only be used for the 
purposes of the coalition's aims, i.e. securing non-Taliban rule 
in Afghanistan and weakening al-Qaida.90 The defence 
minister was focusing on general Russian interests in the CIS 
when he said, "the CIS is a very crucial sphere for our security 
( ... ). We are not going to renounce the right to use military 
power there in situations where all other means had been 
exhausted. ,,91 This change of emphasis indicated that Russia 
was now taking a less patient view on the presence of NATO 
forces in Central Asia. Both the revision of the Military 
Doctrine and the speech in Colorado Springs communicated a 
Russian signal to the West that the CIS was a sphere of 
Russian interests in which the West should only engage to rhe 
extent that this also suited Russia's interests. 
The relationship between Russia and the West in the 
second half of 2003 took a turn towards a less cordial 
alignment. From the Western point of view, it was becoming 
a staple objection that Russia was not wholeheartedly 
integrating with rhe West, and rhat real partnership demanded 
shared values as well as coinciding strategic interests. From 
the Russian point of view, the West still had not appreciated 
Russia's strategic interests. The continued absence of concrete 
strategic or financial concessions from the West in return for 
Russia's support in the campaign against terror was seen by 
Moscow as testifying to the Western view that Russia could 
never integrate with the West. Western leaders became 
impatient with and later disappointed by Russia. This inclined 
them to limit their engagement with Russia. Russian e1ites had 
89 Ibid. 
90 "'Rossiia potrcbuet svernut inostrnnnye bazy v Srcdnei Azii" [Russia 
demands a rollback of the foreign bases in Central Asia], gazeta.rtI, 10 
October 2003. 
91 RFElRL News/iltc, 10 October 2003. 
"A CRUCIAL SPHERE FOR OUR SECURI1Y" SS 
their worst suspicions confirmed: the West was not taking 
Russia seriously and it would be better for Russia to 
. . 
concentrate on Its own Interests. 
Summing up: Russia's reactions to the West 
Russia's reactions to the Western military bases in Central 
Asia showed some development over the period from 11 
September 2001 to the end of 2003. I will now summarise 
briefly how the response to the West developed and who was 
responsible for communicating it. 
The president is formally responsible for conducting 
Russian foreign policy. Putin has actively conducted Russian 
foreign policy, and this is particularly true when the 
relationship with the United States is concerned. This applies 
most of all in times of crisis, like the period immediately 
following 9/11. Accordingly, it was the president who 
communicated Russia's reactions to the attacks, offers of 
assistance to the United States, and the major lines of Russian 
policy in the campaign against terror. His first reactions to the 
attacks, with offers of condolences and support, came quickly 
and reflected a well-considered decision to support the United 
States in a campaign against terror. However, as the question 
about Western use of Central Asian military bases came up, it 
was difficult to find an appropriate response. 
Between 11 and 24 September 2001, the defence and 
foreign ministers also communicated with the West and 
Western, predominantly US, politicians. The two ministers 
had different roles. Sergei Ivanov initially ruled out the 
possibility of Western forces on the Central Asian airbases. 
After this, the defence minister did not make any statements 
that seemed directed towards the West, or were received as 
such, until the start of the campaign on 6 October. Igor 
Ivanov, on the other hand, went to Washington on 18 to 20 
September to meet Bush, Rice and Powell, and was apparently 
entrusted with the task of reaching an understanding with the 
US president on the extent of Russian support for the 
campaign against terror. 
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After this initial phase the roles of the president, the 
defence minister and the foreign minister were clearly defined 
for the rest of the period under study. This appeared to be 
well coordinated. The president was the key figure here. 
Remarkably, his statements directed towards the West were 
consistent and nearly identical throughout the period under 
study. He always emphasised Russia's support for the 
campaign on terrorism, more often than not framing it in a 
global context that included Chechnya. He also emphasised 
Russia's and the West's shared strategic goals, and this was 
especially pronounced in the first few months after 1'1" 
September 2001 up until after the summit in May 2002. From 
the autumn of 2002, Putin mentioned this less often, and by 
late 2003 the emphasis was instead placed on coinciding goals 
in the war against terror. However, Putin did not express 
concerns at any point regarding the Western bases in Central 
Asia. 
The task of communicating Russian impatience and 
concerns about the bases in Central Asia was firmly placed 
with the defence minister. Remarks about Russian-American 
cooperation aside, it was Sergei Ivanov who met Lord 
Robertson in November 2001 to say that Russia was 
cooperating at the level of equals and for mutual gains, and it 
was he who communicated the increased importance of the 
CIS in Russian military doctrine in October 2003. Igor Ivanov 
and the MFA could be placed in-between the defence minister 
and the president: the foreign minister occasionally expressed 
concerns about the Western presence, and let the optimism 
concerning an Russian-American alignment be accompanied 
by concerns over American unilateralism. The picture that 
emerged was not difficult to understand: there were significant 
worries about US goals in Central Asia in the Kremlin as well. 
However, Putin was not going to let them influence the 
Russian-American relationship more than necessary, and 
placed his relationship with the American president above 
such concerns. He left it to the defence minister to 
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communicate Russia's concerns, and later the revised military 
policy on the CIS, and left it to the foreign minister to convey 
all the nuances of the Russian position. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the development of the Russian 
reactions directed towards the United States and the West. 
While some critical statements had already been voiced at the 
level of the bilateral relationship in January 2002, bilateral 
relations did not deteriorate significantly before the 
disagreement over Iraq in the winter of 2002-2003. The 
strategic alignment deteriorated after this, but was not until 
autumn 2003 that it became apparent that substantial political 
determination in both Russia and the West would be required 
to save it. It is worthy of note, however, that the first negative 
exchanges in the strategic alignment in January 2002 were on 
the topic of the Western, and specifically, the US military 
engagement in Central Asia. 
58 FORSVARSSTUDlER 312005 
"A CRUCIAL SPHERE FOR OUR SECURITY" 59 
Chapter 4 
The Russian political debate 
In this chapter, I shall go through the Russian respunse to the 
establishment of Western bases in Central Asia as it emerged 
in the domestic debate. The reader will recognise some 
statements and issues from the previous two chapters, though 
here they will be viewed as a part of the domestic Russian 
debate. At the end of the chapter there is a summary of the 
main features of the development of the Russian domestic 
debate on the Western bases in Central Asia. 
Restricted criticism in Moscow 
During the autumn of 2001, doubts were raised as to whether 
the Russian elites had been convinced by Putin's strate?ic 
decision in favour of a closer alignment with the West. 2 But 
while criticism of the closer relationship with the West 
emerged indirectly through criticism of its implications or was 
only implicit as undertones in comments, open discussion 
about the relationship with the West emerged rather slowly. 
Predictably, nationalists and communiSts criticised the 
president's strategic decision to support NATO and the United 
States. This did not differ significantly in content from 
criticism of Putin's foreign policy before 11 September, but 
this kind of criticism was heard more often and presented in 
starker terms than before. At this point, nationalist and 
92 For example, in Andrei Riabov, "'Putin ushel v otryv" [Putin has lost 
contact]. Vek, no, 42, 26 October 2001. 
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communist criticism combined with criticism from another 
part of Russian society committed to the image of Russia as a 
great power, the military-security constituency. 
One example of an early contribution from the military-
security constituency is when, during the preparations for the 
attack on Afghanistan started on 6 October, army veterans 
and their supporters appealed to Putin not to let Russia be 
drawn into the coming war.93 Criticism at this point also 
accused Putin of acting against Russia's strategic interests.94 
This was frequently heard in criticism from the military-
security constituency though others also joined in. For 
example, the leader of the Communist Party, Gennadii 
Ziuganov, warned Putin of the potential of being drawn into 
a war with the Islamic world, as well as letting "NATO ( ... ) 
come to the Pamir", implying that when the alliance would 
leave the region was unknown.95 After the operations in 
Afghanistan started, criticism of the alignment with the West 
subsided. 
At this point, mainstream comments focused on the 
bombing of Afghanistan and the American choice of strategy. 
This issue was gradually replaced in the political debate by 
muted, but widespread criticism of the decision to allow the 
Americans and NATO forces to use bases in Central Asia. 
One early example is the opinion voiced by the head of the 
General Staff, Anatolii K vashnin, when on a visit to Erevan in 
early October. He said that there was "no sense" in US plans 
to use air bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to attack on 
93 RFEIRL Neu'slille,5 October 2001. 
94 For example, from the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii. When he said this on Russian television, the presenter of 
the programme "Geroi dnin"', Savik Shuster, at the cnd of the interview 
with Zhirinovskii, tried to disassociate himself from Zhirinovskii's 
comments and caBed them "daring and controversial". "Russia will lose 
Central Asia if it gets involved in Afghanistan", NTV IntemotiOllal, 2 
October 2001. 
95 "Zyuganov to urge Putin to prevent Russia from being pulled into war", 
Inter{ax, 24 September 2001. 
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Afghanistan. 96 It seemed at the time that criticism of the 
Western hases in Central Asia was a way in which to criticise 
indirectly the strategic alignment with the West. 
The overall picture in Moscow's elites remained one of 
unconvinced support. In the words of Andrei Riabov of the 
Carnegie Moscow Centre, "There is undoubtedly a gap 
[between the president and the elite]. But the political elite 
cannot take issue with the president today ( ... ). [They] declare 
their support for Vladimir Purin's actions, and by this they 
take all responsibility from their own shoulders and load it on 
the president" .97 One reason he cited for this passivity was the 
president's popularity.98 
The unconvinced support also revealed itself in a statement 
issued by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), 
an independent association which acts as a forum for 
discussion and exchange of views on foreign and defence 
policy among influential foliticians, bureaucrats, businessmen, 
analysts and journalists. 9 In a statement on 2 November 
SVOP supported the president's line, but this support was 
hardly uncontroversial, as there had in fact been disagreement 
within the association. In the end SVOP approved 
participation in the war on terrorism, because "attempts to 
wait it out would be costlier" .100 
Quid pro quo 
Though Russia's strategic alignment with the West was not 
generally approved of, there was a section of the political elite 
which applauded it. Pragmatic commentators and politicians 
saW Putin's choice as wise. Their view was that Putin's choice 
had been to cooperate more closely with the West withour 
96 RFElRL News/inc, 4 October 1001. 
97 "Elita ne pospevaer" [The elite does not keep up pace}, Vrcmia /louoste;, 
19 October 2001. 
98 Riahov, "Putin ushel "mfY"". 
99 SVOP has dose to 150 members. The council meets for a plenary session 
annually, and otherwise arranges rounclmbles and conferences. Its 
working groups also comment on current issues. 
100 Yevgcny Verlin, "Some advice for the president''', Vremia A1N, 2 
November 2001. 
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pursuing a closer strategic relationship or closer integration 
outside the framework of the war on terrorism. Evgenii 
Primakov, for example, described Putin's line as "careful", 
"taking into consideration Russia's own interests and 
concerns, without following Washington's lead".101 Some 
expected Putin to bargain with the United States for continued 
Russian support and cooperation in the war against terror, a 
quid pro quo strategy. 10_ The argument was that foreign 
policy should "give dividends" .10 This was one version of the 
view that Putin's decision was essentially a tactical one. In this 
view, his decision had been made to improve Russia's 
relations with the West, without aligning with it strategically. 
Some commentators and politicians argued that Russia should 
receive (temporary, limited) security guarantees from the 
United States or NATO, as compensation for the risks of the 
new foreign policy line.1 04 
Others focused on older Russian demands from the United 
States. Among the possible returns Russia could achieve were: 
complete freedom to deal with Chechnya, CIS as a Russian 
zone of interests, recognition of Russia's position on the 
development of a National Missile Defense and the future of 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, that all Russian debts 
to the West be wri tren off and an equal voice for Moscow in 
G-8 and NATO, or even NATO membership.1 0S Some 
recommended that demands regarding Chechnya, debts and 
NATO enlargement not be made, but argued for the viability 
101 RFEIRL News/ille, 1 October 2001. 
102 Viktor Sokolov, "Mark Urnov: Rossiia torgucrsia 5 SShA - i slav3 
Bagu!" [lvlark Urnav: Russia is negotiating with the US - and thank 
God!], stral1a.nt, 26 September 200l. 
103 "My mozhcm sdclat shag nazad" [We risk taking a step back], 
Ne:::.arrisimaia gazet.z, 20 October 200l. 
104 "Viacheslav Igrunov: 'Rossiia dolzhna poluchit Ot NATO gamntii 
sobsrvennoi bczopasnosti'" (Viacheslav Igrunov: Russia should receive 
security guarantees from NATO], strt11/fl.ru, 26 September 2001; Tatianu 
Zamiatina, "Kak daleko idti Rossii v podderzhke SShA?" [How far 
should Russia go in supporting the US?], stralla.ru, 5 November 2001. 
105 RFEIRL Newshnc, 29 October 2001; Lidiia Andrusenko, "Poliwlogi 
claiur nakaz Purinu" [Political scientists give instructions to Putin1, 
Nezattisimaia gaze/a, 26 October 2001; Verlin, "Some advice ... "'. 
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of demands such as US recognition of the CIS as a zone of 
Russian interests, recognition of Russia as a market economy 
and that Russian interests should be taken into account in the 
American plans for NMD.l()6 On the other hand, one 
commentator maintained that the West was not going to 
accede to Russian demands or to sympathise with the Russian 
war in Chechnya, and therefore, it was too early to formalise 
Russian cooperation with the West in the war against 
terror.10? Remarkably, in the debate on quid pro quo the 
Russian political elite did not acknowledge that Russia had 
already gained a major concession from the US in the 
downplaying of criticism of the war in Chechnya. 
The debate on a quid pro quo tactic could be viewed 
differently, as suggested by Bobo Lo.108 He suggests that it 
was a conscious strategy from the Kremlin to encourage 
participants in the debate, such as Duma deputies, to sound 
proposals about concessions from the United States that 
would be misplaced and crude in a formal bilateral context. 
On the other hand, as Dmitri Trenin argues, the debate on 
quid pro quo could simply have been a reaction in the elites to 
Putin's lack of strategy and explanation of the choice he had 
made after 11 September.109 Instead of discussing the strategic 
aspects of this choice the elites were reduced - because of 
Putin's lack of arguments for the strategic decision - to 
commenting on the more familiar image of quid pro quo. 
The divisive strategic decision 
From these expectations regarding Putin's possible demands 
from the US, it emerged that many Russian observers initially 
received the president's support for the US-led campaign 
against terror as a tactical step. After the Crawford summit in 
November, the view of Putin's line in Moscow changed, and 
from now on it was regarded as a strategic decision. The 
106 Gcorgii I1ichcv, "Doroga na Krouford" [The road to Crawford] in 
lzuestiia, 25 October 200t. 
107 Viacheslav Nikonov of the Politika Fund in Zamiatina, "Kak dalcko ... " 
1 08 Lo, V/adimir Putilt and the Evolutioll of Russian Foreign POIiC)i p. 40. 
109 Trenin, "Through Russian ..... 
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choice itself became more widely and openly discussed than 
before the summit, and Putin was criticised for his willingness 
to integrate with the West. However, his line was supported 
among the more liberal members of the elite, and among the 
pragmatic parts of the elite closer to the Kremlin. The strategic 
decision had become divisive in Moscow, but criticism in 
public was still not widespread. The issue of Western bases in 
Central Asia was discussed as a consequence of the strategic 
decision in favour of the West. Criticism of the strategic 
decision mainly took the form of wariness in relation to the 
US aims in Central Asia. But there was also indirect criticism 
of the strategic decision through covert references to division 
in the political elite, e.g. when observers and politicians 
warned against the problems Putin faced in pursuing a foreign 
policy against the inclinations of large parts of the elite. Some 
underlined the lack of support from the military establishment 
or the foreign and security bureaucracies; others likened Putin 
to Yeltsin and Gorbachev in his not seeking support from 
large parts of the elite. 110 Some of this criticism left an 
alarmist impression, e.g. before the summit when one observer 
in Nezavisimaia gazeta speculated that Russia could be close 
to a coup as Putin was leaving for Crawford. 1 11 
Positive assessments of Putin's strategic decision focused on 
how it had changed the international environment to Russia's 
benefit. This was emphasised by Mikhail Margelov, the 
chairman of the Federation Council's Foreign Affairs 
Committee.1 12 The opposite view was also represented in the 
Federal Assembly. Andrei Nikolaev, head of the Duma 
Defence Committee, suggested in early November that the 
United States had used the events of 11 September as a pretext 
to advance its goal of greater, long-term influence in Central 
Asia. l13 
110 Vadim So]ovcv, "Gcneraly ukhodiat v oppozitsiiu Krcmliu" lGencrals 
go into opposition against the Kremlin], Nezal.lisimaia gazeta, 13 
November 2001; RFEIRL Newiilil1e, 19 Novcmber,2{)Ol. 
111 Solovcv, "Gcncraly ukhadiat ... ", cf. "'Nez3visirnaia gazeta' mnogo 
znaet pro generaIskie intercsy" [Nezal'isimaia gazeta knows a lot about 
generals' interests], smi.ru, 13 November 200l. 
112 RFElRL Newslinc, 3 January 2002. 
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As the campaign in Afghanistan continued with 
considerable Sllccess for the coalition, fewer in Moscow 
emphasised the negative effects and dangers of aligning with 
the West in the war on terrorism. At the same time, it was 
becoming clear that it would take a long period of time before 
the coalition's tasks in Afghanistan were completed. This 
raised several questions in Moscow. How long would Western 
bases in Central Asia be needed? How did this affect Russia 
and its strategic interests in Central Asia? What would the 
future strategic position of Central Asia be? Many saw these 
issues as acute. Therefore, the Western bases in Central Asia 
gradually gained prominence in the debate. While the issue of 
the strategic decision attracted less interest than it had before 
the coalition's deployment in Afghanistan, the bases turned 
into one of the prominent contentious issues among 
participants in the debate on Russian foreign policy.1 14 
Seriously and for the long term! 
Developments in Central Asia and US policy towards the 
Central Asian states were followed closely in Moscow. 
Therefore, when the US assistant secretary of state for 
European and Eurasian affairs, Elizabeth Jones, remarked in 
December that the US was engaging in Central Asia "seriously 
and for the long term", 115 this was received in Moscow as a 
confirmation of the worst fears of large parts of the elite. 
'Seriously and for the long term' (vser'ez i nadolgo) became a 
catch phrase in the Russian political debate from January 
2002. The construction of the Manas Base was seen as a 
113 .. Andrei Nikolacv: SShA ispolzuiut slozhivshuiusia situatsiiu, chtoby 
zakrcpitsia v Tscntralnoi Azii" [Andrci Nikolac\'; the US is using the 
situation to strengthen its positions in Central Asia], 5tral1a.nt, 9 
November 2001. 
114 At this point, another debate added fucl to the debate on "Western bases 
in Central Asia. In summer 2001, it was finally decided to close the two 
last bases from the Soviet period outside the former Soviet Union. The 
closures of the military facilities at Lourdes in Cuba and in Cam Ranh 
Bay in Vietnam were due to be completed by early 2002. The nvo 
dcbatcs were intemvined for a short period in late autumn 2001. 
115 Jones, "Testimony Before ... " 
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confirmation of the American intentions to stay in Central 
Asia. To Moscow, this was particularly worrying because 
Kyrgyzstan was more closely aligned with Russia than 
Uzbekistan. Now, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were 
hosting Western airbases with American dominance. 
The worries of Russian politicians over a possible long-
term US military engagement in Central Asia were amply 
illustrated in January 2002. During visits to Astana and 
Dushanbe in early January, Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev 
stated that he was against long-term deployment of US forces 
in Central Asia. He also proposed that decisions related to the 
establishment of permanent American bases in Central Asia 
should be made only after discussions involving Russia as well 
as the Central Asian states had taken place. He suspected that 
the United States was using the bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan in an effort to control the situation on the Indian-
Pakistani border, in western China and in Kazakhstan, as well 
as in Afghanistan.116 However, politicians loyal to Putin 
maintained the president's line on the Western bases in 
Central Asia. For example, the speaker of the Federation 
Council, Sergei Mironov, commented on the same day as 
Seleznev issued his statement that, "for Russia, the question of 
foreign presence in the Central Asian states is a question for 
each state [to decidej.,,117 
Two notable additions to the internal Russian debate came 
from Konstantin Totskii, director of the Federal Border 
Service, and the head of the General Staff, Anatolii Kvashnin. 
Torskii, in Tajikistan on 17 January, said according to one 
source that the Western presence should be temporary, and 
that "if [the Western presencej is for long, we will not be 
friends" .118 A few days later, he moderated his view. On 22 
January, he said that the leadership of the Federal Border 
Service understood that there had to be a foreign military 
116 RFEIRL NeflJs/ine, 10 and 14 January 2002. 
117 Nikolai Ulianov, "U politiki Rossii v SNG mogut poiavitsia navye 
niuansy" [New nuances may appear in Russia's CIS policy}, strana.nI, 9 
January 2002. 
118 "Russia wants West's stay in Tajikistan short", Reutcrs, 17 January 
2002. 
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presence in Central Asia for the duration of the anti-terrorist 
campaign, but that there would be "no point in keeping 
NATO airplanes on airbases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan after the [end of the] anti-terrorist operation in 
Afghanistan:,119 K vashnin was somewhat more moderate 
when he emphasised on 19 January that the US military 
presence in Central Asia at this point was of a "temporary 
character" .120 Kvashnin's deputy, Iurii Baluevskii, in an 
interview in March with the main military newspaper said 
that the military presence of the United States in Central Asia 
could affect Russia's relations with some of its CIS 
partners.121 
These statements deserve further comment. Mironov as 
well as K vashnin were communicating the official Kremlin 
position. Kvashnin added a qualification about the Western 
military presence's temporary character that was becoming a 
standard phrase for defence officials, and Baluevskii also 
referred to this in the interview. For Seleznev's and Totskii's 
statements, there are two options. They may have conveyed a 
subtler message with the tacit approval of the Kremlin, or they 
may have signalled discontent with official policy. In Moscow, 
both their statements were interpreted as discontent with 
official policy "at the highest level" .1 22 This is a likely 
interpretation. Firstly, there is no reason to doubt that their 
statements were sincerely held opinions. Secondly, neither the 
director of the Federal Border Service nor the Duma speaker 
would be the Kremlin's first choice to convey any subtle 
message. The official line stood firm, but it was accompanied 
by considerable anxiety at a high level. 
119 Vladimic Egorov, "Amcrikanskii general provodit konsultatsii \' 
Tashkcntc i Dushanbc" [American general carries out consultations in 
Tashkcnt and Dushanbe], stralla.nt, 22 January 2002. 
120 "Rossiia i SShA do]zhny razvivur politichcskii di.tiog, sehitacr An3rolii 
Kvashnin" [Russia and the US should develop a political dialogue-
Anatalii Kvashnin], strana.ru, 19 Januarv 2002. 
121 Interview with Iurii Baluevskii: "Otvctstvenny za sudby mica" 
[Responsible for the world's fate], KraslI(lia ZlIcwa, 13 March 2002. 
122 Armen Khanbabian, "Amerika vystraivact svoiu vcrtikal v1asti" 
[America builds its power vertical], NeZtlL'isimaia gazeta, 4 February 
2002. 
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Explicit emphasis on the temporary character of the 
Western military presence in Central Asia, expressed at every 
possible occasion, also indicated that high-ranking officials 
within the government itself were taking the political elite's 
worries seriously. Typical in this respect was a comment made 
by Sergei Ivanov at a press conference in Moscow on 12 
February. He noted that the presence of the anti-terrorist 
coalition in Central Asia was a positive factor for Russia, but 
that it was important that "the United States and the Central 
Asian states abide by their promises to Russia that the 
presence of the anti-terrorist coalition in the region is only a 
temporary measure, and that they will leave once the 
operation is finished." 123 
A second wave of apprehension 
High-ranking officers and politicians were, as we have seen, 
unconvinced about the consequences of support for Western 
bases in Central Asia, and voiced their concerns in the media. 
This was accompanied by an exchange of opinions by 
observers and journalists, academics and politicians. It is 
however important to appreciate the limits of participation in 
the debate at this point. The debate involved a limited number 
of politicians and observers, mostly from the military-security 
constituency, and mostly those with long-standing interests in 
CIS affairs. To them had been added a few more participants 
than one would have seen in foreign policy debates on the CIS 
states before 9/11. These added participants were mainly 
prominent politicians, like Seleznev, who had taken up the 
cause. 
The Russian concerns over the Western military presence in 
Central Asia were rarely noticed outside Russia. The internal 
debate hardly affected the bilateral relationship with the US, 
with the exception of General Tommy Franks' statement on 
23 January that the American presence was indeed temporary, 
which seems to have been meant to reassure the political elites 
123 RFE/RL NeUlsli1te, 13 February 2002. 
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in Moscow and also the Russian government.124 In spite of 
General Franks' statement, the Russian elite remained 
unconvinced. 
The wave of Russian media interest in the American 
military presence in Central Asia was called by one media 
observer a "second wave of apprehension" as regarded the 
bases. 125 The first wave, in October and November 2001, had 
been more restricted. From January 2002, attention was being 
drawn to a wider range of topics, with a more openly critical 
view of American intentions and plans in Central Asia. The 
debate also took place in more diverse media, including TV 
news and analytical programmes. 126 There was also more 
variation among the participants, especially as the debate 
included centrist politicians, members of the government and 
the military elite to a greater extent at this time than in the 
autumn. 
Who offers what in a zero-sum game? 
At this point, two types of issues dominated the debate. The 
first issue was how to explain why the Central Asian states 
had chosen to welcome a Western military presence. There 
were two main answers, concerning finances and security 
respectively. The second issue was the altered strategic 
situation in Central Asia, consisting of two interconnected 
questions: the reasons for and the future of the American 
engagement in the region and the question of how the general 
regional strategic balance would develop. 
The financial benefits the Central Asian states stood to gain 
from the Western presence became a topic in October 2001, 
when rumours started to circulate about how much the United 
States paid to use Central Asian airspace and bases.!2? By the 
124 "Central Asia: Franks Says No Permanent V.S. Bases In Region". 
125 Evgcniia Abramova, "SShA v prcdelakh byvshikh sovcrskikh rcspuhlik" 
[The US within the former Soviet republics], smi.rtt, 24 January 2002. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Vladirnir Gcorgicv, "'Uzbckistan prodalsia Vashingtonu za 8 mlrd. 
dollarov" [Uzbckistan sold itself to Washington for 8 billion dollars], 
NezaJJIsimaia ga::.cta, 19 October 2001. 
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end of January 2002, the speculation that the Central Asian 
governments were expecting to gain financially from the 
American presence had become a staple in the debate.128 
Militar~ sources inside the region confirmed that this was the 
case. 12 Such gains were first and foremost seen as direct, i.e. 
investment in military infrastructure and modernisation, 
payments for take-oHs and landings as well as road traffic to 
and from the bases, and income from the use of air corridors 
and air bases. In addition, the discussion touched on the 
possibility of indirect financial gains from a long-term 
American willingness to invest in the region.130 As the US 
government was paying very well for the use of the airbases, 
it was hard~ surprising that financial incentives seemed 
important.1 1 The issue of indirect financial gains was 
however debated on the basis of expectations rather than fact, 
although it was known by now that US aid to Central Asia 
had increased substantially after 9/11. Attention was also paid 
to possible long-term gains for the Central Asian states. For 
example, Kyrgyzstan might be awarded American loans, but 
also possibly American support in negotiations for IMF and 
World Bank loans.132 
Others focused on Russia's inability to guarantee the 
security of the Central Asian states. One example consists of 
the remarks in Izvestia that Russia was "morally ready" to 
defend Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from a "great war with 
unpredictable consequences" for the regimes there. As 
commented by the journalist, Russia did not possess the 
128 
129 
BO 
131 
Cf. Dmirrii Gornosracv, .. Amerikanskaia myshelovka dlia lidcrov 
Srcdnci Azii" [The American mousetrap for Central Asia's leaders), 
strmta.TU, 28 January 2002; Khodarenok, '''Starshego brara' sdali la 
milliard dollarov"'; Viktoriia Panfilova, "Na zapad - vslcd za Moskvoi'" 
[To the West- following Moscow], Ne::::ovisimaia ga:::cta, 4 March 2002; 
"Otvetstvenny la sudby mira". 
Panfilova, "Na zapad ... " 
(;ornmtaev, '" Ameriknnsknin myshelovka ... " 
The payment for each takc~off and landing at the Manas Base was 7000 
US dollars. 
"Voennaia baza SShA poiavitsia na tcrritorii byvshcgo SSSR" [A US 
military base appears on the territory of [he former USSR], hvestiia, 8 
January 2002. 
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means to do so.133 Better then to let the Americans do what 
the Russians could not, Of, as one observer put it, "lit is] 
better to have the Americans in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan 
than [Chechen terrorist Shamil] Basaev in Moscow.,,134 This 
had been a part of the debate in October and November; that 
the US was doing Russia a favour. 135 Some warned that it was 
dangerous for Russia to deleiate its security interests to 
NATO and the United States . .36 By January, the view that the 
US was doing Russia a favour had slipped out of the debate. 
Instead, the view that Russia was not in a position to 
guarantee Central Asian security prevailed. One observer 
concluded that the establishment of a coalition base in 
Kyrgyzstan was for all practical purposes an acknowledgment 
by Bishkek that "the Collective Security Treaty cannot 
guarantee Kyrgyzstan's security, and actually [the base 
represents{, a unilateral termination of the [treaty] by this 
country." 07 SVOP stated that Russia's inability to guarantee 
security in Central Asia and the Caucasus had led to a security 
vacuum, which was now being filled by the United States. This 
again was seen as a threat to Russian security.138 
The second issue was the strategic situation of Central 
Asia. The two main topics in the discussion were the 
uncertainty that surrounded American geopolitical interests 
and aims in Central Asia and the question of how the strategic 
balance of the region would develop. The view that the United 
States was aiming at gaining a foothold in Central Asia was 
widely subscribed to in Moscow.139 Many commentators 
133 Semen Novoprucl:;kii, "Nasha voina" [Our war], lzllcstiio, 8 October 
1001. 
134 "'Chcrnoe i beloe poslc 11 semiabria" [Black and white after 11 
September], Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 October 1001. 
135 c.g., "There is no other way", Obshchaia gazeta, 22 November 200!. 
136 "Puri Purina" [Putin's courses], Vcrst)~ 27 November 200l. 
137 Mikhail Khodarcnok, "Nenuzhnyi soiuz" [An unnecessary union]. 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 21 January 2002. 
138 Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike (SVQP), Nov)'e u),zo[J), 
bezopasllosti i Rossil'a [New Security Challenges and Russia], 10 July 
2002 (Moscow). 
139 .Judith Ingram, "Russian Military; V.S. Goals Hazy''', AP, 19 October 
1001. 
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believed that the US had come to stay for a long time, perhaps 
to secure access to oil and f,:as or control transport routes, as 
alleged by Leonid Ivashov. 40 In addition to access to oil and 
gas, others cited support for American corporations' interests 
as a US goal in Central Asia. 141 In sum, there was 
considerable fear that the Americans had come to stay. 
The strategic situation was discussed as a zero-sum game. 
In this respect, the Central Asian states could not exist in a 
vacuum, but had to belong to a sphere of influence, Russian 
or otherwise. This issue was raised very early after the 
American military deployment in Central Asia, and in stark 
terms: "Former Soviet Central Asia will inevitably· become 
somebody's zone of responsibility, either of the Americans, of 
the Russians, of the Americans and Russians together, or of 
the radical Islamists.,,142 Politicians close to the Kremlin 
unsurprisingly disagreed with the prevailing view that in a 
competition for influence in Central Asia between Russia and 
the United States, Russia would likely be the loser. But they 
nonetheless shared the approach of a zero-sum game. For 
example, on 14 January, Mikhail Margelov, the chairman of 
the Federation Council's Foreign Affairs Committee, remarked 
that he was not concerned about reports that the US was 
planning to set up permanent military bases in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan: "Russia is sure it will preserve its influence in the 
region even with an American presence there. ( ... ) the United 
States is well aware that efforts to counter Russia's historical 
and geographical impact on the region are doomed to failure". 
He concluded that the US was unlikely to take the risk. 143 But 
many observers in Moscow argued that this was exactly what 
the United States was planning to do. In one comment in 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, it was even argued that as the members 
of the Collective Security Treaty, especially Russia, ignored 
140 "Lconid Ivashov: 'Likvidatsiia baz za rubezhom - strategicheskaia 
oshibka'''' [Leonid h'ashov: The elimination of the bases abroad was a 
strategic mistake], Nczauisimaia gazcta, 18 December 200l. 
141 E.g., Baris Volkhonskii: "SShA na mestc SSSR'" [The US instead of the 
USSR], K01l1mCrsol1t, 23 January 2002. 
141 Novoprudskii, "Nasha voina". 
143 RFEIRL News[fnc, 17 January 2002. 
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their own interests, the Americans were likely to create a 
regional military and political bloc of Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and possibly also Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In 
his view, the Russia-led and the US-led blocs were unlikely to 
complement each other and thereby guarantee the security of 
Central Asia. Rather, it would probably mean that the Central 
Asian states would become eVen more distant from 
Moscow.144 These speculations betrayed a view of the 
region's security as wholly dependent on the actions of great 
powers, and ignored the complexities of security in Central 
Asia. 
By this time, there were very few arguinp, that Central Asia 
was not a vital sphere of Russian interest. 45 The sphere of 
interest idea was well-established, and the debate continued 
along these lines. 
Attempts at reassurance 
These topics reflected the Kremlin's continued failure to 
convince the elite that the Western bases in Central Asia were 
in accordance with Russia's own security interests. Until 
February 2002, this fail ure could be explained by a lack of 
trying. There were no efforts to explain to the elite or to the 
general public, why Putin's strategic decision had been within 
Russian interests. This was openly mentioned in a policy 
document from SVOP prepared in winter and spring 2002 and 
released in the summer. According to this document, the 
presence of the United States in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
"seriously worries a significant part of the Russian elite ( ... ) 
[elven more so as official Moscow either does not explain 
what is going on, or explains it rather contradictorily" .146 
144 Armen Khanbabian, "Pri iavnom ravnodushii Maskvy" [With 
Moscow's obvious indifference], Nezallisimaia gaze-ta, 6 February 2002. 
145 Onc exception was onc of the most prominent members of SVOP, Sergei 
Karaganov, from the Europe Institute of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. According to his line of argument, Russia's interests should lie 
elsewhere. See "Sergei Karaganov: Rossiiu ne dolzhno pugat prisutsrvic 
SShA v Srcdnci Azij" [Sergei Karaganov: Russia should not fear the 
presence of the US in Central Asia}, strana.TtI, 20 December 2001. 
146 SVOP, Novye uyzOl'}' bezopasl1osti j Rossiia. 
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But there were some efforts from the government to 
reassure the elite and the public that Russia had not given up 
its influence in Central Asia. In February, Sergei Ivanov made 
two statements that seemed to declare a Russian sphere of 
influence in the CIS. In the first remark, on 19 February, he 
said, "Russia is capable of defending itself and its allies. ,,147 
This remark clearly aimed at reassuring the Russian public 
about Russia's influence in the CIS. The second remark, 
"Russia will not leave its bases in Central Asia,,,148 came at a 
press conference after a meeting of the Council of CIS Defence 
Ministers in St. Petersburg on 27 February, and was 
accordingly directed mainly towards the CIS governments.1 49 
However, it was widely cited in the Russian press, and should 
also be seen in the context of the internal Russian debate. 
Igor Ivanov also tried to reassure the Russian public. When 
answering questions from the listeners of Radio Mayak, he 
refuted the view that Russia had made concessions to the Wesr 
when aligning with the United States in the anti-terrorist 
campaign. Among the potential concessions, the Western 
bases in Central Asia were mentioned. However, the foreign 
minister emphasised that there had been "no concessions", 
and that Russian policy was guided only by "our own 
interest". Moreover, "Russia did not and will not go for any 
·1 I . ,,150 unl atera concessions. 
147 Aleksandr Or/av, "'Scrgci Ivanov: Rossiia sposobna zashchitit scbia i 
svoikh soiuxoikov" [Sergei lvanov: Russia is capable of defending itself 
and its allies1. straW1.TtI, 19 February 2002. 
148 At this point, Russia had no bases in Central Asia. The deployment at 
Kant was at a very early planning stage, and the 201 Sf Division outside 
Dushanbe was very far from being transformed into a base, although the 
transformation had been agreed berween Russia and Tajikistan in 1999. 
Russia was responsible for guarding Tajikistan's outer (non-CIS) 
borders, but this deployment was not withill the frame of a base. 
149 "Sergei Ivanov: Rossiia ne sobiraersia ukhodit s vocnnykh baz v Srednei 
Azii'" [Scrgci Ivanov: Russia is not going to leave its military bases in 
Central Asia], strolla.rlt, 27 February 2002. 
150 "Foreign minister denies Russia making concessions to USA", RIA 
Novosti, 16 March 2002. 
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A naive foreign policy 
In the public debate, the question of unilateral concessions 
and Russian interests in Central Asia remained a contested 
topic. One observer called the Kremlin's foreign policy line 
"na'ive" and called for more active protection of Russian 
interests.151 Another comment went further and emphasised 
that "Russia should not share its interests with anyone," 
adding somewhat enigmatically that for Russia, the events in 
Afghanistan were a prologue to the "fight for Siberia" .152 
Others accused the Kremlin of not being able to formulate a 
suitable and clear response to the US military presence in 
Central Asia, a presence that had narrowed Moscow's 
geopolitical options.153 
But a few comments supported the Kremlin's foreign 
policy, especially the alignment with the West. One 
commentator close to the Kremlin propagated the view that 
the closer Russia was to the United States, the stronger Russia 
would be, as the US "is the centre of world power and 
strength [and] ( ... ) for Russia to resist this and to look for an 
adequate reaction to every move Washington makes is 
counterproductive.,,154 Another comment from a member of 
the academic community criticised the current dualism in 
foreign policy, where the Kremlin focused on economic 
priorities and integration with the West, while there was a 
tendency to prefer an anti-Western, "imperial" foreign policy 
in the political elite. And while the pro-presidential parties in 
the Duma and officials from the foreign affairs, military and 
security establishments formally supported the Kremlin's line, 
to this observer it was apparent that they were either confused 
151 Pavel Zolotarcv, "Kholodnyi dush v zvczdnuiu po]osochku" lA cold 
starry-striped shower], Nezauisimaia gazeta, 22 March 2002. 
152 Vladimir KV3Chkov, U Afgan: istoriia dvizbetsia po spirali" [Afghan: 
History moves in spirals], Nezauisimoe 1I0t!1lf10e obozrcllie, 29 March 
2002. 
153 Mikhail Khodarcnok, "Ozherelc iz amerikanskikh haz" [A necklace of 
American bases}, NCZill'isimaia gazcta, 25 March 2002 (Nezavisimoe 
lIOC1I11Oe obozrclIie 29 March). 
154 Sergei Markov, the director of the Institute of Political Research in RFEI 
RL Newsline, 21 March 2002. 
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by or opposed the pro-Western line. This comment was one of 
the few that referred to divisions in the political elite at this 
point. Unlike a few months earlier, the distance between the 
Kremlin and the rest of the political elite was now hardly 
mentioned in the debate. The opinion piece in question was 
also nearly alone in supporting the Kremlin's line.155 
However, in May Evgenii Primakov joined in with cautious 
support for the alignment with the West and offered explicit 
criticism of those who talked of unilateral concessions to the 
West. This was to Primakov "the approach of a haggler" .1 56 
Putin speaks 
Until April 2002, Putin's views were absent from the debate. 
From time to time his closest advisors on foreign policy, for 
example Mikhail Margelov, reiterated the official position. 
Putin himself first rderred to the debate in his annual address 
to the Federal Assembly on 18 April, where he emphasised 
that the CIS was a foreign policy priority for Russia. Igor 
Ivanov further elaborated this on 21 May, when he called for 
multilateral mechanisms to ensure security in Central Asia. He 
also warned again that Russia would "demand from the 
United States transparency in the transportation and presence 
of a foreign military contingent in Central Asia. ,,157 
A more explicit attempt at co-optation of the political elite 
came on 22 May, when Putin chaired an extended meeting of 
the Presidium of the State Council, at which foreign policy 
was discussed. In addition to the regional leaders represented 
in the presidium, the meeting included the most prominent 
foreign policymakers in Russia, e.g., the leaders of political 
factions represented in the Duma and the Federation Council, 
the leaders of the foreign affairs committees of both chambers, 
Vladimir Rushailo, Sergei Ivanov and Igor Ivanov, the prime 
minister, Mikhail Kasianov, the head of the Foreign 
155 Vladimir KuJagin, "'Dvocvlastie' vo vneshnei politike" ['Dual power' in 
foreign policy], NCZtwisimaia ga:::eta, 27 March 2001. 
156 Interview with Evgcnii Primakov: '"A Heavyweight's Forecast", 
Moskouskii Komsomo/ets, 17 May 2002. 
157 RFE/RL Ncws!i,w, 21 May 2002. 
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Intelligence Service, Sergei Lebedev, and the leader of the 
General Staff's main intelligence command, Valentin 
Korabelnikov. This meeting was supposed to secure, through 
co-optation, the support of the political elite for the Kremlin's 
foreign policy line before the summit between Putin and Bush, 
which was to start the next day.158 As such, the meeting was 
unprecedented. The State Council was a consultative body set 
up in September 2000 to give a role to the regional leaders in 
the Federation Council, who at this point lost most of their 
powers. The State Council had discussed foreign policy issues 
only once before this meeting. This had occurred on 24 
September 2001, when it had been summoned to a plenary 
session by President Putin, and was consulted on Russia's 
strategic alignment with the West in the campaign against 
terror, a decision that had in fact been made before the 
consultation. 
The sensitivity of the issues at hand demanded that the 
discussion be closed to observers and journalists. In a 
comment after the meeting, Mikhail Margelov lauded the 
president for his "unprece~ented level of openness in making 
foreign policy decisions". 1.>9 Nonetheless, the Presidium's 
recommendations to the president were not discussed in detail, 
allegedly to "maintain political correctness before the 
upcoming summit" .160 Putin touched on the most sensitive 
issue, the extent to which the alignment with the West was 
within Russia's interests, only once in his opening speech, 
when he described the current state of Russian-American 
relations: 
158 RFEIRL Newsline, 22 May 2002; Irina Nagornykh, "Prezidium 
Gossoveta vyshcl na mczhdunarodnyi uroven" [The Stare Council 
Presidium goes out on the international level], Kommersallt, 23 May 
1002; Anon Zakatnova, uPrezidiurn Gossoveta zanialsia vneshnci 
politikoi" [The State Council Presidium engages in foreign policy]. 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 May 2002. 
159 "'Mikhail Margclov: Prczidcnr pokazaJ bcspretscdcntnyi uroven 
otkrytosri v priniatii vncshncpoliticheskikh re.shcnii" (Mikhail 
Margclov: The president shows unprecedenred openness in making 
foreign policy decisions), VVP.m, 22 May 2002. 
160 Zakatnova, "Prezidium Gossovcta ..... 
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The atmosphere of mutual trust and clear 
understanding, [the sense] that our countries are no 
longer enemies, that we have attained [in Russian-
American relations] over the past year, have allowed us 
to make new agreements .. , to limit the strategic 
potential of our country. This is not only within 
Russia '5 interests, but also [in the interests of} the 
global community.161 
This statement was similar to official statements Putin had 
made at summits on the international level. The style did not 
encourage critical comment. 
The statements from Sergei Ivanov in February, Igor Ivanov 
in March, and Putin in April and May seemed to be part of an 
effort to reassure the political elite that Russia's alignment 
with the West was in Russia's interest. The extended session 
of the State Council's Presidium in May indicated that there 
was a need for further efforts to convince the political elite. 
One consequence of the efforts to reassure the elite was 
that the interest in the Western bases in Central Asia waned 
somewhat. This was undoubtedly welcome in the Kremlin. 
These efforts also effectively set the limits of what the political 
elite could comment upon. The Western bases in Central Asia 
could be discussed, and discussion continued. But gradually, 
this became the preserve of the military-security constituency. 
This part of the political elite is considerable, but in the debate 
on the \X'estern bases in Central Asia, the participants tended 
to be less infl uential in policymaking. In the general pol itical 
elite, Putin's strategic decision to align with the United States 
in the campaign against terror was now even less than before 
a topic open for discussion. In this respect, co-optation was a 
success. Nevertheless, when the relationship between Russia 
and the United States deteriorated later in 2002, a significant 
part of the political elite was again ready to be generally 
critical of American foreign policy. 
161 Vladimir Putin, "Vysruplcnie na rassbircnnorn zascdanii prezidiuma 
Gossovcta n [Speech at the extended session of the State Council 
Presidium}, 22 May 2002. 
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Martial arts in foreign policy 
A debate in the daily Nezavisimaia gazeta reflected the 
internal Russian debate in autumn 2002. It started On 11 
September, with a feature article about what Russia had 
gained and lost by aligning with the United States one year 
earlier. According to the newspaper, the most significant 
question for Russia in considering the consequences of 11 
September 2001 was whether Russia had gained or lost in the 
geopolitical balance of "expenses and income". In sum, the 
newspaper found that Russia had lost. The primary reason 
cited was the Western bases in Central Asia, "an actual 
geopolitical surrender of positions" in the region, which the 
"NATO forces will not leave". Among the other Russian 
defeats cited in the article were NATO's enlargement to the 
Baltic states, the US unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty, 
and the failure of the international community to write off 
Soviet debt. The article ended with a table that listed twelve 
anticipated Russian demands from the United States under the 
heading "What Russia wanted to receive", side by side with 
the corresponding list of "What Russia received" .162 
It was not uncommon to hear statements along these lines, 
but the feature article was unusually frank and detailed. The 
quid pro quo mode of thinking was still predominate in the 
Russian political elite. The feature article in Nezavisimaia 
gazeta led to a new rush of comments on the US presence in 
Central Asia. Not everyone agreed that the US was in Central 
Asia to stay. For example, Viktor Kremeniuk of the USA and 
Canada Institute did not agree that the US presence in Central 
Asia would last, and found it unlikely that the American 
influence in the region would increase. If this did nevertheless 
happen, he thought it even more unlikely that the Central 
Asian governments would welcome this.163 However, other 
analysts subscribed to the view that the American influence in 
the region was increasing, while the Russian influence 
162 Lidiia Andrusenko and Olga Tropkina) "Mezalians s Amerikoi" 
[Misalliance with America]. Nezavisimoia gaz:da, 11 September 2002. 
163 "Rossiiu zhdct konflikt s NATO" [Conflict with NATO awaits Russia], 
Nezmdsimaia gazeta, 23 September 2002. 
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decreased. Among these was Stanislav Belkovskii of the 
Council for National Strategy, who argued rather 
pessimistically; "Russia ceased to be a power centre for the 
Central Asian republics when American bases were established 
in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.,,164 This view was supported 
by Viacheslav Igrunov, deputy chairman of the Duma 
Committee for CIS Affairs from the Yabloko Party. He 
acknowledged that after the confrontation between Russia 
and NATO had ended, there were no "formal reasons" to 
reproach CIS states for acting against the interests of Russia. 
But he observed that Russia's monopoly on security in the CIS 
had ended, and accused the Russian government of being 
passive when faced with American competition in Central 
Asia. He also expected that this development could end up 
with Central Asia being declared a zone of special American 
interests.165 
At the end of 2002, Viacheslav Igrunov's opinion and three 
other statements summed up the current state of the internal 
Russian debate on the American bases in Central Asia. Sergei 
Lebedev shared Igrunov's worries as he said that Russia was 
"concerned" by NATO's "declared interest in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus" .1 66 Igor Ivanov emphasised the official 
Kremlin line in remarks made on an ORT television show, 
where he mentioned the Western bases in Central Asia as one 
of many concessions to the United States that were in line with 
Russian national interests, and an example of how Russia's 
national interests could coincide with American foreign policy 
objectives.167 Mikhail Margelov participated in the same TV 
164 Sranislav Bclkovskii, "Poslednie doi sodruzhestva" [The 
commonwealth's last days], Ne:uJtlisimaia gazcta, 8 October 1002. 
Bclkovskii's comments were generally received as particularly weighty. 
165 Vasilina Vasileva, "Srrany Sodru7.hcstva promcniali starshego hrata na 
zaokeanskogo diadiu" [The commonwcalch states changed their big 
brother for an uncle from overseas], Nezatl;simaia gazeta, 2 December 
2002. 
166 RFEIRL News/il1c, 20 December 2002j "Scrgci Lebcdev: tot fakt, chto 
deistvuiushchii president - professionalnyi razvedchik, pomogaer rune 
kak direktoru SVR'" [Sergei lehedev: the fact that the present president 
is a professional intelligence officer helps me as the director of the 
Foreign Intelligence Service], stralla.m, 20 December 2002. 
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show. His opinion was that Russia had enhanced its national 
security without sacrificing the lives of its soldiers because of 
the United States' operations in Afghanistan. He also 
compared this aspect of Russian foreign policy to martial arts 
like judo,168 "in which you use the energy of your adversary 
to achieve your own goals." 169 Margelov's views were 
considered close to those of Putin's advisers, and Putin was 
reported to consult him directly as well. 
These comments also show one other aspect of the internal 
Russian debate as it had developed towards the end of 2002. 
The room for comments critical of the Kremlin's policy in 
Central Asia was clearly restricted. This applied less to general 
n1edia coverage than to mainstream politicians and 
bureaucrats, but the tendency was apparent in all types of 
criticism. The comments cited here hardly amount to a debate. 
Coverage of Central Asian issues in general, especially in 
relation to Russian foreign policy, also decreased in 2002. In 
the coverage that did appear, there were few critical comments 
from visible political actors. Viacheslav Igrunov's repeated 
commentaries became the exception. Remarks like that of 
Sergei Lebedev, cited above, were also exceptions. But 
Lebedev's remark was only briefly cited at the Internet news 
page stral1a.TU and cited in translation to English by Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The interview from which it was 
taken was printed in Rossiiskaia gazeta, but his comment on 
NATO in the Caucasus and Central Asia did not appear in the 
newspaper. 
A lost region for Russia? 
The worsening relationship between Russia and the United 
States in early 2003 was reflected in the Russian debate about 
the Western bases in Central Asia. It now focused on the issue 
of Russian influence in Central Asia: how to preserve it, and 
why it was waning. That Russian influence was waning had 
167 RFElRL Necvslinc, 23 December 2002. 
168 President Putin practises judo. 
169 RFEIRL Newslillc, 13 December 2002. 
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by now become an axiom in the press at least. From 
comments made by sources closer to the Kremlin, it emerged 
that this view had not yet taken hold there. The view that 
Russia's interests and American foreign policy goals had 
coincided when the Western bases were established still 
predominated among the central foreign policymakers. But 
there were fewer comments of this type, and they all seemed 
to contain a certain ambiguity towards the American 
deployment in Central Asia. This contributed to the 
impression that Kremlin's officials were not as thoroughly 
convinced as they had previously been that the presence of 
American forces in Central Asia was wholly in agreement with 
Russia '5 strategic interests. 
The two topics in the internal Russian debate at this point, 
the 'lost' Central Asia and how Russian influence could be 
preserved or even enhanced, were by now firmly established. 
The idea that Russia had 'lost' Central Asia was a conclusion 
undisputed in the Russian press. The Kremlin was accused of 
having been passive towards the region, thereby contributing 
to this loss. A few observers discussed what to do about this, 
and how to reengage with Central Asia, bur the debate was 
relatively muted. There were few media reports from Central 
Asia, and the Western bases there were yesterday'S news. The 
upcoming Duma elections at the end of the year did not 
contribute to raising public interest about this rather 
unspectacular region. 
The topic of Russia's strategic loss of Central Asia was also 
connected to the allegedly aggressive behaviour of the United 
States in the region, leaving an impression of a competition for 
influence. In one view, the competition for influence in 
Central Asia was connected to the American invasion of Iraq: 
"One of the consequences of the anti-Iraqi military operation 
that has not yet begun is the renewal of the struggle between 
the strongest states in the world for influence in Central 
Asia.,,170 The article then gave the example of a recently 
completed visit to Dushanbe by Igor Ivanov, during which 
170 Viktoriia PanfilovOl, "Moskva za nimi" [Moscow is after them1. 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 March Z003. 
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Russia had allegedly tried but failed to influence Tajikistan's 
government to repudiate its "close cooperation ,; with the 
United States "at the eve of the anti-Iraqi campaign". This 
was taken as evidence that the United States was trying to 
"increase its military influence in Central Asia on the quiet 
during the anti-Iraqi campaign".171 Viacheslav Igrunov in the 
same article voiced his fear that countries like Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Georgia would become clients of the United 
States. In his view, Russia had no chance to match the US 
"gifts" to Tajikistan. However, to increase its influence in 
Central Asia and the world in general, it should disassociate 
itself from the US and enter into closer alignment with 
"balancing" countries.1 72 But he did not exclude the 
possibility that Russia was more acceptable as a partner for 
the Central Asian states in the long run than was the United 
States. 
Others were more directly critical of the Kremlin's handling 
of relations with the Central Asian allies. One observer even 
opined that Russia's influence in Central Asia had been lost 
"deservedly", as Moscow's efforts had been too blatantly 
aimed at controlling the states. Viktor Kremeniuk again 
emphasised that Moscow's intention to retain the Central 
Asian states as allies had never been followed up by 
"impressive material resources". He also drew attention to 
how "nobody in Moscow" had ever explained the Russian 
interests in Central Asia in a "distinct manner".1?3 His advice 
for Russian policymakers was to avoid a clash with the US in 
Central Asia through a change in tone in the ongoing dialogue 
between the US and Russia. 
For the government, it was important to emphasise the 
development of Russian influence in the region rather than 
draw attention to Russian-American relations there. The Kant 
Base in Kyrgyzstan was steadily growing, and the plans to 
171 Ibid. 
172 "Rossiia ispolzuet SShA v kachcstve bufcra v Tsentralnoi Azii" [Russia 
uses the US as a buffer in Central Asia] in NCZiw;simaia gazcta, 30 April 
2003. 
173 Ibid. 
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develop the 201 st Division in Tajikistan into the Fourth Base 
were proceeding. These were good opportunities for the 
Kremlin to promote its Central Asia policy, and the defence 
minister duly did so a couple of times during the first half of 
2003. However, the delays in finalising the base were 
becoming an embarrassment to the Kremlin, as it contradicted 
the image of Tajikistan as a close ally of Russia in Central 
Asia. Tbe official opening of the Russian base had by now 
been postponed from July to October.1 74 A persistent rumour 
in Tajikistan, which claimed that the US had offered 
Tajikistan one billion dollars in long-term loans in return for 
ending the Russian militar~ presence, made it into Moscow 
newspapers that summer.1 5 Unreliable coverage like this 
seemed closely connected to the lack of official information 
and reliable media reporting, about the very real problems 
that Russia and Tajikistan had encountered in the negotiations 
over the new base. 
Renewed interest in Central Asia 
The relationship between Russia and its allies in Central Asia 
was dominated in autumn 2003 by the official opening of the 
Russian base at Kant. The internal Russia debate reflected 
this, with renewed attention on Russia's policies and aims in 
Central Asia as well as in the CIS as a whole. 
The topics in the internal debate in this period remained 
the same as previously. Various officials emphasised the 
continued development of Russian influence in Central Asia, 
and asserted that the CIS was a sphere of Russian influence. 
Such assertions were met positively in the few other comments 
there were, and also generally in media coverage of the region. 
The few comments that originated from outside official circles 
remained critical of the lack of direction in the Kremlin's 
efforts to form a Central Asia policy. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that at this point, there was very little room 
174 RFE/RL Nell'slillc, 27 June 2003. 
175 Igor 11!ugatarev, "Moskve prcdlozhili rokinut Tadzhikistan iz-za 
milliarda dollarov'" [Moscow was offered a billion dollars to leave 
Tajikistan], NeZilf'isimaia ga::eta, 16 July 2003. 
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for debate about Russia's policies in Central Asia inside 
Russia. Therefore, comments from non-state participants in 
public debate left an impression of being suspended in air, i.e. 
non-official responses were slow in coming, and often beside 
the point. Official comments contained only oblique 
references to non-official contributions in the debate. 
During most of the autumn, the opening of the base at 
Kant overshadowed the problems connected with the 
projected Fourth Base in Tajikistan. One exception was the 
former head of the General Staff, Leonid Ivashov, who in an 
interview with Nezavisimaia gazeta on 6 August commented. 
that Moscow had made a series of mistakes in the negotiations 
with Tajikistan over the new hase, e.g. by not placing the 
necessary emphasis on Russian investments in Tajikistan, 
unnecessary delays in the General Staff, and the lack of a 
Russian strategy towards Central Asia. I ?6 But his was one of 
very few comments on the issue. 
A new Military Doctrine. 
Official comments, on the other hand, were not only assertive 
towards Central Asia, but contained critical comments on the 
Western position in Central Asia as well. The first indication 
came when Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losiukov in 
an interview with Vrenlia l10vQstei said, "neither China nor 
Russia are happy about the American military presence in 
Central Asia," although he emphasised that the American 
military presence was a natural consequence of the operations 
in Afghanistan, which had removed a source of threat to 
Russia. I ?? This comment was at the time remarkable for its 
outspokenness. 
176 Viktoriia Panfilova, "Tiazhelo v tadzhiksko·rossiiskom uchcnii ... " 
[Tough Taiik-Russian studies], Nezavisimaia gazetd, 6 August 2003. 
177 Katcrina Labetskaia, "'Rcch ne 0 tom, kogo Rossiia prcdpochtct-
Iaponiiu iIi Kitai'''' ['The question is not about whom Russia prciers, 
Japan or China'], Vremia l101!Ostci, 24 July 2003. 
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The most authoritative contribution to the internal debate 
this autumn came from the deputy foreign minister 
responsible for CIS affairs, Viacheslav Trubnikov. In a feature 
article in Nezavisimaia gazeta on 15 September he stated that 
the Russian position [on the foreign military presence 
in Central Asia] is unalterable: a military presence here 
of powers from outside the region can be seen as a 
stabilising factor only when strictly co-ordinated with 
the aims and timeframes for solving the cancrerS tasks 
of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. I ? 
He also called for transparency and accordance with 
international norms and regulations from Russia's partners 
against terrorism inside and outside of the CIS. Specifically, he 
accused plans of the US and GUUAM to create a regional 
anti-terrorist centre under GUUAM of being unclear and 
"without any practical purpose" .179 Trubnikov's views were 
echoed in an article contributed to the July-September 
(Russian~ issue of the foreign policy journal Russia in Global 
Affairs.1 0 Here, Mikhail Margelov elaborated what was 
meant by the often-repeated view that seemed to prevail in the 
Kremlin - that the CIS was a traditional sphere of influence 
for Russia: 
This should not he interpreted as a revival of some 
latent imperial ambitions: Moscow has no plans of 
dictating to its neigh bars whom to befriend or how to 
behave, nevertheless, problems emerging in the CIS 
countries do have direct bearing on Rusgia, and the 
world community must reckon with it. 1 1 
178 Viacheslav Trubnikov, "Vncshncpolitichcskii front Rossii" (Russia's 
foreign policy front], Nezauisimaia gaze/a, 15 September 2003. 
179 Ibid. 
180 In Russian: Rossiia l' globalnoi /JOlitikc, www.globalaffairs.ru. The 
journal is published in Russian and English, but the Russian and English 
issues differ in content and number of volumes per year. 
181 Mikhail Margelov, "Pobeda po ochkam", Rossiia 11 globallloi /Jolitike, 
vo!. 1, no. 3 (july·September 2003): 8-16, 12-13. As translated in 
Mikhail Margelov, "'Victory on Points: Pragmatism in Foreign Policy", 
Rmsia ill Global Aifairs vol. 1, no. 3. 
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Trubnikov's and Margelov's articles prepared the ground in 
Moscow for the more assertive line towards the CIS and 
Central Asia taken by Sergei Ivanov in his speech on 2 
October. In the speech, the defence minister emphasised the 
links between Russian security and potential instability in the 
CIS. Preventive strikes within the CIS were mentioned as a 
possibility for Russia for the first time. Judging by the speech, 
NATO and the US were again seen as adversaries at least 
within in the territory of the CIS, instead of partners, let alone 
allies. 182 
This was again consistent with the negative view of the 
Western military presence in Central Asia that Sergei Ivanov 
signalled in Colorado Springs later in October. It was clear 
that to the Kremlin's official position on the Western military 
presence in Central Asia as temporary, limited and useful but 
not without drawbacks had been added apprehension and a 
view that it could damage Russia's own interests in the region. 
Russia's foreign policy position had changed, but in the 
domestic debate, these were older thoughts. 
Summing up: the Russian political debate 
Of course, the Russian debate on the Western bases in Central 
Asia had far more participants with more diverse opinions 
than the official Russian reactions directed towards the West 
show. However, in this debate the president and the defence 
minister were also important participants. 
As regards the president, this was a presence that differed 
markedly from that of other participants in the debate. There 
waS a difference both in the number of appearances Putin 
made in the debate, as well as in the role he assumed once 
participating. Firstly, as regards Putin's number of 
appearances in the debate, he was in fact conspicuous by his 
absence from the debate, rather than for his participation in it. 
Other participants in the debate commented upon his absence. 
Comments of this kind often argued that the political elite was 
unconvinced by the president's strategic decision, indirectly 
182 S. Ivanov, "Vystuplenic na sovcshchanii .. ," 
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charging that Putin had not sufficiently explained his policy to 
the political establishment. In this way, Putin's long periods of 
non-participation in the internal debate were also periods 
within which his participation appeared called for. This 
applies especially to the autumn of 2001 and spring of 2002. 
After Putin's televised speech, in which he outlined Russia's 
strategic decision, there were no further efforts to explain and 
ehlborate on this choice. The Crawford summit, and the high 
profile that Putin at this point maintained in international 
politics, meant that in Russia firsthand reports about 
developments in Russian foreign policy were received mainly 
from non-Russian media or from the Russian media's 
reporting on Putin's meetings with international leaders. On 
the home front, the president kept a low profile on foreign 
policy issues. This lasted until April 2002, when the annual 
address to the Federal Assembly contained some comments on 
foreign policy. But the speech did not place much emphasis on 
foreign policy in general, and the few comments ahout the CIS 
that it contained were clearly not enough. This was indicated 
by the extraordinary meeting in May, at which Putin met 
central parties of the political elite to gather support for his 
foreign policy line. 
This leads on to the second point - the role Putin assumed 
in the debate. Throughout the spring of 2002 there were many 
critical comments from politicians and officials with a high 
profile about the Western military presence in Central Asia. A 
fair share of the political elite did not approve of the 
president'S strategic decision from the previous autumn. This 
was particularly reflected in the general suspicion and 
disapproval with which the Western bases in Central Asia 
were met. After Putin's meeting with the political elite in May, 
however, the criticism quieted, and disappeared outright from 
the media. The president'S efforts may have convinced the 
elite, but as pointed out earlier in this chapter, the 
disappearance of the widespread criticism may just as well 
have been caused by a general perception that the president'S 
intervention had narrowed the room and scope for criticism. 
Of course, as new developments in international politics 
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eclipsed the Western bases in Central Asia and the war in 
Afghanistan, these topics were less prominent in the public 
debate. The sudden disappearance of all criticism does 
however lead one to think that the president's intervention 
was important. Also, critical questions regarding Russian 
policy, be it in the war against terror, or in Central Asia, 
disappeared from the public debate. The debate became 
narrower, focusing instead on the secondary issues of 
American policy or policies of the Central Asian governments. 
Accordingly, one may speak of Putin's forceful presence in the 
debate. 
Putin's participation in the debate is characterised by a 
feature often noted in Russian rolitics: the president loftily 
poses as being 'above politics'. 1 3 In this case it may be added 
that not only did Putin make himself appear to be above 
politics, he was also above explaining or elaborating policy as 
well. This left the political elite unconvinced at first (autumn 
2001), later concerned (first half 2002), and thereafter 
disinterested to a degree bordering on apathy. 
Apart from Putin's conspicuous absence, punctuated by 
short breaks of forceful appearances, there are other notable 
characteristics in the debate. The range of participants varied 
over time. At times, for example just before the Crawford 
summit in November 2001 and in the first months of 2002 it 
included large parts of the political elite. At other times, for 
example the period just after the president's speech on 24 
September 2001, and partly also in autumn 2002, it consisted 
mainly of a military-security constituency. This included some 
participants from the military and security agencies, retired 
officers and a few analysts and politicians with a professed 
183 Scc Peter C. Ordcshook, "Rc-examining Russia: Institutions and 
Incentives"', Jotlmal of Democracy 6, 2 (April 1995): 46-60. Reprinted 
in Archic Brown: Contemporary Russia1l Politics. A Reader (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). The expressions 'above parry' and 
'above politics' were first used to refer to Boris Yeltsin's refusal to be 
associated with any Russian party, especially in the 1996 presidential 
election campaign. Vladimir Putin has continued this tradition, although 
he has been associated with United Russia and its predecessor Unity 
more directly than Ycltsin was with any so~called party of power during 
his presidency. 
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belief in Russia's need to maintain great power status. This 
constituency was mostly critical of the Kremlin '5 foreign 
policies, especially of the Kremlin's perceived inaction or 
passivity in the CIS, and any Russian concessions to the 
United States. 
Very few voices in support of the Kremlin's policies were 
heard. In the autumn of 2001, Russia's liberals welcomed 
Putin's strategic decision, though they did not later participate 
in the debate. One persistent Kremlin supporter throughout 
the period under study was Mikhail Margelov, chairman of 
the Federation Council's Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Margelov was seen in the period as one of Putin's key advisors 
on foreign policy. His participation in the debate took on 
official overtones, especially when he elaborated on Putin's 
strategic decision and explained it for domestic consumption. 
More direct answers to domestic criticism came from the 
defence and foreign ministers. This happened in February and 
March 2002, when Sergei Ivanov maintained that Russia was 
reasserting itself in the CIS, while Igor Ivanov refuted that 
Russia had made concessions to the United States in the war 
against terror. The amendments to the military doctrine 
concerning the CIS may also be seen as an answer to the 
criticism that Russia was too passive in the post-Soviet space. 
While the focus on CIS and Central Asia in general was 
undoubtedly called for to make Russian foreign and security 
policy more consistent, it also answered a large part of the 
elite's concerns, especially those of the military-security 
constituency. 
The questions in the debate were increasingly framed in 
narrow terms. There were three main topics: the alleged 
unilateral Russian concessions to the United States, the 
question of why Central Asia was lost to Russia, and the 
question of how Central Asia could be regained for Russia. 
While the question of unilateral concessions emerged before 
the Crawford summit and nearly disappeared in spring 2002, 
the two latter topics emerged more gradually, but persisted 
longer. Their content is discussed above in this chapter. The 
dominance of these questions in the debate emphasises the 
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degree to which geopolitical thinking, characterised by zero-
sum games, notions of balance of power and spheres of 
influence, shapes the worldview of the Russian political 
elite,184 Apart from the geopolitical mindset, however, a 
notable feature in the domestic debate was the absence of 
questions about the strategic decision in favour of an 
alignment with the West in the war against terror. This would 
not have been remarkable if the domestic debate had indicated 
that one consequence of this choice, the Western bases in 
Central Asia, was welcomed by the Russian political elite, 
However, the lack of criticism of Putin's strategic decision 
remained a contrast to the unpopularity of the Western bases 
and the general scepticism in the Russian political elite 
towards the American goals in the war against terror. In this 
respect, one can say that the Kremlin succeeded in its efforts 
to set the limits for discussion, 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have seen how the issue of the Western 
bases in Central Asia hecame contentious in the Russian 
political elite, and how this was especially visible in January-
February 2002, The elite's support for the strategic alignment 
remained unconvinced, Efforts from the Kremlin to co-opt the 
elite in April and May 2002 were not a success, and can best 
be characterised as too little, too late, The debate remained 
framed in the view that a competition for influence in Central 
Asia existed, a zero-sum game, and it became an axiom that 
Russian influence there was waning, In autumn 2002, 
comments from the Kremlin indicated that uncertainty about 
US goals in Central Asia had spread even to the most 
prominent policymakers, As regards the Russian-American 
relationship, it is noteworthy that room for domestic political 
debate on this issue became restricted, especially in spring 
184 Cf. Lo, Vladimir Putin alld tbe Eflo/utiolt of Russian Foreiglt Po/ic)" p. 
72. 
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2002, in what may have been a conscious effort by the 
Kremlin to reduce the impact of the domestic political debate 
on this relationship. 
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Chapter 5 
Russia's policies in Central Asia 
This chapter contains the narrative of Russia's response to the 
establishment of Western bases in Central Asia as it emerged 
in Russian policy and Russian political signalling towards the 
Central Asian states. Some statements and issues are the same 
as in the previous chapters, but in this chapter they are seen as 
belonging to this aspect of the Russian response. I will also 
focus on how concrete steps followed political signalling with 
an emphasis on military steps. However, energy resources and 
their transport are important in the engagement of external 
powers in Central Asia. Towards the end of the chapter, I will 
discuss Russia's energy engagement in Central Asia in some 
detail. Finally, I sum up the main features of the Russian 
policy towards the Central Asian states. 
Renewed Russian interest in Central Asia 
The Central Asian countries received renewed attention from 
Russian politicians, media and commentators after 11 
September and Putin's speech on 24 September.185 Also 
Western, especially American, politicians, journalists and 
NGO representatives visited the Central Asian states to an 
extent never experienced before. The new attention from the 
West concentrated on security issues, and mainly concerned 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan and 
T urkmenistan were still more interesting for their energy 
185 Putin, "Zaiavlcnic Prczidenta Rossii". 
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resources. Russian interest in multilateral settings involving all 
the five countries also increased.186 Policy towards the Central 
Asian states was no longer the preserve of a few officials, the 
military establishment and politicians with special interests. 
Russian politicians from government ministers to lesser Duma 
politicians toured the Central Asia capitals to discuss the war 
on terrorism. This campaign influenced the full set of foreign 
policy priorities. In this way, one could say that the war on 
terrorism reinforced the more active Central Asian policy that 
Putin had introduced. 
Typical of the increased interest in Central Asia was a 
particularly heavyweight delegation to Dushanbe in late 
October. Four of the top securiry and defence officials visited 
the Central Asian capitals.187 In Dushanbe, Vladimir Rushailo 
and Sergei Ivanov joined President Putin, who made a 
stopover on his way from the APEC summit in Shanghai to 
Moscow.1 88 On the agenda was the campaign against terror 
and Russia's and Central Asia's place in it. Most importantly, 
Putin, Tajikistan's president, Imomali Rakhomonov, and 
Burhanuddin Rabballi, the political leader of the Afghan 
Northern Alliance, had a trilateral meeting to discuss the post-
Taliban government in Afghanistan.189 Prior to Putin's 
arrival, Sergei Ivanov, Nikolai Patrushev, and President 
Rakhmonov had discussed upgrading the Tajik-Russian 
. . 190 
secunty cooperatIon. 
186 Many of these settings involved four countries, as Turkmenistan 
participated less in accordance with its neutrality policy. 
187 Specifically, Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo, the head of 
the General Scaff, Anatolii KV3shnin, FSB Head Nikolai Parrushcv, and 
Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov. 
188 Putin was accompanied by 19or Ivanov, the deputy head of the 
presidential administration Sergei Prikhodko, and the emergency 
situations minister, Sergei Shoigll. 
189 "V Dushanbe sostoinlns vstrecha Vladimira Pmina, Emomali 
Rakhmonova i Burkhanuddina Rabbani" [Vladimir Putin, imomali 
Rakhmonov and Burkhanuddin Rabbani met in Dushanbe], strallo.ru, 
22 October 2001. 
190 RFEIRL Newsliltc, 22 OctOber 20(H, 
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Another sign that Moscow's interest in Central Asia was 
growing was a proposal from the Russian-Kyrgyz 
interparliamentary commission on 5 October. The 
commission proposed to create a joint Russian-Kyrgyz 
military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, within the parameters of 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty. The head of the Russian 
delegation to the commission, Duma Speaker Gennadii 
Seleznev, stated that such a base would be in Kyrgyzstan's 
interest. 191 One more indication of an increased Russian 
military presence in Central Asia came on 7 December, when 
Sergei Ivanov discussed a strengthening and re-equipping of 
the 201 sr Motorised Rifle Division in Tajikistan with President 
Rakhmonov.192 This had already heen agreed to in 1999 in 
connection with an agreement to transform the 201 se Division 
to a fully-fledged Russian base; however, the plans had not 
been followed up afterwards. 
There were also other offers. On 14 November, Deputy 
Interior Minister Viacheslav Tikhomirov said that Russia 
could possibly offer CIS governments special technologies to 
help them combat terrorism.1 93 Through a variety of 
channels, Russia was using the opportunity offered by the war 
on terrorism to develop its military and security relations with 
the Central Asian countries. 
Seriously and for the long term 
By early 2002, Russia was increasing its military engagement 
in Central Asia. This renewed activity was directed mainly 
towards Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In both countries, the 
plans involved military bases. An obvious explanation for this 
was that after the faU of the Taliban, it was important to 
maintain stability in the wider region. Undoubtedly, Moscow 
sought to secure positions to observe and influence further 
developments in and around Afghanistan as well. But there 
191 RFEIRL Newslinc, 9 October 2001. 
192 RFEIRL Newsline, 10 December 200!. 
193 RFE/RL NCllIsline, 15 November 2001. 
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were also indications that the increased Russian engagement 
was partly there to balance the Western presence in the 
Central Asian states. 
That balancing was the aim was particularly evident after 
Elizabeth Jones's statement about the American engagement in 
Central Asia, which in her words, as discussed at the end of 
chapter 2, was intended "seriously - and for the long 
term" .194 One indication came in the apprehensive comments 
Russian politicians made in January 2002 on the presence of 
Western forces in Central Asia. These comments, discussed on 
page 64, contributed to the internal Russian debate on the 
Western military presence in Central Asia. However, the 
Central Asian leaders follow debates and statements in Russia 
very closely. They may certainly regard them as indications of 
how official policy may develop. The level of freedom of 
speech was higher in Russia than in any of these countries in 
the period under study, and this may have further disposed 
them to see political debate as a medium for conveying semi-
official signals.195 Some statements may simply carry more 
weight when approached from Central Asia than they do 
within a specifically Russian context. This particularly applies 
to the statements from Gennadii Seleznev in January. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Seleznev was against the 
long-term deployment of US forces in Central Asia. He said 
that any decisions related to the establishment of permanent 
American bases in Central Asia should be made only after 
discussions involving Russia as well as the Central Asian 
states, and expressed suspicions that the US was using the 
bases in Uzbekistan and K yrgyzstan in an effort to control the 
situation on the Indian-Pakistani border, in western China and 
in Kazakhstan.1 96 These statements were made in Central 
Asia, while Seleznev was visting Astana and Dushanbe. 
Therefore, it is more likely that they were intended for the 
Central Asian governments and these governments saw them 
as Russian political signals. 
194 jones1 "Testimony Before ... " 
195 Point emphasised by Azhdar Kurtov. Interview 19 November 1004. 
196 RFElRL NcU!sJinc) 10 and 14 January 2002. 
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A more active policy 
The level of Russian activity towards the Central Asian states 
was kept up in the spring of 2002. Its two characterising 
features were firstly that the main concerns belonged to the 
military and security spheres, and secondly, that it focused on 
bodies and mechanisms that did not include the West, 
accompanied by statements that were mildly wary of the 
United States' intentions in Central Asia. 
By the time of the unofficial CIS summit in Almaty in late 
February, it was evident that a period with growing Russian 
activity in Central Asia had begun. In Almaty, President Putin 
declared that the CIS states' support for the campaign against 
terror had been the only possible strategic and moral choice in 
the circumstances after 11 September 2001.197 Throughout 
March and April, the assertive rhetoric observed from January 
and February towards the Central Asian countries with 
Western bases was accompanied by concrete plans and 
measures. This activity was first and foremost concerned with 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
In a meeting with the speaker of the lower chamber of the 
Kyrgyz parliament in early April, the chairman of the Duma 
Committee for CIS relations and former deputy foreign 
minister, Boris Pastukhov, said that the agreement signed by 
the Kyrgyz government concerning a one-year lease for the 
US-led base at Manas should not be prolonged.198 A few days 
later, at a meeting in Almaty of security council secretaries 
from the member states of the Collective Security Treaty, 
Vladimir Rushailo called for the treaty states to cooperate 
more actively in the war on terrorism. He also underlined that 
the treaty was open to new members.199 Plans for turning the 
197 "Vladimir Putin: podderzhka stranami SNG antiterroristichcskoi 
koalitsii - edinstvcnno vozmozhnyi shag" [Vtadimir Putin: support for 
the anti-terrorist coalition from the CIS countries is the only possible 
step], stral1a.ru, 1 March 2002. 
198 RFE/RL News[inc, 3 April 2002. 
199 RFElRL Newslil1c, 12 April 2002. 
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treaty into a treaty organisation were approved by the 
presidents of the participating states at a presidential summit 
in Moscow in May. 
Both Rushailo and his Kyrgyz colleague, Misir Ashirkulov, 
made statements concerning the Western forces in Central 
Asia. Ashirkulov opened for a prolonged Western military 
presence if the anti terrorist operation lasted longer than 
anticipated. Rushailo, on the other hand, said that although 
Russia viewed the US as its strategic ally, "the tasks, goals, 
and schedule of the Western military presence in Central Asia 
should be 'clearly determined'. ,,200 
The focus was not only on the Collective Security Treaty. 
From mid-April, the development of security cooperation was 
the topic of bilateral contact between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. 
The contact included telephone contact between Putin and 
President Akaev and meetings between Nikolai Patrushev and 
Akaev, and between the director of the Federal Border Service, 
Konstantin Totskii and the Kyrgyz defence minister, Esen 
Topoev.201 From the outset Patrushev tied his visit to Bishkek 
in to the US military presence in Kyrgyzstan. In a comment, he 
said that the main aim of his visit was "to renew the full 
extent of security cooperation between the two countries" 
[Russia and Kyrgyzstan], on the grounds that the Americans 
were in Central Asia for a short period only.202 In line with 
this, Patrushev and Akaev discussed expanded bilateral 
cooperation against international terrorism within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as external to this 
organisation. 
Totskii and Topoev signed a protocol on military-technical 
cooperation between the Russian Federal Border Service, the 
Kyrgyz Defence Ministry, and the Kyrgyz National Security 
Service. The cooperation mainly concerned equipment for the 
Kyrgyz borders, the aim being to establish an independent 
Kyrgyz border service by 2003.203 These contacts with 
200 RFEIRL News/illc, 15 April 2002. 
201 RFElRL NewsHnc, 17 and 24 April 2002. 
202 Panfilova and Khanbabian, "Patrushcv, Totskii i Ramsfcld ... ". 
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Kyrgyzstan indicated that Russia was trying to raise the level 
of bilateral cooperation with Kyrgyzstan to the level that 
already existed in its relations with Tajikistan. 
Russia's policies in Central Asia were significantly tilted 
towards security contacts. For example, in April, Russian, 
Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Tajik forces participated in a Russian-led 
anti-terrorism exercise in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.204 The 
direction of the efforts to develop the relationships with 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan demonstrated that this was to be 
continued. Statements by Akaev and Putin and by 
Rakhmonov and Putin after bilateral meetings on the sidelines 
of the summit that more should be done to strengthen 
bilateral trade sounded insubstantial in comparison with what 
was being discussed on the military and security sides.205 
The closer relationship between Russia and Kyrgyzstan was 
formalised the following month when Sergei Ivanov and Esen 
Topoev met in Bishkek to sign several bilateral cooperation 
agreements. One of them permitted Russia to maintain its 
military installations in Kyrgyzstan and according to Ivanov 
they would remain for another 7 to 15 years.206 There were 
also agreements on the joint training of crack military units 
and Rnssian purchases of Kyrgyz military goods.2D7 Another 
confirmation of a close relationship came at a joint press 
conference with Ashirkulov and Rushailo in Bishkek on 13 
June, when Ashirkulov said that the Western deployment in 
203 Independent of CIS assistance and as an entity separate from the Kyrgyz 
Army. In 2001, Kyrgytstan had received equipment for border 
surveillance from Russia to the value of 2.5 million rubles. PanfiJova and 
Khanbabian, "Patrushcv, Totskii i Ramsfdd ... ". 
204 RFE/RL News/illc, 15 Aprii2002; Arid Cohen, "CIS Remains Top 
Priority In Russian Foreign Policy"', Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 24 
April 2002. 
205 RFEIRL News/iuc, 15 May 2002. The economic side of bilateral 
relations \Vas also weakened by the Duma's refusal to approve the plans 
to restructure Kyrgyz debts to Russia (133 million USD), on the grounds 
that the American use of the Manas Base gave the Kyrgyz state a 
substantial income. Sce Panfilova and Khanbabian, "'Patrushev, Totskii i 
Ramsfcld ... " 
206 RFElRL NCUJslillc, 14 June 2002. 
207 Marina Kozlova, "'Russian military to remain in Kyrgyzstan", UPl, 13 
June 1002. 
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Kyrgyzstan should end within six months of the mandate's 
expiry, i.e. within the first half of 2003. Rushailo added that 
Moscow would consult with Kyrgyzstan if the terms of that 
withdrawal were changed.IOS This indicated that Russian 
influence over Kyrgyzstan's security priorities would remain 
strong and was unlikely to decrease in the future. 
Russia also seemed to be trying to strengthen Russian-
sponsored alternatives to a close relationship with the United 
States in the war on terrorism. But the increased Russian 
activity could simply have been an effort to secure Russian 
influence in the region when faced with purely regional 
organisations. A new regional organisation - the Central 
Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) - had been 
constituted on 28 Februarl' on the basis of the Central Asian 
Economic Cooperation.ID This may have served as a motive 
for Russia. The planned upgrade of the Collective Security 
Treaty to a Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 
seemed to reflect such Russian efforts to secure its influence in 
the CIS. Before the presidential summit in Moscow, the 
defence and foreign ministers of the member states had 
proposed a joint military force under the command of the 
Russian General Staff. The member states' presidents r~ected 
this proposal, as they had failed to reach agreement.21 
Clearly, the other member governments were reluctant to give 
the Russian General Staff command over some of their forces, 
and access to internal staff procedures. However, they 
endorsed the upgrading of the Tashkent Treaty to an 
international organisation. 
The CSTO was controversial for another reason too. 
Uzbekistan's government was strongly critical of the creation 
of CSTO on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty, from 
which it had withdrawn in 1999. Uzbek Defence Minister 
Kadyr Guliamov's failiure to come to a meeting of the SCO 
208 RFEIRL News/hIe, 14 June 1002. 
209 The members at this point were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzsran, Tajikistan and 
Uzbckistan. The Central Asian Economic Cooperation was constituted 
in 1998 when Tajikistan joined the Central Asian Economic Union from 
1994. 
210 RFE/RL NeUJs/illc, 15 May 2002. 
"A CRUCI,IL SPHERE FOR OUR SECURITY" 101 
defence ministers in Moscow directly after the CSTO 
presidential summit was taken as a sign of Tashkent's 
disapproval of the CSTO.211 
Focus on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
From summer 2002, Russia's efforts to increase and reaffirm 
its military presence in Central Asia gathered new speed. The 
efforts focused on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The relationship 
between Russia and Uzbekistan did not develop much in this 
period. On the military side, the level of cooperation remained 
very low. In contrast, the much closer bilateral relationships 
with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan became increasingly tilted 
towards security and military affairs. 
In summer 2002, it became known that Russia was 
providing Kyrgyzstan with equipment and spare parts worth 
around 130,000 US dollars to modernise its air defence 
system.2l2 Further assistance in the form of anti-aircraft 
missiles was possible.213 The two presidents also followed up 
their foreign ministers' conclusions from June when they 
discussed a possible extension of military-industrial 
cooperation between the two countries mainly in the form of 
Russian purchases of Kyrgyz defence hardware at their 
meeting in Sochi in Septem ber. 214 
However, the most important development in Russian-
Kyrgyz relations this autumn Was the start of the Russian 
deployment at Kant Airbase outside Bishkek.2l5 On 2 
211 Viktoriia Panfilova and Armen Khanbahian, "Uzhekistan ne zhelaet 
druzhit armiaiami" [Uzbckistan does not want a friendship in armies], 
Nczovisimoia gazeta, 16 May 2002. 
211 Aleksandr Bogatyrcv, "Iuzhnyi rubczh" [The southern frontier], 
Krasltaia Ztrczda, 5 December 2002. Onc source claims that the free of 
charge Russian deliveries in 2002 were worth 7.6 million rubles, or 
around 250,000 US dollars, and that the total .sum for Russian deliveries 
of air defence equipment to Kyrgyzstan since 1998 equalled 14 million 
rubles. See Vladimir Shvarev, '''Shkvali' iz Bishkeka'" ['Squalls' from 
Bishkek], Neuwisimoc I'oel/noc obozrelJie, 31 October 2003. Regardless 
of which sum is correct, the contribution was quite small. 
213 RFE/RL Ncwsline, 11 July 2002. 
214 RFE/RL News/ille, 10 September 2002; Viktoriia Panfilova, "Skazano-
sdclano" {Said and done], Nezal'isimaia gazeta, 23 September 2002. 
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December, Russian combat aircraft landed at the site of the 
future base. According to Kyrgyzstan's defence minister, Esen 
Topoev, the Russian deployment ~lanned to extend to about 
20 aircraft216 and 700 personnel.-1? It escaped nobody's 
attention that the future Kant Base was located about 30 
kilometres from the Western Manas Base, and some observers 
cited this as one of tWO main reasons for the location of the 
base.218 An obvious reason for the choice of location was 
Kant's relative proximity to Russia's borders compared with 
the 201 st Division in Tajikistan. This eased the logistical 
arrangements for the deployment in Tajikistan. On the other 
hand, while being a convenient stop on the way to Dushanbe, 
Kant was far enough from Kyrgyzstan's troubled southern 
borders to minimise the threat from militant Islamic radicals. 
One aim could even have been to suppress outbursts of 
militant Islamic radicalism and handle security threats such as 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's military incursions 
from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and 
2000. The location close to Bishkek also fuelled speculations 
that one objective of the base was to offer President Akaev 
and the Kyrgyz government armed support if necessary, 
perhaps even to "[prop] up Akayev's embattled 
215 The plans for a Russian base on Kyrgyz territory were initiated by Askar 
Akacv, see Roman Strcshncv, "Shchit dlia orcchcstva", KraSlloia Zl!ezda, 
24 October 2003. Incidentally, Knot had been considered as a location 
for the coalition base, but the Western evaluation team preferred Manas. 
See Bogatyrcv, "'Iuzhnyi rubczh". 
216 RFFJRL specified the aircraft as .. 1 0 fighters, five training aircraft, two 
transport planes, and two multi-purpose helicopters", a total of 19 
aircraft. RFEIRL News/fllc, 03 December 2002. These aircraft were in 
Bogaryrcv, "Iuzhnyi rubezh", given as five Sukhoi 5u-27 fighters, five 
Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft, two Amonov An-26 transport aircraft, five 
1.-39 :1ircrnft, two Mi-39 helicopters and two I1iushin 11-76 transport 
aircraft. 
117 Zamira Eshanova, "Central Asia: Diplomatic Visits Highlight U.S., 
Russian Competition" t RFEIRL, 3 December 2002. 
118 Viktoriia Panfilova and Sergei Sokut, "Putin spasct Akaeva" [Putin will 
save Akacv], NeZill.'isimaia gazeta, 1 December 1001. 
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administration".219 When Akaev was in fact unseated in 
March 2005? the troops at the Kant Base remained neutral 
and passive.-20 
The importance of the deployment was further underlined 
by Putin's visit to Bishkek on 5 December, the same day Sergei 
Ivanov attended the arrival of two Russian combat aircraft at 
Kant. Putin met Askar Akaev and the two presidents discussed 
a wide variety of matters. This included signing an agreement 
to write off two thirds of Kyrgyzstan's debt to Russia,221 an 
issue that the Russian State Duma had delayed in the spring. 
When summing up the meeting, Akaev proclaimed that 
Kyrgyzstan's aspiration was to become Russia's "main 
, '" C I A' 7?O strateg1c partner In entra sla. ---
The bilateral relationship between Russia and Tajikistan 
was not characterised by such high-level contact in autumn 
2002, but there were a few visits by Russian officials and 
politicians. There were also assertions that Kyrgyzstan was 
developing a closer relationship to Russia, while Tajikistan at 
this point was trying to distance itself from Moscow.223 The 
highest-ranking visitors to Dushanbe this autumn were 
Nikolai Patrushev, on a visit in October, and the chairman of 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty, Valerii Nikolaenko, who 
came in September. Nikolaenko also visited Kyrgyzstan on the 
219 JU5tin Burkc, "RussiJn deployment in Kyrgyzsran could prompt growing 
domestic turmoil", Eurasia If1sigbt, 11 December 2002. 
220 Nikolai Bordiuzha, secretary general of CSTO,Iarcr regreeted that the 
organisation's mechanism for stabilising member states was not put to 
use during the unrest in Kyrgyzsran. Sec RFEIRL Newslil1c, 5. April 
2005, 
221 Artem Vcmidub, "Istrchiteli Putioa seli v Kirgizii" [Putin's fighters have 
landed in Krrgyzstan], ga;:eta.ru, 5 December 2002. 
222 RFElRL News/iltc, 6 December 2002. "Russia, our strategic partner" 
was also the slogan displayed on posters held by children along the road 
from the airport to the city as l)utin arrived. Sce Viktoriia Panfilova and 
Natalia Melikova, "5 bcregov Ganga \' tumannyi Bishkek" [From the 
banks of the Ganges to misty BishkekJ, Nezat,jsimaia ga:;:;eta, 6 
December 2002. 
123 Sergei Sokut, "Grozit tcrroristam budem iz Bishkeka" [We will threaten 
the terrorists from BishkekJ. Nezavisimoe UQennoe obozrcnic, 6 
December 2002. 
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same trip. Both Nikolaenko and Patrushev met President 
Rakhmonov, the former to discuss political and military 
cooperation, the latter to discuss regional security. 
Meanwhile, the frequency of contact between Russia and 
Central Asia in multilateral settings had slowed down 
compared to the preceding months. There were no high-level 
meetings in the SCO or other international organisations in 
the region, on the sidelines of which bilateral contacts 
regularly took place. Additionally, the most important 
changes to the regional security situation following the arrival 
of Western troops had already been addressed. 
The contacts between Russia and Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
and Tajikistan in this autumn underlined two increasingly 
characteristic features of Russia's policy in Central Asia. 
Firstly, there was a continued reliance on security and military 
aspects of bilateral cooperation. This included regular visits 
from Russian security and military officials to the 
governments in Bishkek and Dushanbe. Russia's military 
presence in the region had now been significantly increased 
with the new Kant Base, which had not yet been officially 
opened but was already partly operative. Secondly, it seemed 
that plans for strengthened bilateral relations and Russian 
promises on financial assistance were slowly becoming a 
reality. Russian policy in Central Asia had long been bascd 
mainly on rhetoric. In 2002 however, both military 
deployment and restructuring of debts were realised in the 
relationship between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. This could be 
one indication that policymakers in Moscow had realised that 
real alliances and real military access to Central Asia would 
not come for free. 
Progress at Kant 
In 2003, Russian policies in Central Asia continued to 
concentrate on the Russian forces there, namely the 201't 
Division in Tajikistan and the new base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, 
officially opened in October. One may discuss the extent to 
which Russia's approach to its close partners in Central Asia 
throughout the second part of 2002 and 2003 went back to 
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the usual pattern, in the sense that (especially) bilateral and 
multilateral contact was again maintained by military and 
security officials with a few Duma politicians thrown in. But 
there was still more frequent contact than had been the case 
before Septem ber 2001. 
The Russian policy in Central Asia also in this period 
concentrated on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, the 
focal point of interest was of course the Kant Base. In early 
2003, the plans for this base involved organising it as a base 
for a rapid reaction force under the CSTO, with forces from 
Russia and Kyrgyzstan.224 Most of the cost of equipping and 
modernising the base would be covered by Russia according 
to an agreement reached in January.22S The talks in January 
were held at the level of air force deputy commanders. By 
March, the negotiations had reached the level of air force 
commanders. The number of Russian soldiers now to be 
deployed was eventually to be 500, while the first contingent 
to arrive in April would number 200. The Russian Air Force 
commander, General Vladimir Mikhailov, said the task of the 
Russian military presence was to maintain "peace in the 
Central Asian region" .226 The final agreement between Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan was reached in June. 
The CSTO, under whose aegis the Kant Base would 
operate, was formally established only on 28 April 2003 when 
the presidents of the signatory states met in Dushanbe. Even at 
this first summit, it could be surmised that one of the purposes 
of the CSTO was to limit the influence of outside powers, 
especially the United States, in the security policies of the 
CSTO states. This was especially evident from the interest 
with which the summit participants asked the Kyrgyz 
representatives about the duration of the Western deployment 
in Kyrgyzstan.227 Another notable result of this summit was 
224 In addition to the Russian aircraft outlined above, the base would house 
the following Kyrgyz aircraft: four training aircraft, two helicopters and 
two fighters. RFE/RL Newsline, 24 January 2003. 
225 RFE/RL NelVslinc, 14 January 2003. 
226 RFE/RL Neu!s/ine, 17 March 2003. 
227 Maksim Glikin, "'V Dushanbe sozdali 'vostochnyi blok'" ['Eastern bloc' 
created in Dushanbc], Nezallisimaia gazeta, 29 April 2003. 
106 FORSI' ARSSTUDIER 3/1005 
that a joint military force, under the command of the Russian 
General Staff, received the support of the CSTO members. 
This may even have been connected to the US military 
campaign in Iraq and the Russian view that this marked a 
"watershed in the territorial redivision of the world" .228 
A colder climate between Moscow and 
Dushanbe 
The relationship between Russia and Tajikistan in the first 
half of 2003 was dominated by delays in transforming the 
201't Division to a base. This was on the list of issues to be 
discussed in meetings between Putin and Rakhmonov on the 
sidelines of the CSTO summit in Dushanhe.229 The issue had 
first come to the attention of the Russian public in December 
2001, when the Moscow newspapers Izvestiia and 
Nezavisimaia gazeta wrote about the alleged plans of 
Tajikistan's government to demand rent for the presence of 
the 201't Division in the country from 2002 onwards.230 
These rumours seemed to originate both from the Russian 
Ministry of Defence and from defence sources in Tajikistan, 
though Tajikistan's government and the Russian Ministry of 
Defence promptly denied them.231 In the agreement between 
Russia and Tajikistan that regulated the transformation of the 
201 st Division, the issue of rent from Russia to Tajikistan was 
not even touched on. The agreement was from 1999 and was 
ratified in 2001. Plans to implement it by early 2002 were 
228 This is suggested by Wilhclmscn and FJikkc, "COP)I That ... ", p. 28-29. 
229 Vladimir Mukhin, "Moskva pokupaet soiuznikov" [Moscow buys 
allies], Nczavisimaia gazeta, 21 April 2003. 
230 According to Izvcstiia's sources, the demand from Tajikistan could 
amount to 150-200 million US dollars annually. According to 
NczQl'isimaia gazeta, the demand was 250 million dollars. Aleksandr 
Grigorev, "'Soiuznikov vybiraiut" [Choosing allies].l:::llcstiia, 25 
December 1001; Sergci Sokut, "Dushanbc Moskvu ne vygonioct" 
[Dushanbe is not expelling Moscow), Neuwis;maia gazeta, 26 
December 2001. 
231 "U Rossii v Tadzhikisrane poiavitsia vocnnaia baza'" [Russia to have a 
military base in TajikistanJ, strana.nI, 26 December 2001; RFElRL 
News/i1le, 3 January 2002. 
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clearly delayed, apparently because of the rent issue. This waS 
at least the interpretation of Nezavisimaia gazeta's journalist, 
who wrote, "Tajikistan is practically blackmailin.B Russia 
using the American presence as an alternative.,,2 -
Throughout 2002, the Russian side kept quiet about the plans 
for the 201" Division and the place of rent in these plans. 
Tajikistan's government also declined to comment. The 
process of establishing a Russian base in Tajikistan Was at a 
standstill. 
The Tajik government seemed to be trying to balance itself 
between Russia and the United States. Russia was kept at 
arm's length, while Tajikistan tried to achieve benefits from 
the US. On the issue of the 201 st Division and its future, the 
Tajik government was trying to have the division transformed 
to a base de ;/l1'e as well as de facto, because a Russian base 
in Tajikistan would mean that Russia would have to shoulder 
a substantial proportion of its costs as well as pay rent to 
Tajikistan. A Russian base with the legal status of a joint 
peacekeeping force, or with forces formally organised as a 
subdivision of a base inside Russia, could not as easily be 
subjected to demands for rent. 
In March 2003 it became known that the US Defense 
Department had resumed talks with the Tajik government on 
a proposal to lease three airbases in Tajikistan.233 This 
proposal had been largely forgotten after the first months of 
2002. The resumption of talks met with negative reactions 
from Russia. Igor Ivanov, on a visit to Dushanbe in March, 
seems to have tried to dissuade the Tajik government from 
entering into closer military cooperation with the United 
States.234 
The other purpose of the foreign minister's visit was to 
prepare for Putin's visit to Dushanbe in late April 2003. From 
the signals that came from the Kremlin before Putin's visit, 
one might have expected the plans for a Russian base in 
233 
234 
Sokm, "Dushanbe Moskvu ne vygooiact." 
RFElRL NCUlSliIlC, 10 1\'1:1rch 2003. 
Farangis NajihuJlah, "Central Asia: Why Is Russia Suddenly Paying So 
Much Attention To Dushanbe And Bishkck?" RFEIRL, 18 March 2003. 
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Tajikistan to have leapt forward during the visit. However, 
this did not happen. In spite of continued declarations to the 
contrary, the process was not moving forward. The plan to 
award formal base status to the 201't Division dnring Putin's 
visit did take place, though this was a r:urely formal measure 
not accompanied by an inauguration.2 5 In front of the 201 St 
Division's commanders Putin repeated earlier fromises to 
increase the military presence in Tajikistan.23 Over summer 
2003, it became evident that relations between Moscow and 
Dushanbe were souring again. This led to a revival of the 
persistent rumour that the US was offering Tajikistan a credit 
of one billion dollars in return for ending Russian military 
presence. This time, the rumour matched well with the bad 
state of affairs in Russian-Tajik relations, and it was quoted 
even by the serious daily Nezavisimaia gazeta in Moscow.237 
The US ambassador to Dushanbe later denied the rumour in a 
letter to Nezavisimaia gazeta's weekly military review, 
N . . b' ?38 eZaV1SI111-0e voel111oe 0 ozrelue.-
Rumours aside, it was evident that Russian-Tajik relations 
had changed from "absolute indifference to obvious 
irritation" .239 Nevertheless, the Russian side developed its 
plans for an increased military presence in Tajikistan. As 
expressed by Colonel-General Aleksandr Baranov, the 
commander of the Volga-Urals military district in charge of 
the working group on development of the base, this included, 
"a powerful group of forces, with an aviation component. 
[The group] will be equipped with the most modern 
weaponry, and it will co-0f,erate closely with the power 
structures in [Tajikistan].,,_40 
235 Viktoriia PanfiJova, "Rossiia ukrcpit svoe voenno~politjchcskoe vliianie 
v Tadzhikistanc" (Russia will strengthen its military~political influence 
in Tajikistan], Newlfisimaia gazeta, 15 April 2003. 
236 RFEIRL News/iltc, 28 April 2003. 
237 Plugatarev, "'Mosk"c predJozhili pokinut Tadzhikistan iz-za milliarda 
dollarov. '" 
238 Franklin P. Huddle, "Ni snam, ui dukhom" [Neither heard nor seen}, 
Nczavisimoc t'OClmac obo::.rcllic, 8 August 2003; RFElRL Newslinc, 11 
August 2003. 
239 Panfilova, "Rossiia ukrcpit ...... 
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Two Russian-controlled bases 
The official opening of the Russian base at Kant rook place on 
23 October 2003. The agreement authorising the base had 
been signed a month previously in Moscow. The most difficult 
parts of the negotiation process had concerned the funding of 
the base. According to the agreement, Russia paid no rent for 
the space the base occupied. However, a substantial delivery 
of free Russian arms to Kyrgyzstan was widely rumoured to 
be Russia's compensation for Kant,241 and the writing off of 
two thirds of Kyrgyzstan's gas debts to Russia in autumn 
2002 were also a part of this context. In addition, Russia 
alone financed the base.242 Kyrgyz authorities vigorously 
denied that the arms deliveries were compensation or payment 
for access to the base, insisting that they were being provided 
free of charge because of Kyrgyzstan's financial problems.243 
When answering questions after the opening ceremony, 
both Putin and Akaev made a point of emphasising that the 
nearby Manas Base had been established "only for the 
concrete task of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and for the 
duration of that operation", while the Kant Base was there 
"on a permanent basis" .244 It was emphasised that the base 
was there to maintain security and stability in Central Asia. 
The initiative to build the hase had been taken by the Kyrgyz 
government and President Akaev personally. All in all, the 
opening of the base seemed more important to Kyrgyzstan 
than to Russia.245 
240 Vladimir Mukhin, "Rossiia sozdact krupnuiu voennuiu bazu v 
Tscntralnoi Azii" [Russia will establish a major military base in Central 
Asia], Neuwisimaia ga;:.eta, 21 May 1003. 
241 E.g., Andrci Reut, "Putin otkryl pcrvuiu rossiiskuiu voennuiu bazu v 
Tscntralnoi Azii" {putin opens the first Russian military base in Central 
AsiaJ, Gazcta Gzt.ru, 24 October 2003. The delivery was worch around 
3 million US dollars. It included small arms, different uniforms and 
equipment, radio communications, and an overhaul of a Mi~8 
helicopter. Sce Shvarev: "'Shkvali' iz Bishkcka". 
242 "Rossiia otkryvaet aviabazu v Kirgizii" {Russia opens airbase in 
Kyrgyzstan), Gazcta Gzt.ru, 22 September 2003. 
243 RFElRL NCIVSlil1C, 4 November 2003. 
244 Reut, "'Putin otkryl..." 
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In contrast to the successful opening of a new base at Kant, 
the plans for the conversion of the 201 5 ' Division in Tajikistan 
into the Fourth Base were progressing slowly. According to 
the Tajik defence minister, Sherali Khairulloev, the delays 
were not caused by excessive demands from Tajikistan, but 
were the fault of the Russian side.246 Denies notwithstanding, 
the problem seemed to be that the Tajik government did not 
want to pay for the base, and demanded ownership of the 
Russian military hardware on its territory. In addition, 
Tajikistan claimed a rental fee of 50 million US dollars for the 
Russian satellite surveillance station "Okno" in Nurek, which 
had become fully operational in July 2002.247 Tajikistan also 
expected Russia to write off the 300 million dollars it owed 
Russia. The Russians were reluctant to fulfil all the Tajik 
demands, making this a risky strategy, with the potential of 
costing the "the present leadership in Dushanbe dearly" in the 
unlikely event of a Russian pullout.248 
In the end, the Tajik strategy was successful. The opening 
of the Fourth Base took place on 16 October 2004 in the 
presence of Putin and Rakhmonov. The signing of a new 
bilateral military cooperation agreement in June 2004 had 
eased the transformation of the 201st Division into the Fourth 
Base.249 Among the bilateral agreements signed during the 
visit were agreements on extenSIve economic cooperation. 
According to these agreements, Russian firms, state-owned 
and private, would invest over two billion dollars in 
245 "Rossiia vozvrashchaetsia?" [Russia returns?], Radio SlIoboda, 25 
Oerobe! 2003. This point was also made by Fcdor Lukianov in an 
interview with the author, 19 November 2004. 
246 RFElRL News/int", 15 August 2003. 
247 OkI/O means "windowT'O in Russian. Rustam Burnashcv and Irina 
Chernykh, "'Vooruzhcnnye sily rcspubJiki Tadzhlkistan" [Tajikistan's 
Armed Forces]. Tselltra/noia A:::;iia i Kallkaz, 6, 2002,119, and Russian 
Centre TV, Moscow, 19 June 2003, FBIS, quoted in Henry Plater-
Zybcrk, Tajikistan. W'aitillg For A Storm?, (Cambcrley; Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
2004), p.5 and 17 (in 19). "Okno''', an optical-electronic sensor, is part 
of Russia's space surveillance system. 
248 RFElRL Newslil1e, 17 March 2004; Illarer-Zyhcrk, Tajikistan. 
Wlaiting ... , p. 5. 
249 Sec RFEIRL News/hie, 8 June 2004. 
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Tajikistan. The Russian aluminium company Rusal and the 
Russian electricity monopoly, Unified Energy System (UES), 
would invest more than one billion dollars in aluminium and 
hydro power projects. As remarked by Anatolii Chubais, the 
UES chief executive officer and a sraunch advocat of a Russian 
'liberal empire' based on economic integration in the former 
Soviet Union, this was indeed a step forward in creating a 
liberal empire.250 The "Okno" surveillance station in Nurek 
was sold to Russia for 242 million dollars of Tajikistan's debt 
to Russia. "Okno" will return to Tajik ownership only after 
49 years.251 Tajikistan committed itself to investing the 
remaining 50 million dollars of the debt in Russia's share of 
the Sangtuda hydroelectric power plant, which supplies power 
to Tajikistan's aluminium indusrry.252 Accordingly, the Tajik 
side succeeded in attaining most of their demands from the 
Russian side. Interestingly, they also acquired full control of 
their own borders, as withdrawal of the Russian border 
service from Tajikistan's borders was stipulated in another of 
the agreements in the package.253 In return, rhe Russians were 
relieved of an embarrassing situation and obtained a military 
base, the second new base in Central Asia in two years. 
The change in military doctrine 
The changes to the Military Doctrine presented by Sergei 
Ivanov in early October 2003 represented a new view in the 
Kremlin on the place of the CIS in Russian security. The 
doctrine now specifically declared the CIS and neighbouring 
250 VitaJii TsepJiaev, "Vosrochnaia diplomatiia" [Eastern diplomacy], 
Argume1lt)' i Fakt)" 20 October 2004. For 'liberal empire', scc "RAO 
UES dicf secs Russia as liberal empire", Rmsia Journal, 26 September 
2003. 
251 Alcksandr Chudodcev, "'Prishla na bazu" [Arrived at base], ftogi, 26 
October 2004. 
252 Alexander Duhovoi. "Advantages and Disadvantages of the Russian-
Tajik Military Coopcration", WPS DefclIse and Security Report, 314, 
22 October 2004; KonscOlntin l)arshin, "Tajikistan~ The Russians Arc 
Coming BOlt:k'" Transitions Ol1linc, 3 November 2004. DES invested 
200 million USD, see Tscpliacv, "VostochnOlia diplomOltiiOl". 
253 Chudodccv, "Prishla nOl bazu". 
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regions a Russian sphere of interests. Within this sphere, 
cross-border threats could justify both preventive strikes with 
conventional weapons and the use of nuclear weapons.254 
This revision of the Military Doctrine was an unambiguous 
signal to the Central Asian leaders that Russia's reengagement 
in the region was part of an effort to re-establish the CIS as a 
zone of security and military Russian interests. Trade interests, 
investments and writing off debts were means to this end. It 
was also a signal to the West that in the CIS, Western interests 
should he coordinated with Russia's interests and that the 
former were subordinate to the latter. 
Russia's energy engagement 
So far in this chapter, I have mainly discussed Russia's 
military engagement in Central Asia and the general political 
signals that accompanied this. However, to provide a fuller 
picture of Russian policy in Central Asia in the period under 
study, I also feel it necessary to discuss Russia's engagement in 
the exploitation and transport of energy resources. This 
engagement involves Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well as 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Russian companies participate through joint ventures with 
Kazakh companies in the exploitation of three Russian and 
Kazakh offshore fields in the Caspian Sea.155 The oil pipeline 
(the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or CPC pipeline) from the 
Tengiz field through Russia to Novorossiisk on the Black Sea, 
which started to operate in 2001, was also a result of Russian-
Kazakh cooperation. The Russian oil company Lukoil is 
involved, apart from Tengiz, in two Kazakh projects, 
Karachaganak and Kumkol. Kazakhstan also exports oil 
through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline. Russia's involvement 
with hydrocarbons from Kazakhstan is well supplemented by 
254 S. Tvanov, 'Vystllplenie na soveshchanii ... '" 
255 Sec Robert M. Cutler, "The Caspian Energy Conundrum"', IOl/mal of 
International Affairs, 56, 3 (Spring 2003),89-102; Iurii Borovskii, 
"Energcticheskaia bezopasnost Rossiiskoi Fedcratsii v ramkakh SNG" 
fRussia's Energy Security in the Context of the CIS], Allaliticheskic 
zapi,ki NKSMI MCIMO, no. 4 (6) (Ma;ch 2005), p. 25. 
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many other economic, security and military ties, securing a 
continued close relationship hetween two states that are 
strategically important to each other.256 Russia's ties with 
Kazakhstan are supplemented by the other Russian economic 
and security engagements in Central Asia. However, the 
importance of the Russian-Kazakh relationship is independent 
of Russia's other engagements in the region - this is a 
relationship that will continue to grow irrespective of how 
other relations develop. 
In 2003 and 2004, Russia's energy ties with Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan were significantly bolstered. For both 
countries, natural gas is the most important energy export. 
The long-term export of Turkmen gas to Russia was secured 
in April 2003 after several years of difficult negotiations 
between the two countries. According to an inter-
governmental agreement, Turkmenistan will export gas to 
Russia for 25 years at rates that are favourable to 
Turkmenistan. Only half the cost wiII be paid for in cash, the 
rest taking the form of barter. 257 Gazprom, the Russian gas 
monopoly, on the other hand, acquires Turkmen gas for 
domestic use. This gives Gazprom considerable flexibility in 
supplies, which makes it possible to export the more expensive 
Russian gas to Europe. The agreement was mutually 
beneficial, and it was at the time unclear which side gained 
more.258 One provision of advantage to Turkmenistan was 
the possibility to reconsider the conditions of the agreement 
every five years. The Russian side received the advantage of a 
considerable energy presence in Turkmenistan before the 
Turkmen gas market opens to non-Turkmen companies, a 
development which is expected within a few years. This was 
ensured when the Russian companies Gazprom, Zarubezhneft 
and Itera were awarded exploitation rights in the Turkmen 
sector of the Caspian in October 2004. 
256 Cf. Vitalii Naumkin, "Russian Policy Toward Kazakhstan" in Thinking 
StrategicaIl),,,., cd. Legvold, pp. 39-65. 
257 This arrangement was renegotiated in 2005, and Russia now pays with 
cash in full. Sec RFEIRL News{illc, 18 April200S. 
258 Michacllelyvcld, "Turkmenistan: Niyazov Seals Energy, Security 
Contracts With Russia", RFElRL, 11 AprHI003. 
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The successful outcOme of the negotiations between Russia 
and Turkmenistan was accompanied by a security cooperation 
agreement and a protocol that confirmed a bilateral friendship 
treaty. For Turkmenistan's president, Saparmurat Niyazov, an 
important non-energy issue resolved during the gas 
negotiations was the elimination of a dual citizenship 
agreement between the two states. Turkmen authorities 
quickly acted on the agreement and set a two-month deadline 
for dual-citizenship holders to choose citizenship preference. 
For Turkmenistan's up to 100,000 citizens with Russian 
passports, as well as for the reported 100,000 who had 
applied for Russian citizenship, life was becoming very 
difficult.259 This led to public outrage in Russia. But the deal 
was politically important to the Russian energy engagements 
in Central Asia. Russia wanted to avoid Turkmenistan 
exporting its gas through other countries, for example across 
the Caspian Sea to Baku and further through the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to the Mediterranean.260 That would 
be a least favoured scenario for Russia. In addition, the energy 
agreement was meant to be a cornerstone in Russia '5 relations 
with Turkmenistan. This relationship had been difficult for 
some time, partly because of the problems of reaching an 
agreement. Turkmenistan's strict neutrality in foreign policy 
meant that many of the usual perks that Russia could offer, 
such as weapons, military equipment or security cooperation 
were irrelevant. 
Fully-fledged energy cooperation with Uzbekistan 
materialised a year later. In October 2002 Gazprom acquired 
an export agreement with the Uzbek energy company 
Uzbekneftegaz, regulating Uzbek gas supplies to Russia 
through 2012. In the strategic partnership agreement entered 
into by Russia and Uzbekistan in June 2004, such cooperation 
was central. Lukoil and Uzbekneftegaz now had a production-
sharing agreement for 35 years, worth around one billion US 
dollars, in gas fields in southwest Uzbekistan, and Gazprom 
also invested in development and exploitation.261 As with 
259 RFEIRL Celltral Asia Re/Jort, 3, 16 (1 May 2003). 
260 Borovskii, "Encrgeticncskaia bczopasnost ... n p. 27. 
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Turkmenistan, energy was a considerable part of the bilareral 
relationship. While the strategic partnership focused also on 
regional security, the military cooperation between Russia and 
Uzbekistan was not particularly extensive. But this did not 
preclude close cooperation in intelligence. 
In Kyrgyzstan as well as in Tajikistan, Gazprom became a 
supplier of natural gas in 2003. This was gas from Uzbekistan 
and T urkmenistan bought by Gazprom and resold to 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. With Gazprom assuming the 
position of intermediary between buyers and suppliers, this 
arrangement moderated the political consequences of 
Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's energy dependence on 
Uzbekistan. At times, the relationships between these states 
had been very tense. The agreement also contained provisions 
for assistance from Gazprom in developing Tajikistan's and 
Kyrgyzstan's own energy resources over the next 25 years.262 
From 2002 onwards, Russian companies, especially Gazprom 
and UES, entered into agreements with Kyrgyz and Tajik 
authorities on substantial investments in hydro energy and 
gas, and particularly on the modernisation of power plants in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.263 This continued throughout 
2004, when Russia and Kyrgyzstan agreed on investment in 
the reconstruction of power plants in Kyrgyzstan to the value 
of one billion US dollars.264 Some of these deals were 
brokered with the Russian government's involvement, 
demonstrating the importance of energy issues in relations 
with Russia's close partners in Central Asia. 
In Tajikistan, investments in hydro energy were explicitly 
tied to the Russian military base in the country when this was 
formally established in 2004. The planned investments 
261 Antoine Blua, "RussialUzbckistan: Presidents Sign Strategic-Partnership 
Agreement", RFElRL, 17 Juoe 2004; Borovskii, "Encrgctichcskaia 
bezopasnosr ..... , p. 29. 
262 Btuce Pannier, "Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Tajlkistan Hope Gazprom 
Deals Will Make Their Winters Warmer". RFEIRL, 22 May 2003; 
Borovskii, "Energctichcskaia bczopasnost ,.,", p.19. 
263 See j00500, Vladimir Put;n and Central Asia, pp. 103-104 and 1()7-
11 0; Borovskii, "Encrgctichcskaia bczopasnosr ." ", p. 30. 
264 RFEIRL Central Asia Report, 16 November 2004. 
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originated with Russian companies and with the Tajik 
government's reinvestment of cancelled debts to Russia. This 
part of the deals surrounding the Fourth Base was particularly 
useful to Tajik and Russian companies and politicians. Not 
only were they necessary to develop Tajikistan's aluminium 
industry, but they also had the potential to solve Tajikistan's 
energy problem, which added credibility to Russia's position 
as a guarantor of Tajik security. 
Summing up: Russia's policies in Central Asia 
Russia's relations with the Central Asian states before the 
period under study were tilted towards the domination of 
military and security interests over other interests, although 
economic interests did play a part as well. Especially in the 
Central Asian states less discussed here (Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) energy was an important part 
of Russia's interests. However, the parts of the government 
occupied with security and military policies took on top-level 
responsibility for Russia's relations with Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. The infrequent attention given by other parts of 
the political elite to Central Asia as a whole could have led to 
conflicting signals to the Central Asian governmen ts. 
The first reaction in Russia to the Western request to use of 
bases in Central Asian seemed to be confusion over how to 
respond. Policymakers issued conflicting statements, and in 
particular, Sergei Ivanov's negative response contradicted 
Putin's initial acknowledgement of the American right to 
retaliate. Following Ivanov's statement, there were efforts to 
dissuade the Central Asian governments from responding 
positively to the American request. This was connected to 
Vladimir Rushailo's visit to the Central Asian capitals on 18-
21 September 2001. Following his round-trip, the Tajik 
government, already hesitant, seemed to be preparing to give 
a negative answer to the Western request, while the Uzbek 
government seemed more equivocal than it had been. Moscow 
may also have tried to become effectively a mediator between 
the United States and the Central Asian governments, but this 
effort did not succeed. 
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Following the establishment of the Western bases in 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Russian interest in Central Asia 
increased. In the period from 11 September 2001 and through 
spring 2002, not only military and security officials, but also 
many other officials and politicians went to the Central Asian 
capitals to discuss various aspects of the war against terror 
and Central Asian security. This contact was mainly 
concerned with the military and security spheres, a 
consequence of the war on terror. However, there was some 
contact connected to the energy sphere as well. 
Military and security issues dominated the content of ties 
between Russia and the Central Asian states, especially 
regarding Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. There were several such 
· Issues: 
• Joint military exercises under the aegis of the Collective 
Security Treaty, and later the CSTO; 
• Efforts to create a joint military force under the command 
of the Russian General Staff within the CSTO; 
• Plans for Russian bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; 
• The development of a CIS anti-terrorism centre in Central 
Asia, located in Bishkek. 
These issues had three characteristics. Firstly, the new security 
situation in Central Asia motivated the governments involved 
to find solutions to Central Asia's security problems. While 
the answers were not really new, they were nevertheless 
different from the situation before September 2001. While 
joint military exercises had also been carried out at regular 
intervals before September 2001, the exercises after September 
2001 focused on combating terrorism. They were also larger 
and more frequent than had previously been the case. The 
plans for a Russian base in Tajikistan had been more or less 
forgotten after their initiation in 1999, but they were reopened 
in 2001. This also applied to the CIS anti-terrorism centre. 
However, the plans for a base in Kyrgyzstan were new. 
The second characteristic was that Russian-Central Asian 
efforts to improve Central Asian security did not involve the 
West. Joint exercises with NATO troops in the region had an 
emphasis on civil-military coordination in emergency 
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situations, and they did not involve Russia. Exercises 
involving Russia were larger, directed more explicitly against 
terrorism or military aggression, and did not involve Western 
troops. This seemed a natural consequence of the Central 
Asian states' close ties to Russia on the one side, and the 
newer benefits of being in the centre of attention on the other 
side. But it is remarkable that there was no effort to involve 
both NATO and Russia in at least one of these exercises. 
Accordingly, there were no exercises involving scenarios for 
shared international assistance to the Central Asian 
governments in case of an emergency. 
Thirdly, the Russian policy in Central Asia in the period 
under study centred on military solutions to security 
problems. This reduced the possibilities for closer cooperation 
with Uzbekistan. There was some cooperation on intelligence 
and a less strained relationship between Russia and 
Uzbekistan but the Russian strategic reassertion in Central 
Asia initially passed Uzbekistan by. Uzbekistan's close 
strategic partnership with the United States left Islam Karimov 
little room for military cooperation with Russia at the time. 
While the Russian military engagement in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan partially compensated for this, the prominence of 
Uzbekistan in the region made it a glaring exception for some 
time to come. 
However, the strategic reassertion was not only conducted 
through military engagement, although this was the most 
central part of it. As regards Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, energy relations were just as important. And in 
conjunction with the opening of the bases in Kant in 2003 and 
in Dushanbe in 2004, more attention was paid to financial 
and trade relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
and Tajikistan. In conjunction with the establishment of the 
Kant Base, Kyrgyzstan's debts to Russia were reduced by two-
thirds. The Fourth Base outside Dushanbe was accompanied 
by a larger financial package. In effect, all of Tajikistan's debts 
to Russia were written off against Russian ownership of the 
satellite surveillance station "Okno" and Tajik investment in a 
Russian-owned hydro electrical power plant in Tajikistan. In 
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addition to the Kant base Kyrgyzstan acquired Russian arms 
worth 3 million US dollars for free, while Tajikistan received 
an investment package of 2 billion US dollars.165 The bases 
themselves were paid for by Russia, but in return, Russia waS 
exempt from paying rent. It is worth noting that the financial 
gains for Tajikistan from the establishment of the Fourth Base 
were far more substantial than the compensation Kyrgyzstan 
received for the Kant Base. However, as cooperation between 
Russia and Kyrgyzstan on hydro electric energy developed 
further in 2004, Kyrgyz gains from the closer relations with 
Russia grew by an estimated one billion US dollars.266 
Notwithstanding the trade and financial arrangements, the 
opening of the Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
bases highlighted the lack of trade and financial ties in the 
relations between Russia and these Central Asian states. The 
Russian government and the business community had ignored 
repeated calls from the Kyrgyz and Tajik government and 
from Russian officials in charge of relations with Central Asia 
for more Russian investment in the region for a long time. 
Serious interest from the Russian business community and 
serious financial assistance from the Russian government came 
only in conjunction with the Russian bases in Central Asia. In 
this respect, the Russian bases underlined the continued 
emphasis on military and security ties with the Central Asian 
governments. 
Conclusions 
To outline the main conclusions in this chapter in brief, the 
Russian activity towards the Central Asian states was 
substantial from 9111 onwards. It was characterised by an 
emphasis on military and security ties, but it was 
complemented by comprehensive energy engagement. Russia's 
activity took place in structures which excluded the West. 
Statements that indicated reservations towards Western 
265 It remains to be seen how much of this investment package thilt will be 
realised. 
266 RFEfRL Central Asia Rvport, 16 November 2004. 
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activity in Central Asia also accompanied the renewed Russian 
activity. The main partners in Russia's policy in Central Asia 
were Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These features had been 
characteristic of Russian policy in Central Asia before 9/11 as 
well. But while policy had at best seemed half-hearted before, 
there was a new determination to achieve results from the 
Russian side after 9/11. This was especially visible in the way 
in which Russia offered real investments, real economic ties 
and substantial military support to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
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Chapter 6 
Analysis: Russia's reactions to 
the Western bases 
This chapter contains a systematic, comparative analysis of 
the three aspects of Russia's reactions to the Western military 
bases in Central Asia. The aim is to discuss the degree of 
correspondence and possible discrepancies between the three 
aspects of Russia's reactions. In particular, I shall be 
discussing the question of whether Russia's ambitions towards 
Central Asia were portrayed differently in relations with the 
West than inside Central Asia. 
The chapter starts with a summary of the main conclusions 
from the previous chapters. 
Reactions towards the United States and the 
West 
Initial hesitation before the president's decision. There was 
considerable initial hesitation concerning how Russia should 
respond to the American request to use Central Asian airbases 
in the assault on the Taliban. While Russian policymakers 
realised that possible Western deployment would be decided 
by the Central Asian governments, it was obvious that 
Russia's position on the issue would be important as well. The 
decision to welcome the Western military bases was made by 
President Putin after extensive consultation with the main 
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decision-makers in the security field. Putin's stance, endorsing 
an American nlilitary presence in Central Asia was supported 
by only a minority of the political elite. 
Stability ill the coml1ltmicatioll of Russia's /)ositiol1. 
Russia's position on the Western bases as it was 
communicated to the United States and the West remained 
relatively stable throughout the period of study. This 
particularly concerns the division of labour berween the three 
main figures involved in this communication: Vladimir Putin, 
Sergei Ivanov and Igor Ivanov. Putin emphasised Russia's 
support for the war on terrorism and Russia's alignment with 
the West in this campaign. Putin did not at any point express 
concerns over the Western IniJitary presence in Central Asia. 
Quite the contrary, even in September 2003 he stated that 
Russia "welcomed US activity in Central Asia".267 The 
defence minister, meanwhile, communicated Russia's worries, 
and the foreign minister conveyed the nuances of the Russian 
posItIon. 
A change of emphasis occurred ill 2002. In spite of the 
relative stability of Russia's response to the appearance of 
Western military bases in Central Asia, a change of emphasis 
did occur from spring to autumn 2002. After the Moscow 
summit in 2002, Putin mentioned the 'shared strategic goals' 
less often when referring to Russia's alignment with the West 
in the war on terrorism, and instead used the expression 
'coinciding goals'. Igor Ivanov expressed reservations about 
the United States' "geostrategic" goals in the war on terrorism 
as early as March 2002, and connected his reservation 
explicitly to the American military presence in Central 
Asia.26B 
267 Vbdimir Putin, "Vystuplenic i otvety nn voprosy v Kolumbiiskom 
univcrsirctc" {Speech and question and answer session at Columbia 
University), 26 September 2003. 
268 "'Russian minister calls on USA to put cards on tablc over Central Asia. n 
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The Russian political debate 
Putin's absences a1ld a/J/Jearallces. Putin's role in the domestic 
debate on the Western bases in Central Asia can be 
characterised as being 'above politics', a heritage from the 
time of Boris Yeltsin's presidency.269 In the debate, the 
president was conspicuous by his absence. He failed to explain 
the choice of a strategic alignment with the West in the war on 
terrorism. This was especially noticeable to the large part of 
the elite that did not agree with the strategic alignment. When 
Putin did finally make an effort to gather support for his 
policy, choosing a consultative body - the State Council - to 
do so indicated that the aim was not to compromise with the 
political elite but to co-opt it. The effect was less room for 
general criticism. A majority of the political elite, however, 
continued to disagree with the strategic alignment. The 
Kremlin's efforts to gather support for the strategic alignment 
could be described as too little, too late. This was pertinent to 
the debate on the Western bases in Central Asia because the 
bases were the most visible, and most controversial, 
consequence of the strategic alignment. Throughout 2002, 
criticism of the bases in Central Asia became increasingly 
synonymous with criticising choosing a strategic alignment 
with the West. However, as the scope for criticism of the 
strategic alignment narrowed, expressing concerns about the 
Western bases became a way of expressing such criticism 
indirecrly. 
A varyi1lg muge of participa1lts. The range of participants 
in the internal debate varied over time. While at times the 
military-security constituency dominated the debate, at other 
times - for example from November 2001 to March 2002 -
large parts of the political elite participated. The main 
governmental participants were the defence and foreign 
ministers. Another notable participant closely associated with 
the official line was Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the 
Federation Council's Foreign Affairs Committee. 
269 Ordeshook, "Rc-examining Russia: Institutions and Incentives". 
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A 11arrow range of topics. The topics in the debate were 
framed in increasingly narrow tefnlS. In autUInn 2001, an 
important topic was the perception of unilateral Russian 
concessions to the United States. The Western bases in Central 
Asia were most frequently mentioned as a concession. Two 
other topics emerged between October 2001 and January 
2002; the question of why Russia had 'lost' Central Asia, and 
the issue of the changed strategic situation in the region. These 
topics quickly became framed within a geopolitical 
perspective. Accordingly, the main underlying premise became 
the issue of 'who offers what in a zero-sum game?' Alternative 
interpretations, such as shared goals in tbe strategic alignment, 
disappeared from the debate. Answers to why Russia had lost 
Central Asia increasingly concentrated on financial 
explanations and security explanations. The truths were soon 
established - the United States paid more for their military 
presence in Central Asia than Russia could. Russia had also 
failed to address the security challenges in the region. The 
discussion of the changed strategic situation focused on 
possible American aims for the engagement in Central Asia, 
and the question of how the strategic balance in the region 
might develop. In this discussion, a substantial worry was that 
the Americans might have come to Central Asia to stay. In 
sum, the future strategic situation in the region was 
interpreted as largely depending on the interests and resources 
of the United States and Russia. 
Russian policy in Central Asia 
Domi11ance of military a11d security ties. By 2000, the 
dominance of military and security ties in relations between 
Russia and the Central Asian states had been firmly 
established. After 9/11, Russian policymakers realised that 
Russia needed to provide economic incentives to the Central 
Asian states to expand cooperation and strengthen Russia's 
position. Even so, the understanding that economic incentives 
were more effective in securing Russian influence than 
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assurances of eternal friendship came only slowly, as evident 
from the Russian State Duma's repeated delays in approving 
the restructuring of Kyrgyz gas debts in spring 2002. 
The period after September 2001 saw an increase in 
military and security cooperation between Russia and the 
Central Asian states. This included the establishment of 
Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the establishment 
of a CIS anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek, and more frequent 
joint military exercises under the aegis of the Collective 
Security Treaty/CSTO. In sum, the Russian policy in this 
respect developed considerably in the period under study, 
under what has been aptly described as a 'strategic 
. , ?7'l 
reassertIon ,- \ 
The use of financial and eC0110111ic incentives i1l 
strengthening military and security cooperation. The 
dominance of security and military ties in the Russian policy 
towards the Central Asian states did not preclude developing 
financial and economic ties. This development was initially 
slow in coming, mainly because Central Asia was not seen by 
Russian business as a region ripe for massive investment. 
However, particularly after September 2001, policymakers in 
Russia started to realise that investments in the Central Asian 
states could only benefit Russian security ties with the region. 
Financial incentives accompanied the establishment of the 
Kant Base in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and 2003, but the 
restructuring of debts and deliveries of military equipment to 
Kyrgyzstan were modest compared with the financial 
compensation Tajikistan received when the Fourth Base was 
established a year later. While this development seems 
connected to the differing security policies of Kyrgyzstan's and 
Tajikistan's governments, the Russian awareness of the need 
to provide financial incentives in security cooperation also 
increased throughout the period under study. 
Military and security cooperation did not ;"ciude Western 
countries. The renewal of activity in the military and security 
sphere took place without cooperation, and with little contact 
270 Allison, "Strategic reassertion in Russia's Central Asia policy." 
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below the top level with the United States or NATO. When 
the US and NATO trained and equipped personnel and forces 
in Central Asia, this took place in parallel with and separate 
from Russian efforts. This was also evident in the institutional 
framework for security cooperation, as organisations and 
programmes that included Russia (CSTO, SCO) did not 
include NATO member states and vice versa. 
The strategic reassertion of Russia in Ce71trai Asia initially 
passed Uzbekistan by. This was a consequence of the focus on 
Russian military engagement, and military ties with the 
Central Asian states, in the strategic reassertion. Uzbekistan's 
policy of military cooperation with the United States and no 
military relations with Russia did not change after 9/11. 
However, this changed gradually throughout 2004 and 2005 
as the US adopted a less enthusiastic attitude towards Islam 
Karimov's regime and Uzbekistan became increasingly reliant 
on Russia as a security and, later, strategic partner. 
Correspondences and discrepancies 
To what extent are there correspondences between the three 
aspects of the Russian response to the Western bases in 
Central Asia? Do the different aspects of the response seem to 
be coordinated? Does external policy, for example towards 
the Central Asian states, seem to reflect the domestic debate? 
Or, if there is a lack of correspondence between the three 
aspects of the Russian response, are the participants in the 
domestic debate altogether different from the main 
communicators of Russian foreign policy on the topic under 
study here? Does there seem to be a lack of coordination 
between Russia's response directed towards the West and its 
policy in Central Asia? Can one describe any possible lack of 
correspondence between the three aspects of the response as 
discrepancies? 
"A CRUCIAL SPHERE FOR OUR SECURITY" 127 
Correspondences between the aspects of the 
response 
Over/at) of /)articipallts. One source of correspondence 
between the three aspects of the Russian response is the degree 
to which participants in the Russian political debate 
overlapped with those who were charged with communicating 
the Russian response to the West, or those who participated in 
policymaking towards Central Asia. 
The participants in the Russian political debate mostly 
come from three groups: security and military officials and 
retired officers, Duma and Federation Council politicians, and 
prominent members of the government, which includes the 
president. The president, defence minister and foreign minister 
had the main responsibility for communicating the official 
Russian reactions towards the United States. Accordingly, they 
also provided a correspondence with and even a connection to 
the Russian political debate. 
There was a similar correspondence between the Russian 
political debate and the Russian policy in Central Asia. The 
main participants in Russian policymaking towards Central 
Asia were prominent security and military officials, especially 
the secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Rushailo, the 
president, defence minister and the foreign minister. In 
January 2002, when the interest surrounding the Western 
bases in Central Asia peaked in Russia, Duma representatives 
also participated in Russian signalling towards Central Asia. 
However, one cannot assume that this signified participation 
in policymaking as such, because of the general lack of 
influence that the Federal Assembly, including the Duma, has 
on foreign policy. Putin, Sergei Ivanov, Igor Ivanov, the 
General Staff head, Anarolii Kvashnin, and the head of the 
Russian Border Service, Konstantin Totskii, provided the 
overlap between the Russian political debate and Russian 
policy in Central Asia. 
The two directions of Russian foreign policy discussed here 
- towards the West and Central Asia - overlapped through the 
efforts of Putin, Sergei Ivanov, Igor Ivanov, his deputy 
Viacheslav Trubnikov and Vladimir Rushailo. 
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In sum, although certain correspondences between the 
three aspects of the Russian response were provided through 
the participants in debate and policymaking, relatively few 
participants participated in more than one aspect of the 
response. However, the participants that were involved in 
more than one aspect of the response were very prominent, 
including the president and his closest advisors. 
Similarity and overlap of expressions and topics. The 
overlap of participants between the three aspects of the 
Russian response also points towards possible 
correspondences in the expressions used and between the 
topics in the Russian political debate and the content of 
foreign policy. 
Central policymakers' expressions were rather similar in all 
aspects of the Russian response. However, the main 
correspondence between topics in political debate and in 
policy was between the dominance of military and security 
officials and ties in Russia's Central Asia policy and the 
dominance of security considerations and strategic issues in 
the Russian political debate. This was not only an overlap of 
participants. In the political debate, there was a tendency for 
the security issues to be debated more thoroughly and with 
more diverse participation than economic issues. For example, 
very few participants in the Russian political debate stressed 
positive economic gains for Russia from aligning with the 
West in the war on terrorism and consenting to Western 
military bases in Central Asia.2?1 When the issue was raised, 
there was little or no response. Most comments focused on 
strate9ic gains for Russia from the alignment with the West.-72 Economic gains were seen as befalling the Central 
Asian states only, and mostly in relation to the United States. 
In the relationship with the Central Asian states, security 
issues were emphasised over economic issues. When economic 
ties with the Central Asian states were made an issue, this was 
as a prerequisite for attaining security goals.2?3 The Russian 
271 The issue was raised by Ilichev, "Doroga na Krouford"; see also 
Kuiagin, '''Dvoevlastie' vo vneshnei politike"'. 
272 E.g. Fedorov, "Rossiia stair pcred vyborom" 
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government was criticised for not doing enough to strengthen 
business and economic ties with the region, and this Was cited 
as a reason for the delays in and problems with strengthening 
Russia's strategic position.274 
The emphasis in the Russian political debate on security 
issues and arguments seems connected to the dominance of 
security and military officials in Russia's policy in Central 
Asia. In contrast, it is very difficult to see any such 
correspondence between the Russian political debate and the 
official policy towards the West as regards the Western bases 
in Central Asia. The political debate reflected official policy 
towards the West in a different way: through a disagreement 
in the Russian political elite with the strategic alignment with 
the West. As outlined in chapter 4, this disagreement had 
already been commented upon in the debate in autumn 2001 
and was most often referred to as the elite's 'unconvinced 
support' for the strategic alignment.275 While a minority of 
the elite supported the strategic alignment, the willingness to 
share the political burden for the strategic alignment in the 
domestic Russian setting was limited. Those who supported 
the strategic alignment and the president'S policy participated 
in the political debate to a lesser extent than those who did 
not. And as the prospect of a long-term Western military 
deployment in Central Asia became more likely, the support 
for the strategic alignment decreased. This again limited the 
discussion of the strategic alignment in the political debate. 
After the Kremlin's efforts to reassure the political elite in 
February and March 2002, and the president's efforts to co-
opt the political elite in September 2001 and May 2002, 
criticism became less widespread. But there was also little 
discussion of, or support for, the strategic alignment with the 
West. 
273 See Panfilova, "Patrushev, Torskii i Ramsfeld ... "j Panfilova, UNa zapad 
" 
274 E.g. Panfilova, "Tiazhelo v tadzhiksko-rossiiskom uchcnii ... " 
275 Sec Riabov, "Elita ne pospcvact"j "Putin ushel v otrrv"'. 
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Discrepancies between the aspects of the 
response 
This leads onto a discrepancy between the Russian political 
debate and the official response to the West. These two 
aspects of the Russian response to the Western bases in 
Central Asia did not correspond. This lack of correspondence 
left an impression that the official response to the West had 
not resonated well with the political elite. Indeed, the domestic 
political support for it could be and was questioned. However, 
the lack of correspondence had another component - the 
political debate did not influence Russia's official line directed 
towards the West. As concluded in chapter 4, this may have 
been a consequence of what seemed to be conscious efforts 
from the Kremlin to reduce the impact of domestic criticism 
on the Russian-American relationship. 
On the one hand, one may argue for several reasons that 
there was nothing unusual in the lack of correspondence 
between the Russian political debate and the official line 
directed to the West. Firstly, governments do not always let 
domestic debate influence their foreign policies, especially 
when unpopular policies are concerned. Though this is of 
course a typical feature of undemocratic regimes, it is hardly 
unusual in democratic states either. Secondly, there are 
different traditions of unity or dissent around foreign policy 
issues in different countries. In Russia, one cannot speak of a 
broad foreign policy consensus, although policymaking in 
Putin's first period was more based on consensus and less 
politicised than under Yeltsin.276 Under Putin, the tendency 
has been for disagreements to be less open and vocal than was 
the case previously, but there has nevertheless been a certain 
level of discussion. A third reason is that when foreign policy 
is the president's domain, as indeed it is in Russia, there may 
be dissent within the political elite, but this may influence 
policy less than in states where several institutions are 
involved in foreign policymaking. A fourth reason is that 
those who oppose a policy are more inclined to defend their 
276 See Lo, Russian Foreign Policy ... pp. 3-6; Lo, Vladimir Putin .... 
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position in public than those who support it. This is 
particularly relevant in Russia, where a military-security 
constituency eagerly debates foreign policy, and there is 
widespread opposition to policies that bring Russia closer to 
the West. As a consequence, those who agreed with the 
strategic alignment may simply have reasoned that repeated 
statements of support for the \Vestern military bases in 
Central Asia would not increase public support for the 
strategic alignment with the West in the war on rerrorism. 
On the other hand, certain features of the lack of 
correspondence between the official policy towards the West 
and the Russian political debate were arguably remarkable. 
Firstly, this lack of correspondence reflected a divide between 
the parts of the elite that preferred different directions in 
foreign policy. The military bureaucracy was still largely 
opposed to closer integration with the West, and even those 
who agreed that this was indeed necessary found it difficult to 
accept the appearance of Western bases in Central Asia. 
Therefore, it seemed significant that those who were sceptical 
of the Western bases in Central Asia retained a responsibility 
for Russia's Central Asia policy, while those in favour of the 
strategic alignment were left in charge of relations with the 
West. This leads on to a second point. The lack of 
correspondence between the Russian political debate and the 
official line towards the West contrasted with the 
correspondence between the political debate and Russia's 
policy in Central Asia. This is in itself interesting. Russia's 
Central Asia policy was well-founded in the Russian political 
elite, at least in the way the elite expressed itself in the 
political debate. The official line towards the West did not 
however enjoy a similar level of support. Thirdly, Putin's 
efforts to co-opt the political elite in September 2001 and May 
2002 indicated that he wanted to gather support for the 
strategic alignment with the West, yet he made few other 
efforts to explain the strategic alignment and gather support 
for it. The efforts left a half-hearted impression. This may be 
because co-optation was the only way to produce a semblance 
of collegiality in foreign policy without compromising the 
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strategic alignment with the West.2?? However, to take the 
matter further than co-optation and seek to broaden support 
for the strategic alignment would perhaps have risked 
sparking off an adverse reaction. 
The portrayal of Russia's ambitions 
How were Russia's ambitions towards Central Asia portrayed 
in relations with the West? How did they come across in the 
actual Russian policies in Central Asia? Were there any 
discrepancies between the ways in which this part of Russian 
foreign policy came across in the official line directed towards 
the West and in the actual policy towards Central Asia? 
In the official line towards the West, Russia's ambitions in 
Central Asia were referred to indirectly. A recurrent theme 
was the emphasis placed on the Western military presence in 
Central Asia being temporary - and the importance of 
maintaining transparency around the bases and the transport 
of Western troops. This was repeated from autumn 2001 and 
throughout the period under study. The topic became 
especially important in January 2002, when the Russian 
political debate went through a 'second wave of apprehension' 
as regards the Western military bases in Central Asia.278 The 
issue of the temporary, transparent nature of the Western 
military presence was then brought into the bilateral 
relationship with the United States, where Russian worries 
met with repeated US statements and assurances that the 
military presence was indeed temporary and limited.2?9 But 
even after these assurances, wariness about the Western 
military bases in Central Asia was evident in statements by the 
foreign minister as well as the defence minister.280 
277 Cf. La, Vladimir Pt/tin ... p. 20. 
278 Abramova, "SShA " predclakh ... " 
279 Sce "Central Asia: Franks Says No Pcnnancnr V.S. Bases In Region"; 
"Zamcstitcl Gossckrcraria SShA nazval slukhi _ .. "; RFEIRL Nctlfs/ille, 
11 February 2002. 
180 "Russian minister calls on USA to put cards on table over Central Asia"; 
RFEIRL Newslille, 21 May 2002; RFE/RL NcwsJine, 27 February 1003; 
Shishkunova, "Baz NATO ... " 
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While the insistence on a temporary Western military 
presence in Central Asia referred indirectly to Russian 
interests in Central Asia, other statements were more direct. 
Another topic in the official line towards the West was that of 
Central Asia as a sphere of Russian interests, and a Russian 
foreign policy priority. This was underlined by an emphasis on 
the limitations on the Western military presence, i.e., that it 
had only been established for non-offensive purposes. Putin 
made explicit references to Central Asia as a sphere of Russian 
interests in June 2002, while in April he had declared the CIS 
as a Russian foreign policy priority.281 
However, the clearest reference to Russian ambitions in 
Central Asia came as late as October 2003 in a statement 
directed towards the West. In his remarks at the press 
conference after meeting NATO's defence ministers in 
Colorado Springs, Sergei Ivanov emphasised that Russia 
would boost its military presence in the CIS and particularly 
Central Asia, and that Russia retained the right to use military 
power in "[this] crucial sphere for our security", that is, the 
CIS.282 While the official line towards the West was consistent 
on the existence of Russia's interests in Central Asia 
throughout the period of study, the defence minister's clear 
statement of Russian ambitions reflected a real change in 
Russia's policy in Central·Asia. A reassertion was taking. 
place. Therefore, when considering whether Russia's 
ambitions in Central Asia came across differently in relations 
with the West from Russia's actual policy in Central Asia, it is 
reasonable to discuss the period before October 2003, when 
reassertion had not yet made its way into Russian-Western 
relations. 
As discussed in chapter 5, the increased Russian interest in 
Central Asia was evident in autumn 2001 from 11 September 
onwards. This was not remarkable, but a natural consequence 
of the impending military campaign in Afghanistan and the 
role of the former Soviet Central Asian states in this 
campaign. However, one could also see signs that Russia waS 
281 "Inrerviu kitaiskoi gazctc 'Zhenmin zhibao"'. 
282 Shishkunova, "Baz NATO ... "; RFE/RL Newslillc, 10 October 2003. 
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strengthening its ties with Central Asia, first with Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. The first nine months after September 2001 
were characterised by close multilateral and bilateral contact 
between Russia and the Central Asian states, via the CIS, the 
Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation. Plans for a joint Russian-Kyrgyz military base 
in southern Kyrgyzstan had already been launched in October, 
while the renewal of the plans to transform the 201 st Division 
to a Russian base in Tajikistan took place in December.283 
The Russian government repeatedly stated that the Russian 
base at Kant had not been established because of the Western 
Manas Base at the other side of Bishkek but out of concern for 
the security challenges in Central Asia in general. Accordingly, 
the plans were presented as relevant only to the regional 
security of Central Asia and as a Russian-sponsored effort to 
combat terrorism. This representation was similar in 
statements to Western, Central Asian or Russian audiences. 
And Russia's interests were presented relatively similarly in 
relations with the West and with Central Asia. 
However, there were two differences. Russia's relations 
with the West were characterised by top-level contact, 
repeated assurances of a strategic alignment in the war on 
terrorism and an emphasis on political ties. Therefore, 
Russia's reassertion in Central Asia did not make its way into 
the relationship with the West until Sergei Ivanov explicitly 
placed it there in October 2003. The relations with Russia's 
main partners in Central Asia - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -
were different. Here, close organisational ties and technical 
support complemented everyday contact at many levels, 
whether in the political, military or economic spheres. Not 
only was it possible to convey a wider range of messages than 
was possible in the relationship with the West; partnership in 
Central Asia went well beyond the strategic level. The 
reassertion affected these states directly. Nothing of the sort 
was taking place in relations with the West. Therefore, 
changes of nuance and emphasis in Russian policy were not 
183 RFEJRL Ncwslillc, 9 October 2001; RFElRL News/inc, 10 December 
2001. 
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necessarily as easily understood in the West as in Central Asia. 
Secondly, it is important to remember that this development 
and the entire Russian reassertion in Central Asia were taking 
place in security structures of which neither the US and 
NATO were members or observers. There were no regular 
connections between Russian-sponsored and Western-
sponsored mechanisms for cooperation on security or military 
matters. This was a contrast to repeated Russian assurances 
that the relationship with the United States in Central Asia 
was a cooperative, rather than a competitive, relationship.284 
It also made the emphasis placed on multilateral organisations 
in providing regional security appear as another way of 
excluding the West. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have discussed the correspondences and 
discrepancies between the aspects of the Russian response to 
the establishment of Western bases in Central Asia. While 
there was a discrepancy between the Russian domestic 
political debate and the official policy towards the West, I 
found that the dominance of military and security ties in 
Russia's Central Asia policy corresponded to an emphasis on 
strategic and security considerations in the domestic political 
debate. As regards Russia's ambitions in Central Asia, they 
were clearly present in Russian policy in Central Asia only a 
few weeks after 9111. In contrast, in Russia's relationship with 
the West, Russia's ambitions in Central Asia appeared only 
gradually. From autumn 2001 onwards, they were indirectly 
referred to when Russian officials underlined the temporary, 
transparent character of the Western military presence in 
Central Asia. From June 2002, Central Asia was referred to as 
a sphere of Russian interests even when addressing the 
284 "'Sergei lvanov: Rossiia i SShA ... "'; "Intcrviu kitaiskoi gazetc 'Zhcnmin 
zhibao'''; "Putin gotoV sotrudnichat s SShA v rcshcnii problem Srcdnci 
Azii" [rutin is ready to cooperate with the US in solving Central Asia's 
problems], gazeta.m, 16 September 2003. 
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international community. Only in October 2003 were Russian 
interests tied to Russia's ambitions in Central Asia in a 
statement relevant to the official line towards the West. 
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Chapter 7 
Motivations for Russian policy 
This chapter contains the discussion of a main analytical 
question in this study. What influences Russian policy in 
Central Asia after 11 September 2001? Do the findings 
discussed in the previous chapter suggest any particular 
motivations? The aim here is not to present an exhaustive 
overview of every possible motivation for Russian policy, but 
rather to discuss the motivations suggested by the findings in 
this study. That is why I prefer to use the term 'motivations' 
instead of 'explanations'. In addition, the motivations 
presented here are not a priori mutually exclusive, i.e. any 
combination may occur. To find out how they relate to each 
other is neither an aim nor a possibility in a study like this. 
However, there will be a few suggestions that may be explored 
further elsewhere. 
The timeframe set for this study implies that I cannot 
investigate how motivations for Russian policy in Central Asia 
developed before 11 September 2001. While it would have 
been interesting to discuss how the findings here relate to 
Russian policy in Central Asia before 9111, this is not the 
place for such a comprehensive discussion. The findings and 
discussion here may however shed some light on how Russian 
policy in Central Asia developed from 9111 through 2004, 
which in turn may be a basis for further study. 
The analysis of the three aspects of the Russia response to 
the establishment of Western bases in Central Asia points 
towards three interesting motivations for Russian policy in 
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Central Asia after 9/11. I will discuss in turn the domestic 
politics motivation, a motivation based on the Russian-
American bilateral relationship and strategic concerns as a 
motivation. 
Domestic politics as motivation 
How could domestic Russian politics have motivated Russia's 
policies in Central Asia? As noted in the introduction, Central 
Asia had received relatively little attention in discussions 
about Russian foreign policy before 2001, with interest 
coming largely from a military-security constituency. This 
constituency was primarily interested in strategic issues. In 
their view of foreign policy, Russia's position in Central Asia, 
as in the CIS, was an issue of geopolitical influence. Closer 
relations with the West could easily be interpreted as giving up 
positions in the CIS, and the findings in chapter 4 suggest that 
they were interpreted in this way. Accordingly, many in the 
political elite perceived the choice of a strategic alignment as 
being in favour of the West and to the detriment of Russia's 
strategic interests in the CIS. Moreover, this was a part of the 
elite that had a direct interest in preserving and increasing 
Russia's interests in Central Asia, as an increased military 
engagement in the region could increase their influence and 
possibilities in Russia as well. For example, increased Russian 
military engagement in Central Asia could enhance the 
opportunities for military bureaucrats and actors in the 
defence-industrial complex. Did the changed strategic 
situation in Central Asia after September 2001 increase their 
opportunities to influence Russia's policy in the region? Can 
one see the political elite's misgivings about the strategic 
alignment as a motivation for Russia's Central Asia policy? 
If this were the case, one would not only see a similarity of 
expressions between the political debate and the official 
rhetoric in relations with Central Asia, but also an emphasis 
on the same issues, and perhaps references to domestic 
considerations in official contact with the states in the region. 
If domestic discontent brought about a change of policy, it 
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would have to precede a policy change. This would however 
not exclude that other motivations as well could have shaped 
policy. 
The political elite's lukewarm support for the strategic 
alignment is well documented, from the initial doubts raised at 
the high-level meeting in Sochi on 22 September 2001, to the 
more widespread discontent that surfaced first in November 
2001 and again in January 2002. While such discontent was 
expressed less often after spring 2002, it did not altogether 
disappear. There is also evidence that the Kremlin took the 
implicit criticism from the political elite seriously, as can be 
seen in the attempts at reassurance by Sergei Ivanov, Igor 
I vanov and President Putin from February to May 2002. In 
addition, these attempts at reassurance, and also contributions 
to the political debate from participants close to the Kremlin, 
engaged with the political elite's worries. This happened for 
example when Mikhail Margelov in January 2002 expressed 
his certainty that Russia would preserve its influence Central 
Asia even with an American presence in the region, as 
discussed on page 72.285 The effort to co-opt crucial members 
of the political elite through an extended State Council 
Presidium meeting in May 2002 also showed that the Kremlin 
was not indifferent to the elite's level of support for the 
strategic alignment with the West.286 Accordingly, while the 
Kremlin's efforts to reassure the political elite seemed best 
characterised as too little, too late, the elite's worries were 
taken into account, and accordingly, could be a motivation for 
changes in Russia's Central Asia policy. In other words, the 
political elite could have infl uenced the strategic reassertion of 
Russian policy in Central Asia after September 2001. 
On the other hand, the initiatives to estahlish Russian bases 
in Central Asia and assist CIS countries with defence 
equipment, a central pillar in the strategic reassertion, came 
very quickly after September 2001. The full extent of the 
political elite's discontent was however not visible before early 
185 RFEIRL NClVSlillc, 17 January 2002. 
286 RFElRL News/ilte, 22 May 2002; Nagornykh, "'Prezidium Gossovcm 
vyshd "."; Zakatnova, "Prezidium Gossoveta zanialsia ... " 
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2002. In addition, the emphasis on security and military ties in 
the strategic reassertion was a natural consequence of previous 
Russian policy in Central Asia, as well as of the war on 
terrorism. Therefore, it seems likely that more direct 
influences than that of the political elite's discontent pushed 
Russia's Central Asia policy towards a strategic reassertion. It 
does seem that strategic reassertion followed a conscious 
effort at the highest level to alleviate some of the least desired 
effects of an American deployment in Central Asia. The first 
signs of a strategic reassertion seem not to be tied as closely in 
with elite discontent as with the immediate consequences of 
9111. However, discontent in the political elite may have 
reinforced the tendency towards a strategic reassertion, and 
influenced the Kremlin to continue with the initiatives towards 
the Central Asian states that followed 9111. The speed with 
which these initiatives were followed up, policies implemented 
and the obvious satisfaction this produced among high-
ranking officers and the military-security constituency in 
general indicate that this may have been the case. With the 
military-security constituency already taking responsibility for 
much of Russia's engagement in Central Asia, the issues that 
were addressed quickly after 11 September, such as military 
bases, were probably just waiting for approval by the Kremlin. 
To summarise, domestic factors influenced the shape and 
speed of the Russian strategic reassertion in Central Asia, but 
the circumstances of this reassertion suggest that the elite's 
discontent alone cannot explain it. 
Russian-American bilateral relations - a 
motivation? 
Can one say that Russian policymakers let considerations 
from the bilateral relationship with the United States influence 
their policy in Central Asia? Russian foreign policy is 
predominantly Western-centred. One would think that with 
the new strategic alignment with the West in the war on 
terrorism, maintaining a good working relationship with the 
United States was of importance to Russian policymakers. 
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This was not only because the United States was the most 
important power in the West, and the only superpOwer in 
international politics today, but also because of its leadership 
in the war on terrorism after 9/11. In addition, in the Western-
centred Russian foreign policy, the United States is taken as 
the "principal point of reference" .287 In addition, the findings 
in chapter 4 suggest that the Kremlin consciously narrowed 
the room for debate of the strategic alignment, and the 
Western bases in Central Asia, in what may have been an 
effort to alleviate the impact of the domestic political debate 
on the bilateral relationship. 
The Russian reactions towards the United States as 
regarded the Western military bases in Central Asia indicated 
increasing concerns abour the American presence in the 
region. These worries were accompanied by repeated 
assurances from Russian foreign policymakers about Russian-
American cooperation, as opposed to competition, in Central 
Asia.288 However, Russian-American cooperation in Central 
Asia did not materialise, and the Russian-sponsored 
cooperation there seemed to represent an alternative, not a 
supplement, to US efforts to enhance security in the region. 
This was also visible at the rhetorical level of Russian policy in 
Central Asia. For example, the Security Council secretary, 
Vladimir Rushailo in Almaty in April 2002 commented that 
although Russia viewed the US as its strategic ally, "the tasks, 
goals, and schedule of the Western military presence in 
Central Asia should be 'clearly determined'. ,,289 In other 
words, the strategic partnership between Russia and the West 
did not include partner-like, and open-ended, Russian-
American cooperation in Central Asia. 
In addition, on the level of practical measures offered to the 
Central Asian states by Russia, the United States did not 
emerge as Russia's partner but as Russia's rival. This was 
emphasised by regular Russian statements such as the one 
cited above. The message was clear; Centra I Asia was Russia's 
287 Lo, RUSSian Foreign Policy ... , p. 8. 
28B "'Sergei Ivanov: Rossiia i SShA ... "; "'lnter"iu kitaiskoi gazete ... " 
289 RFE/RL NelUs/ine, 15 April 2002. 
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sphere of influence, in which the West, and the US especially, 
was an outsider. At the level of Russian-American bilateral 
relations, the cooperation rhetoric was accompanied by 
demands of transparency around the Western military 
presence in Central Asia, as well as an emphasis on its 
temporary character. In sum, cooperation belonged to the 
rhetorical level, while in its policy in Central Asia, Russia 
positioned itself as an alternative to the United States. 
Why was a Russian alternative to the United States' policy 
in Central Asia the preferred choice? It is interesting here to 
take a brief look at the other side of great power relations in 
the region. While there was little interest on the Russian side 
in creating an open and cooperative security structure in 
Central Asia, the United States did not consult Russia or 
China on its expanding engagement in the region. This pattern 
of policy has been described as acting "regardless of, rather 
than in consultation with or as a counterbalance to Russia and 
China".290 Accordingly, for both Russia and China, balancing 
behaviour WaS a safe option for meeting the US as an 
increasingly important actor in Central Asia. The response 
could be formed according to Russia's strategic concerns. 
Briefly, therefore, if considerations about American actions 
motivated Russia's policy in Central Asia, this had less to do 
with cooperation than with competition. The strategic 
alignment with the West Was built on the premise that there 
was no competition between Russia and the United States. In 
the reality of Russian-American relations in Central Asia, 
there was competition for influence between the two states. 
Accordingly, it does not seem that the consideration of 
maintaining a good and cooperative relationship with the US 
mattered as a motive for Russian policy. 
290 S. Neil MacFarlane, "The United States and regionalism in Central 
Asia", International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 447-461, 459, 
citing Todd Diamond, "US Unilateralism Fuels Great Power Rivalry in 
Central Asia", Eurasia Illsigbt, 1 October 2003. 
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Strategic interests and Russian Central Asia 
policy 
On page 125, the development of Russia's policy in Central 
Asia was described as a strategic reassertion. It is therefore 
relevant to discuss whether strategic interests really did 
motivate this policy. The findings in this study, particularly 
the conclusions in chapter 5, point towards the use of military 
and security ties in strengthening Russia's position in Central 
Asia. In chapter 4, particularly from page 70, it was discussed 
how the domestic Russian debate in autumn 2001 and winter 
2002 became dominated by the view that the competition for 
influence in Central Asia was a zero-sum game. I will now try 
to draw the lines between these two sets of findings via a 
discussion of Russia's interests in Central Asia. This is 
performed in two steps. First, I shall discuss how Russian 
strategic interests may be realised in the engagement in 
Central Asia after 9/11. Secondly, I shall look into the demand 
side of Russian policy in Central Asia as a possible alternative 
motivation for Russian policy, before I go back to Russian 
leaders' own presentations of strategic interests in their 
presentations of Russian policy in Central Asia. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Russia's strategic 
concerns in Central Asia before September 2001 were to 
"maintain regional stability, and to prevent 'outsiders' from 
gaining influence in the Central Asian states.,,291 These 
concerns reflected one of the first Russian aims in Central Asia 
from the early 1990s onwards - what Dov Lynch calls 
Russia's aim to n1aintain a "Russian-oriented status quo" in 
the region, closely connected to its claims to being a great 
power.292 Here, I will see the Central Asian states' orientation 
towards Russia as especially desirable when it corresponds to 
Russia's interests in the region. These interests have been 
described by Dmitry Trofimov as "stability in the region ( ... ); 
291 Jooson, "'Russia and Central A"ia", pp. 98 and 114. 
292 Dav Lynch, Russian Peacckeel"'lIg Strategies in the ClS. The Cases of 
Mo/doua, Georgia and Tajikistall (London: Macmillan l'rcss/RIIA, 
2000). pp. 175-176. 
144 FORSVARSSTUDIER 3/2005 
unrestricted use of the Central Asian transit potential to 
maintain partner relations with China, India, and Iran ( ... ); 
[the] continued existence of common economic expanse with 
Central Asia" to aid "Russia's economic modernization ( ... ); 
use of the region's geostrategic potential ( ... ) to preserve its 
status of a world and regional power ( ... ); international 
recognition of Russia's leading role in the region. ,,293 How 
does Russia's military engagement realise Russian interests in 
Central Asia? Does Russia's energy engagement complement 
the military engagement in realising these interests? Energy 
engagement is discussed here because it is the main component 
of Russia's engagement in Central Asia besides the military 
engagement. 
The military engagement 
Both the base at Kant and the military engagement in 
Tajikistan are maintained with the aim of contributing to 
stability in the region. In Tajikistan, regime stability seems to 
be the main aim, while stability as protection from armed 
incursions and terrorist attacks is more important in the 
deployment in Kyrgyzstan.294 Establishing a military presence 
in the two weakest states in Central Asia seems to serve 
Russia's interest well in maintaining stability in the region, 
although there is always a danger that such measures may 
backfire. This could be the case in Tajikistan, where militant 
Islamism represents a more immediate threat than in 
Kyrgyzstan. But this possibility is far outweighed by the 
benefits of having an opportunity to support the incumbent 
regime in a country only recently out of civil war. There is 
also a danger of contributing to great power rivalry in the 
region, which would hardly increase regional stability. 
293 Dmitry Trofimov, "Russia and the United States in Cenrral Asia: 
Problems, Prospects, and Interests", Central Asia mId the Caucasus, no. 
1 (19) (2003), 72-82, 76. 
294 This vicwt widespread at the time of the KOlnt Base's establishment, was 
confirmed at a later point by the non-interference of the forces at Kanr in 
the cflange of regime in Kyrgyzstan in March 200S. RFE/RL NeUfsline, 
5 April 2005. 
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However, to sOme Russian policymakers, the danger of great 
power rivalry may not deter them from engagement in Central 
Asia. Instead, one would expect that should great power 
rivalry develop, the main task in Russian policy would be to 
bolster Russia's position by strengthening the military 
presence. 
The bases also serve the interest of maintaining a Russia1l-
oriented stability, as they pull the two closest Russian allies in 
the region closer to Russia. As regards coordination in threat 
management, regular, Russian-sponsored exercises emphasised 
the shared goal of maintaining stability and fighting terrorism 
and incursions. This was the case in "South - Anti-terror", the 
anti-terrorism exercise in April 2002 as well as the SCO's anti-
terrorism exercise in August 2003.295 There were also other 
forms of assistance and regular contact between Russian, 
Kyrgyz and Tajik military forces, e.g. in joint training 
196 arrangements.-
The bases arguably contribute towards securing Central 
Asia's transit pote1ltial in partner relations with other powers 
close to the region, such as China, India and Iran. While 
maintaining bases is not sufficient to secure the region's transit 
potential, it seems a necessary contribution towards having 
this option in the longer term, because a Russian military 
presence may be required to maintain the requisite stability. 
The bases also provide a focus for contact, especially with 
China, and are a signal of Russia's interests in the region. 
As regards the contin ued existence of a comma" economic 
expanse with the Central Asian states, the military bases in 
themselves are less directly connected to this than the various 
agreements that accompanied the establishment of the bases. 
There are two types of such agreements. Some pertain mainly 
to investments in civilian infrastructure, debt reduction and 
the like. Others refer to investments in military infrastructure 
295 RFElRL NCIVS/i/lC, 15 April 2002; RFEIRL Newsli1tc, 7 and 11 August 
2003. For a good overview of joint bilateral and CSTO exercises that 
involve Tajikistan, see I)latcr~Zybcrk, Tajikistan. Waiting For A Storm? 
p.6-7. 
296 Kozlova, "Russian military to remain in Kyrgyzstan". 
146 PORSVARSSTUDIER 312005 
and trade in military equipment and technologies. As regards 
the Kant Base in Kyrgyzstan, its establishment was 
accompanied by an agreement that wrote off two-thirds of the 
state's debts to Russia. In addition, Russia covered most of the 
costs of establishing the base as well as its maintenance.297 
Several of the agreements on military equipment, technologies 
and training entered into in spring and summer 2002 were 
also later connected to the establishment of this base.298 In 
April 2002, a protocol regulated Russia's assistance in the 
formation of a properly equipped Kyrgyz border service.299 
An agreement that allowed Russian military installations in 
Kyrgyzstan to be maintained for another 7 to 15 years was 
signed in 1 une 2002, and at the same time it was agreed that 
Russia would purchase Kyrgyz-produced military goods.300 
Apart from technology directly connected to the establishment 
of the Kant Base, equipment for Kyrgyzstan's air defence 
system came from Russia, and one source estimated such 
assistance to be worth around 14 million rubles in the period 
from 1998 to 2003.301 
In the process of establishing the Fourth Base in Tajikistan, 
it waS evident that the compensations and accompanying 
agreements expected by the Tajik side were not going to be 
matched by the Russian side. Russia, on its side, would have 
to go through a tough negotiation process to achieve its aims 
for a comprehensive military presence in Tajikistan. As it 
turned out, the Russian investment in Tajikistan connected to 
the establishment of the Fourth Base was far more substantial 
than Kyrgyzstan had been offered on establishing the Kant 
Base. Not only was most of Tajikistan's debt written off as the 
price Russia had to pay to obtain the satellite surveillance 
station "Okno" in Nurek, there was also substantial Russian 
investment in hydro energy and in aluminium production. All 
in all, investments of over two billion US dollars were 
297 RFEJRL Newslinc. 24 January 2003. 
298 Vcrnidub, "Istrebitcli Putina sdi v Kirgizii." 
299 Sce Panfilova and Khanbabian, "Patrushev, Totskii i Ramsfcld ... " 
300 RFElRL Newsline, 14 June 2002; K01:tOV3, "Russian military co remain 
in Kyrgyzstan." 
301 Shvarev, ""Shkvaii' iz Bishkcka.'" 
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planned. In this instance, the establishment of a military base 
was directly connected to economic ties between Russia and 
Tajikistan, and one could even say that it could prove to aid 
Russia's economic modernisation. However, investments like 
these alone would hardly turn the negative trend in trade and 
investment between Russia and the Central Asian states. It 
remains difficult to see how economic ties with the Central 
Asian states can directly affect Russia's economic 
modernisation. 
The bases are also a step in increasing the region's strategic 
[Jotel1tiai for Russia. The establishment of a base in 
Kyrgyzstan significantly increased the logistical support, as 
well as the variety of potential tasks, for Russia's military 
deployment in the region. Both Kant and the Fourth Base are 
military outposts for Russia to the south, now that other bases 
and military installations outside of the former Soviet territory 
have closed down. When it Comes to the strategic potential of 
the bases, it is important to consider the directions in which 
their potential may be realised. The Fourth Base, and the 201 st 
Division before it, seemed to be connected primarily to 
stability in Tajikistan, and the continued threat of Islamic 
militancy in the region in general. This does not preclude 
other possible strategic aims. The Kant Base and the aircraft 
stationed there, on the other side, seem ill suited for fighting 
terrorism in the region.302 However, the presence of the base 
considerably increases the control of Kyrgyzstan's airspace, 
important not only to the country's security, but also to 
Russia's interests. The presence of aircraft at Kant, including 
an !I-1S, suggests that air reconnaissance might be a 
prioritised task.303 As a supporting force for the Fourth Base, 
Kant is rather small, but strategically located for refuelling 
between Russia and Tajikistan. One may think of other 
possible strategic aims for establishing an airbase at Kant, 
such as the Western Manas Base nearby. In addition, neither 
the proximity of China, nor the importance of Uzbekistan's 
aspirations to becoming a regional centre of power should be 
302 Jonson, Vladimir Plltill and Central Asia ... , p. 96. 
303 Platcr-Zybcrk, Kyrg),zstan - Focusi1lg 011 Sect/Tity, p. 11. 
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overlooked. It is therefore a reasonable conclusion that for 
Russia, the possibility of watching the general strategic scene 
in Central Asia played a considerable part when establishing 
the Kant Base. This also seems to have influenced the 
composition of forces and aircraft at the base. While the 
Fourth Base in Tajikistan is less directly connected with the 
regional strategic scene, Russia's acquisition of the satellite 
surveillance station "Okno" in Tajikistan was highly relevant 
to its interests. "Okno" became operational in July 2002, and 
it complements Russia's other military presence in the region 
with a window to the global strategic scene through space 
surveillance. 
To preserve Russia's status as a global alld regional power, 
a military presence in Central Asia is necessary for several 
reasons. Firstly, this presence signifies Russia's position in the 
region to other powers with a direct interest in Central Asia, 
such as the United States and China, as well as to other 
regional powers whose interest may increase over time, such 
as Iran and India. Secondly, it is a signal of Russian power to 
the two states in the region most likely to contend for 
domination of the region - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While 
the rivalry between these two states in periods becomes less 
intense, it cannot be overlooked. One cannot exclude that 
establishing the Kant Base was partly directed against 
Uzbekistan's claims to regional hegemony. These claims, and 
practical Uzbek measures, have upset Uzbekistan's 
neighbours, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Accordingly, a third reason for Russia to tie military presence 
in Central Asia to its status as a global and regional power is 
that a credible claim for regional power status should be 
underpinned by a military presence. After all, if Russia cannot 
protect its closest allies in Central Asia, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, it can hardly claim to be a regional power. With 
two bases complemented by other forms of military assistance 
in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan Russia's claim to being a 
regional power was far more credible. 
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How does Russia's military presence realise the aim of 
achieving international recognition for its leadillg role in the 
region? This is tightly connected to being a regional, if not a 
global, power. With a military engagement, Russia can 
underpin aspirations for an internationally recognised leading 
role, through a position as a security guarantor for the region. 
Nevertheless, comprehensive engagement in other arenas will 
probably be just as important to secure Russia's interests in 
Central Asia. Without Russian engagement in the Central 
Asian economies, other powers will be more welcome in the 
region than they are today. Thus, while the military presence 
is necessary to signal that Russia claims a leading role, one 
may doubt whether it is sufficient. WilI other powers accept 
that Russia plays a leading role and structure their own 
engagement accordingly? This remains an open question. The 
United States has kept a relatively low profile after 
establishing bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but there are 
no guarantees that other powers will act similarly. While 
China for now limits its military engagement in Central Asia 
to the SCO and to growing bilateral economic ties, this might 
not remain so in the future. Accordingly, a Russian military 
presence seems necessary to achieve international recognition 
for having a leading role in the region, but only time wilI show 
whether the current size and characteristics of this engagement 
can lead to such recognition. 
A lack of economic engagement 
In addition to the military engagement, other types of 
engagement in Central Asia may contribute to the realisation 
of Russia's interests in the region. Our attention goes first and 
foremost to energy engagements. Energy engagements are 
always interesting in a strategic context, but in Russia's 
Central Asia policy, they are the main engagements of an 
economic nature. I will now make a brief excursion into the 
lack of other types uf Russian economic engagement in the 
regIon. 
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Russia's failure to engage in the region's economies outside 
of the energy sphere has been a source of irritation to Central 
Asian leaders. This has been an especially acute problem in 
Russian-Tajik relations. Russian interest has simply not lived 
up to Tajik expectations.304 In addition, a major economic 
connection between Russia and the Tajik economy, that of 
Tajik migrant workers in Russia, was subjected to tensions in 
the bilateral relationship in 2002, when Russian regulations 
concerning migrant workers were reviewed.30S The bilateral 
trade between Tajikistan and Russia has remained at a low 
level after the end of the civil war. One of the accompanying 
agreements to the establishment of the Fourth Base in 2004 
stipulated substantial investment in Tajikistan's aluminium 
industry. So far, this is the only major Russian investment in 
the country. The level of economic interaction outside energy 
is somewhat higher in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but not 
significant enough to draw much government attention 
beyond speeches at summits. Tbe Russian engagement in 
Kazakhstan's economy is varied and considerable. This is one 
of the primary indications that the relationship between 
Russia and Kazakhstan is different from the one between 
Russia and the other Central Asian states. 
The engagement in energy 
On pages 112-116, a considerable Russian engagement in 
energy was outlined. The conclusion in chapter 5 was that 
while military and security interests were at the core of the ties 
between Russia and the Central Asian states, energy 
304 jon50n, Vladimir Plltin and Central Asia, p. lOB. 
305 The number of Tajik migrant workers in Russia could be as high as 
650,000. See lOlls-on, Vladimir Pulill and Central Asia, pp. 108-109 and 
225, £n. 149, citing the head of the Dushanhe office of the International 
Organization for Migration, Igor Rose, in comment to ITAR~TASS, 19 
November 2002. The issue ofTajik migrants' status in Russia was 
partially resolved in connection with the establishment of the Fourth 
Base. See Chudodccv, "'Prishla na bazu. '" 
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engagements were a complement. Does Russia's energy 
engagement also complement military ties in realising Russia's 
strategic interests in Central Asia? 
As outlined on pages 143-144, Russia's interests in Central 
Asia are to: promote stability, preferably a Russian-oriented 
stability, secure the region's transit potential, have a continued 
common economic expanse with Russia in the region, use the 
region's geostrategic potential, establish Russia as a global and 
regional power and to gain international recognition for this 
role. 
Energy ties with Russia do not necessarily promote stability 
in Central Asia. The strategic significance of energy leads to a 
dilemma similar to that of military power; it may encourage 
great power rivalry. The drive to secure energy resources and 
to control their transport may lead to a modern 'great game' 
of power rivalry in a region like Central Asia. A Russian 
energy engagement in the region, if caught up in a great power 
rivalry, will not promote stability. On the other hand, Russian 
failure to develop an energy engagement in Central Asia may 
also have a negative influence on the region's stability. It may 
lead to a Russian engagement reliant on military and security 
ties, and increase Central Asian uncertainty about Russian 
interests in the region. A failure to engage will also deprive 
Russia of opportunities to influence the strategic balance. 
Currently, renewed Central Asian military and energy ties 
with Russia seem to lead to a continued regional orientation 
towards Russia. In this respect, while military ties and energy 
engagement are closely related only in Tajikistan in the case of 
hydro energy development, the two lines of engagement are 
both working in the same direction, towards an increased 
Russian presence. 
While the transit potential of the Russian military bases is 
indirect, energy engagement, especially in the development 
and transport of regional energy resources, is central to 
maintaining the possibility to connect with China, India and 
Iran as partners in the future. In this regard, it is especially 
important to Russia that Russian, not Western, companies 
control the main transit lines to these partners. One could also 
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argue that an energy engagement complements Russia's 
military presence. While the military engagement may not 
necessarily have a positive effect on partnerships with other 
powers, the possibilities for cooperation, trade and interaction 
inherent in the energy engagement could influence 
partnerships positively. 
Likewise, energy engagement and military ties may 
complement each other in contributing towards the 
continuation of a common economic expanse in Central Asia. 
The potential is clearly illustrated in the various agreements 
that accompanied the establishment of the Kant and Fourth 
bases. However, only in the case of the Fourth Base were 
agreements concerning hydro energy tied to the establishment 
of the base. In the case of Kant, a Russian-Kyrgyz investment 
forum was arranged in conjunction with the inauguration of 
the base.306 As regards energy, there were no agreements 
directly related to the establishment of the base. But the 
energy agreements discussed in chapter 5 coincided with the 
establishment of the base, and they probably benefited much 
from the good bilateral relations brought about by the plans 
for the base. Agreements on energy also accompanied the 
establishment of a strategic partnership between Russia and 
Uzbekistan. Accordingly, the connection between an energy 
engagement and a military presence strengthens a continued 
common economic expanse in Central Asia. A renewed effort 
to engage economically in fields other than energy is certainly 
called for to preserve and strengthen the common economic 
expanse. But without an energy engagement, Russia would 
face the imminent danger of disengagement in Central Asia. 
The issues of using Central Asia's strategic potential, 
preserving the status as a global and regional power and 
having its role as a leading power in the region recognised 
relate to the combined energy and military engagement in 
similar ways. For all three aims, it is highly important that 
Russia have a conlprehensive set of energy engagements as 
well as a military presence in the two bases. This situation 
306 Sce RelIt, "Putin orkryl pcrvuiu ... " 
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adds credibility to any claim that Russia will have to being 
important in Central Asia as well as in the world. However, 
one may discuss whether energy engagement is enough to 
achieve these last three aims from page 144. 
As for using Central Asia's strategic potential, the bases 
give Russia better opportunities to watch - and potentially 
also participate - on the region's strategic scene. The energy 
engagement complements the military bases in a crucial way, 
because energy resources as a regional strategic arena are nO 
less important to Russia than security. What remains to be 
seen is how it will develop: will promised investments 
materialise? Will Russian companies maintain their interest in 
the region? And will the Kremlin continue to emphasise the 
importance of economic ties, so that a broader field of 
economic cooperation can support Russia's energy 
engagement? The use of Central Asia's geostrategic potential 
is already there, but to preserve it Russia will have to engage 
more extensively outside the energy field as well. 
A similar line of argument can be seen for the preservation 
of Russia's status as a global and regional power. Russia's 
status as a regional power seems secured, at least for the time 
being. But the question of whether energy and military 
engagements are sufficient to enhance Russia's status as a 
global power is more complicated. There are two main 
reasons to doubt that regional power status in Central Asia 
may be converted into great power status on the global arena 
through an energy engagement. First, there is a lack of 
transport for Central Asia's energy resources to markets 
outside the region at present. Secondly, while Central Asia's 
energy resources are substantial and interesting, the unrealistic 
expectations of the international energy community from a 
few years ago are now giving way to widespread appreciation 
of rhe costs involved in exploiting and transporting them. 
Accordingly, regional power status in Central Asia is certainly 
no disadvantage to becoming a truly global power. However, 
wirh Russian involvement in other economic fields lagging 
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behind that of energy, and Russia's problems in fulfilling 
many other sides in achieving global power status, Central 
Asia is not sufficient to make Russia a global power. 
While it seems that Russia is accepted as playing a leading 
role in Central Asia, this may not continue unless Russia also 
becomes more active in fields other than energy and defence. 
Again, an energy engagement is certainly important to play a 
leading role in the region, but to preserve this situation, it is 
only a prerequisite and not a sufficient condition in itself. 
To sum up this part of the analysis, Russia's energy 
engagement in Central Asia is a necessary complement to the 
military presence to achieve the Russian strategic aim of 
maintaining a Russian-oriented status quo in the region. 
Activity within both types of engagement was stepped up 
during the period under study, and the increases in both fields 
were at times explicitly connected to each other through 
political agreements. While a combination of military and 
energy engagements in Central Asia was not sufficient to 
achieve Russia's aim in the region, they were necessary. The 
conclusion from this part of the analysis is that Russia's 
strategic interests seemed to motivate Russian policy. 
However, to support the argument, I will use the last few 
pages of this chapter to take a step back and discuss the case 
for and against the propnsition that Russian policy was 
motivated by strategic concerns. 
Demands for Russian involvement 
The discussion in this chapter so far can be concluded briefly 
in the following way. While domestic concerns, particularly 
elite discontent, and issues in the Russian-American 
relationship may have contributed towards Russia's policies in 
Central Asia after 9/11, strategic concerns seem to have played 
a more decisive role as motivation for a strategic reassertion, 
as may be expected. However, other issues may also have 
played a part. One such issue is particularly prominent; that of 
Central Asian leaders' demands for a Russian engagement in 
the region. This issue is considered here as a possible influence 
on Russian policies in Central Asia after 9/11. 
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While Central Asia's leaders welcomed broadened Western 
engagement in Central Asia from September 2001, althuugh 
not without apprehension, one should not overlook the 
demand for a Russian engagement as well. The leaders in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan were worried by 
Russia lacking a strategy towards Central Asia after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Russia became a reactive, opportunistic 
power in a region in which it had every opportunity to be a 
major player. Western interest in the region at the time Was in 
some ways a disappointment to Central Asia's leaders. The 
American engagement was focused on Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, on energy and human rights and less on security. 
This was not a real alternative to a comprehensive Russian 
engagement. China emphasised economic involvement and did 
not encroach on a perceived Russian sphere of influence; it 
preferred an advantageous condominium with Russia in the 
region. 3D? Together they sought to minimise foreign influence 
in the region and especially to contain US influence as well as 
Islamism. 
Putin's reengagement from 2000 met with a positive 
response for two main reasons. Firstly, Russian engagement 
could bring investments and military and security cooperation. 
Secondly, with a balance between Russia, the United States 
and China, the Central Asian states had more to bargain for, 
and could avoid excessive infl uence from one great power 
alone. Thirdly, the regional security dynamics were important, 
too. Especially for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it was 
important not to be left alone to cope with the problems of 
cooperating with Uzbekistan. This applied especially to 
problems with border demarcation and minorities, and 
differing ideas on how to fight Islamic fundamentalism. 
Statements from Central Asian leaders indicated that a 
Russian reengagement in the region was welcome. For 
example, when the Russian-Kyrgyz agreement on the Kant 
Base was signed, President Akaev stated, "the opening of a 
military base is evidence of Russia's important role in 
307 Cf. Svantc E. Corncll, "'America in Eurasia: One Year After", Current 
History, vo!. 101, no. 657 (October 2002}: 330-336. 
156 FORS\'ARSSTUDIER .WOOS 
guaranteeing Central Asian stability and security. ,,308 In this 
view, Akaev had support in the political elite.309 The initiative 
to establish the base belonged to Akaev, and it was closely 
connected with his aim of makinf Kyrgyzstan Russia's main strategic partner in Central Asia. 10 One view of this issue is 
that Akaev had more interest in the Kant Base than Putin, 
because Kyrgyzstan under Akaev had the ideological aim of 
being friends with everyone. For Russia, on the other hand, 
the base was more of a symbo!.311 As regards Tajikistan, 
regime stability here is dependent on a Russian presence, and 
Tajikistan views Russia as a strategic partner, as well as a 
guarantor of stability. The Russian military presence is 
considerable, with the Fourth Base and until late 2004 the 
control over the border service. While the Tajik government at 
times would have liked Russia to be more active, in general, 
Tajik demand has had an impact on Russian policy. This was 
especially visible in November 2004, when the handover of 
border control from Russia to Tajikistan started in the Tajik-
Afghan section, in spite of previous Russian declarations that 
Tajik forces were not sufficiently prepared for this task.312 
Uzbekistan provides a contrast as an example of the 
connection between demand for Russian engagement in 
Central Asia and Russian policy. As long as there is no Uzbek 
308 Panfilovu. "Rossiia zanovo osvaivaet ... " 
309 Statements to this effect can be found in "Rossiia vozvrashchactsia?" 
310 See RFEJRL Netllslillc, 6 December 2002; Panfilova and 1.,,1elikova, "$ 
beregov Ganga ... "; "Rossiia vozvrashchactsia?" 
311 Fcdor Lukianov, interview with the author, Moscow 19 November 
2004. 
312 Sce RFE/RL Ncwslinc,15 November 2004. The last statement on 
unprepared Tajik forces before the takeover came in May 2004 from rhe 
deputy head of the Russian Border Service, Aleksandr Manilav. The 
Russian ambassador to Dushanbe, Maksim Peshkov, in summer 2004 
said that the initiative to transfer border control came from the Taiik 
government, and thut it was too early to carry out a transfer. He also 
raised fears about border security in the event of a Tajik takeover. See 
Turko Dikaev, '''Absoliutnyi bred' generala Manilova" [General 
Manilov's 'complete gibberish'], Tribune-UZ, 27 May 2004; ""Too 
early' for Tajiks to take over border coO£rol- Russian envoy" ,ltar-
TASS, 1 June 2004; Vladimir Mukhin, "Vaennye igry na fane teraktov" 
[War games on a background of terrorist acts], Nezavisimoe l'oewtoe 
obozrcnie, 6 August 2004. 
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interest in comprehensive military cooperation between the 
two states, this is out of the question. Other types of 
cooperation and contacts, however, have benefited from the 
strategic partnership agreement from June 2004, and this 
partnership would not have been initiated if not for increasing 
interest from President Karimov in building a closer 
relationship with Russia. 
But while there is certainly a demand side to Russia's 
engagement in Central Asia, two points are well worth 
remembering. Firstly, the demand side should not be 
overstated. While the Central Asian governments are 
interested in Russian engagement in their region, and see it as 
an important component of the strategic balance in the region, 
it is only Tajikistan that is dependent mainly on Russia for its 
internal stability. The others can, and could certainly in the 
period under study, live without Russia, although this was not 
their best option. This runs contrary to the opinion among the 
part of the Russian political elite committed to the idea of 
Russia as a great power, that "Central Asia cannot live 
without Russia".313 To secure Russian interests in Central 
Asia, Russia's policy is just as important. Central Asian 
opportunities cannot be taken for granted. Secondly, Russian 
activity in Central Asia in the period under study still had not 
shed a certain fragmentariness, a reactivity that at times led 
Central Asian leaders to feel insecure about its aims.314 
Accordingly, the demand from Central Asian leaders for a 
Russian engagement, always underlined in official speeches 
and documents, was paired with a wariness of being left 
without any options other than that of Russia for great power 
engagement in the region. 
313 As stared in interview with the author by Serge! Mikhecv. Moscow, 16 
November 2004. 
314 This view is corroborated by statements made in an interview by the 
author with Zoir Saidov, that "Russian policy {in Central Asia] is 
characterised by a fragmentary activity". Moscow, 20 November 2004. 
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Strategic interests in Russian explanations 
An important reaSon to consider strategic interests as a 
motivation for Russian policy in Central Asia is that this is 
how Russian leaders explained it. Strategic interests were 
presented as motivation for both the military and the energy 
sides to Russia's reassertion in Central Asia after 200l. 
Russian leaders, especially President Putin, made statements to 
this effect on several occasions. For example, after the opening 
of the Kant Base, Putin met with a group of Russian 
businessmen at the Rnssian-Kyrgyz investment forum in 
Bishkek and nrged them to invest more in Kyrgyzstan, saying 
"to be honest J ... ] this corresponds to the strategic interests of 
our country." 15 Pntin also specified Rnssia's interests in 
cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in his statement to the press after 
the inangnration: "to broaden and strengthen onr cooperation 
in the sphere of secnrity and the fight against terrorism and to 
create the necessary conditions for further progress in the 
sphere of trade and economy.,,316 Trade, the economy, and 
strategic interests were mentioned in connection with the 
establishment of the Fourth Base in Tajikistan as well. While 
Putin emphasised in his auguration speech the fight against 
terrorism, collective securiry, and stabiliry in Central Asia, the 
defence minister alluded to the connection between economic 
interests and military presence when he said, "[the] Russian 
capital flow [in the Tajik economy] is significant. And this 
capital should be protected. ,,317 Anatolii Chubais, whose idea 
of a Russian liberal empire based on economic integration and 
influence in the former Soviet Union has had substantial 
influence in the Kremlin, was more blunt. At the inauguration 
of the Fourth Base, he remarked that the energy agreements 
connected to the establishment of the base were a step 
315 Reur, "Putin otkryl pcrvuiu ... " 
316 Vladimir Putin, "Zaiavlcnic cllia prcssy po itogam rabochcgo vizira v 
Kirgizskuiu Respubliku" [Statement to the press on the results of the 
working visit to the Kyrgyz Republic], 23 October 2003. 
317 Vladimir Purin, "'Vystuplcnie na rossiiskoi voennoi baze v 
Tadzhikistanc'" [Speech at the Russian military base in Tajikistan], 17 
October 2004; Parshin, "Tajikistan: The Russians Are Coming Back"'. 
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forward in creating a liberal empire.318 At the same event, 
Russian and Tajik officials also remarked that Russia's 
strategic interests, especially in the regional competition with 
the US, had been strengthened.319 Accordingly, we may 
conclude that the creation of a common economic expanse in 
Central Asia, as well as strengthening Russia's strategic 
position in the region, were prioritised aims of Russian leaders 
in the establishment of the military bases. 
Conclusions 
Strategic interests were important as a motivation for Russian 
policy in Central Asia after 2001, although it was pointed out 
above that the lack of support in the Russian political elite for 
the strategic alignment might have contributed in the 
development of this policy. However, the establishment of 
Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and also other 
sides of the military engagement originated in strategic 
concerns. The energy engagement increasingly complemented 
the military engagement. In Uzbekistan, where a 
comprehensive Russian military engagement was not a 
political option, energy nevertheless provided Russia with 
opportunities for influence and considerable points of contact. 
Russian leaders, including the president, explicitly stated on 
different occasions the connection between energy and 
military ties. 
While strategic interests shaped Russia's engagement, there 
was also a demand side to it. At different points the leaders in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were looking for 
closer, strategic relations with Russia. The balance between 
energy and military ties within these strategic relations varied, 
from serious efforts to strengthen the relationship with an 
energy and economic side in the case of Tajikistan, to the 
dominance of energy issues in the case of Uzbekistan. Russia's 
role in the region was of course not shaped only by Russia, 
but also by its partners. 
318 Tsepliaev, "Vostochnaia diplomatiia". 
319 Chudodcev, "Prishla na bazu". 
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Chapter 8 
Russian-American relations and 
this study 
In this chapter, I will consider the implications of the findings 
in the previous chapters for the bilateral relationship between 
Russia and the United States. The question is not only how the 
Russian response to the Western bases in Central Asia affected 
the general relationship. It is also relevant to consider how the 
Russian response, and the Russian-American relationship in 
Central Asia, relate to overall Russian-American relations. 
More specifically, I will discuss the idea of a strategic 
partnership between these two states, in light of their 
relationship in Central Asia and the war on terrorism. 
The Russian-American bilateral relationship 
The relations between Russia and the United States in Central 
Asia constitute only one side of the overall bilateral 
relationship. For the first year after 9/11, it was nevertheless a 
particularly prominent side of the relationship, because the 
war on terrorism overshadowed many other important issues. 
This situation did not last. The bilateral relationship between 
Russia and the United States is characterised by a dependency 
on top-level, even presidential level, contact. This was the case 
with the two sets of leaders before George W. Bush and 
Vladimir Putin. In spite of the criticism this attracted by Bush 
before he became president, he too eventually embraced the 
idea of a personal relationship with Putin. Putin, on his side, 
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seemed determined to develop a close relationship with Bush. 
When the opportunity tu do so opened in Ljubljana in June 
2001, Putin also successfully connected with the American 
president on a personal level. From a focus on Europe during 
Putin's first 18 months in office, Russian foreign policy 
reverted to a more traditional Americacentric orientation.320 
This tendency was reinforced by 9111. 
This example illustrates the top-heavy characteristics of the 
US-Russian relationship. The top-heavy relationship is 
compounded by a lack of day-to-day contact at lower 
government levels. In spite of growing bilateral trade, and the 
United States' position as a major source of direct foreign 
invesrfl1ent in Russia, economic ties between Russia and the 
United States lag behind US-Chinese ties for example.321 This 
leaves it to political contacts and political issues to dominate 
the bilateral relationship. Security and strategic issues again 
dominate the political side of the bilateral relationship. This is 
partly a consequence of the heritage of a relationship between 
two superpowers. Because of Russia's position as a successor 
state to the Soviet Union, several of the issues on the Russian-
American agenda have a strategic content, e.g. the Strategic 
Arms Reductions Treaties and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program.322 But the lack of other political 
issues on the bilateral agenda is also connected to Russia's 
weakness and the strength of the United States. Russia's 
leverage in international politics is limited, and certainly 
limited enough for the United States to disregard it on many 
Issues. On the American side, not only are there many issues 
320 Cf. La, VJadimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Polic}', p. 
128. 
321 Cf. Goldgcicr and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 347; for a detailed 
discussion, see Jnga Litvinsky, Matt London, and Tanya Shusrcr, "'U.S.-
Russian Trade and Investment: Policy and Performance" in Russia's 
Uncertain Eco/1omic Future, Compendium of Papers submitted to the 
Joint Economic Committee (Wasbington, D.e.; Cungress of .he United 
States, 2001), pp. 411-424. 
322 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was initiated by US 
senators Sam Nunn ufld Richard G. Lugar in 1991 co safeguard and 
destroy weapons of mass destruction in the states of the former Soviet 
Union. 
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on which any American administration may ignore Russian 
interests; under the administration of George W. Bush, the 
policy of unilateralism meant that Russia's interests were not 
taken into account even on occasions when it would have 
been relevant to US policy to do so. In addition comes a 
tendency on the American side to underestimate Russia's 
centrality in the international relations of the states of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The war on terrorism and Central Asia 
The war on terrorism combined well with, even reinforced, 
existing mechanisms and priorities in the bilateral 
relationship. The bilateral relationship was already geared 
towards security and strategic issues, which were naturally 
prominent in the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism was 
given top priority by the American side, and this combined 
well with the bilateral relationship'S dependence on the 
relationship between the two presidents. As argued by Bobo 
Lo, the "real shift" in foreign policy after 9111 was not in 
Moscow, but in Washington. The role of Russia in the system 
of international relations was "greatly enhanced", but this 
was caused not by Russian efforts, but by the redefinition of 
the international system by the American government.323 To 
President Bush, Russia was an ally in the war on terrorism: the 
shared threat brought the US and Russia closer to each 
other. 324 The campaign added direction and emphasis to the 
bilateral relationship, but it also represented a framework for 
this relationship. The priority of fighting terrorism 
overshadowed the lack of shared values and everyday contact 
that in the previous years had made ordinary conflicts escalate 
into political problems. In the war on terrorism, the priority 
was on security and strategic interests, which suited both 
governments better. 
However, the United States shared the war on terrorism not 
only with Russia, but also with the Central Asian states. Here, 
323 Lo, V/adilllir Plltill and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Po/ic)', p. 129. 
324 Sce GoJdgeicr and McFauJ, PO/ver and Purpose, p. 331. 
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the strategic interests of the United States and Russia differed. 
While Central Asia in Moscow was seen as belonging to a 
sphere of Russian influence, Central Asia for Washington was 
a region of increasing importance not only to the war on 
terrorism, but also to the long-term energy security of the 
United States and the West. For both powers, there were 
considerable economic, security and strategic interests in 
retaining a comprehensive engagement in the region. To 
Russia, unlike the United States, Central Asia represented a last 
sphere of influence, as well as a "crucial sphere for [Russian] 
security" .325 Therefore, it was difficult for Moscow to accept 
the US military presence in Central Asia, just as it was difficult 
to accept that the Central Asian states could have security 
problems that were solved not by Russia, but by the West. 
Russian misgivings were perceptible at the level of Russian-
US relations in January-February 2002, when American 
officials found it necessary to reassure Russian politicians that 
the Western military bases in Central Asia were there only for 
the duration of the operations in Afghanistan. However, the 
real impact of Russia's unease on the bilateral relationship 
coincided with the disagreement between Moscow and 
Washington over the future of Iraq and the war on terrorism. 
The standoff over Iraq and later the war there emphasised in 
Russia's eyes the degree to which the international system was 
shaped by American unilateralism. Moscow's attention was 
once more drawn to the presence of Western military bases in 
Central Asia. Unlike the misgivings of early 2002, the 
domestic Russian debate about the bases from autumn 2002 
to the end of 2003 was muted. It was even more muted on the 
level of the Russian-American relationship, as the Kremlin 
tried to establish that lack of support for the strategic 
alignment was first and foremost a matter for domestic 
debate. This may have led to a less negative relationship with 
315 As stated by S. Ivanov. RFEIRL Newslillc, 10 Ocrober 2003. 
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the US than would have been the case if more populist 
considerations had been allowed to influence Russian 
"6 policy. -,-
From autumn 2002 through 2003, the Russian government 
obviously had concerns over the Western bases in Central 
Asia. As American unilateralism over Iraq appeared, the 
Western bases were becoming a problem for Russian foreign 
policymakers. While the bases were accepted initially as a 
necessary price to pay for a closer relationship with the United 
States in the war on terrorism, their long-term presence was 
difficult to endorse for the Russian government when the war 
on terrorism started going in a direction perceived as contrary 
to Russian interests. 
Arguably, the problems that arose in the bilateral 
relationship around the issue of the Central Asian bases 
should not have been unexpected. The Western, and especially 
the US, military presence in Central Asia was open-ended. The 
United States' policy around the Western bases in Central Asia 
was no less unilateral and no less open for coordination and 
cooperation than was the case with other policies in the war 
on terrorism. Cooperation was discouraged from the US side 
by a lack of consultation and openness towards Russia and 
China on the American military engagement in Central Asia. 
Russia, on its side, used the war on terrorism to develop 
military and security ties with the Central Asian states. This 
strategic reassertion was closed to the West, because it took 
place within the framework of the bilateral relationships of 
Russia and the respective Central Asian states, as well as in 
multilateral security structures that did not include the West. 
The Russian reassertion was motivated by Russia's strategic 
concerns in Central Asia, and not by, for example, 
considerations arising from the Russian-American bilateral 
relationship. The emphasis was on competition, not on 
cooperation. In this respect, Russian and American policies in 
Central Asia appeared detached from the overall bilateral 
326 Cf. Alexander A. BeJkin, "US-Russian Relations and the Global 
Counter-Terrorist Campaign"', Journal of Slavic Military Stt/dies, vo!. 
17, no. 1 (2004). 13-28. 
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relationship during the first year after 9/11. While Russia's 
alignment with the West in the war on terrorism was built on 
the premise that there was no competition between Russia and 
the US, in reality, the Central Asian policies of both Russia 
and the US inclined towards competition. When the overall 
bilateral relationship deteriorated in autumn 2002 over Iraq, 
in one sense, the bilateral relationship was only catching up 
with what had been visible in Central Asia for several months. 
Russian-American relations reconsidered 
The problems of the strategic alignment in the war on 
terrorism revealed themselves earlier in the relationship 
between the two powers in Central Asia than in the overall 
bilateral relationship. The Russian and American policies in 
Central Asia appeared detached from the overall bilateral 
relationship in the first year after 9/11. In the short term, this 
was revealed as the bilateral relationship deteriorated with the 
standoff over Iraq. But this detachment was also an early 
indication that the Russian-American relationship was going 
into a less dynamic phase. 
Periodic standstills are not a new phenomenon in Russian-
American relations. The tendency for this relationship to go 
through more and less dynamic periods is closely related to 
the reliance on top-level contacts and predominance of 
strategic and security issues on the bilateral agenda. When it is 
difficult to find an understanding on strategic and security 
issues, or when the leaders of the two states are preoccupied 
with other issues, the economic issues, and everyday, 
comprehensive contact in the relationship between the two 
states are not important enough to make the bilateral 
relationship go forward. With a bilateral relationship 
dependent on at least acceptance of the other side's strategic 
aims and security agenda, it is inevitable that less dynamic 
periods occur when the Russian and American leaderships 
have differing views of the international situation. 
The development of Russian and American policies in 
Central Asia from 9111 through 2004 revealed how strategic 
reasoning and aims lie behind the two powers' engagements in 
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the region. Military bases and energy resources mattered for 
the Russian and American policies in Central Asia. On the 
Russian side, US aims and interests in the region were seen to 
be in conflict with Russian aims and interests. US policy, 
which was characterised by unilateral action and little 
openness in future plans for the region, was not open to 
coordination with Russian aims. This is not to say that 
coordination berween Russia and the United States in Central 
Asia should have been expected. If it were to occur, it would 
certainly have been an exception to the usual policies of both 
states. My point here is that there was a marked emphasis on 
alignment, cooperation and coordination in the war on 
terrorism in the rhetoric of the two leaderships. Compared 
with the reality of both states' policies in Central Asia, 
however, the rhetoric sounded increasingly hollow. This could 
not but have a negative effect on the overall hilateral 
relationship as well. Compounded by the different views of 
the two governments on how to handle Iraq in the war on 
terrorism, even the war on terrorism was a problematic issue 
in the bilateral relationship by late 2003. 
Prospects for a strategic partnership 
Strategic partnerships are based on shared strategic interests, 
preferably a wide range of interests, and they are, at least in 
their intentions, quite durable. In this they differ from 
alignments, which more often concern only one issue, or a 
narrow range of closely related issues. On the other hand, a 
partnership has fewer notions of shared security and is less 
formal than an alliance and it is not based on shared values. 
The idea of a strategic partnership between Russia and the 
United States, bolstered by close relations between Russia and 
NATO, dates back to the immediate period after the end of 
the Cold War. For Bill Clinton's administration a partnership 
with Russia based on shared security interests was a goal early 
on. However, by 1994 it was apparent that a real partnership 
between the rwo states would not develop quickly. The United 
States had security and strategic interests in many regions and 
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on diverse issues. Many of these interests did not coincide 
with Russia's interests anu not all issues were relevant to 
Russian foreign policy. 
There were attempts to revive the idea of a strategic 
partnership at some points before 9111, notably after the 
coming to power of Vladimir Putin in Russia and the election 
of George W. Bush in the US. After 9/11, the strategic 
partnership idea was embraced both in Moscow and 
Washington. It seemed that with a common cause and a good 
personal relationship between the two presidents, obstacles 
could be overcome and the relationship between Russia and 
the United States could become a genuine partnership. It was 
possible to imagine that with the war on terrorism, broader 
notions of security, and shared strategic interests would 
strengthen the bilateral relationship and lead to long-term 
partner relations. However, in Central Asia as well as in the 
war on terrorism, it became apparent during 2002 and 2003 
that the strategic interests were shared, but had a more 
parallel character: they were perceived - at least from the 
Russian side - as being mutually incompatible. The relevance 
of the strategic partnership idea decreased as the impulse to 
the bilateral relationship from the shock of 9111 wore off. To 
date, it has not been possible to revive it. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
Two questions have guided the analysis bere. Tbe point of 
departure for the analysis was the question of what influences 
Russia's policy in Central Asia after 9/11. The analysis was 
based on a thorough investigation of Russia's response to the 
establishment of Western US-dominated military bases in 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and a substantial Western military 
presence in Tajikistan in 2001 and 2002. Furthermore, a 
second aim was to discuss how Russia's response to the 
establishment of Western bases in Central Asia influenced the 
bilateral relations between Russia and the United States. 
Russia's response to the establishment of Western bases in 
Central Asia was studied at three levels: Russian-American 
relations, the domestic Russian political debate on the 
relationship to Central Asia and Russian policy in Central 
Asia. The three elements of the response were then compared 
and correspondences and discrepancies between them were 
discussed. The findings in the analysis were first used to 
answer the first question posed, i.e., to discuss possible 
motivations for Russia's Central Asia policy after 9/11. Three 
motivations were thoroughly discussed; one arising from 
domestic politics, another connected to the Russian-American 
bilateral relationship, and one with a background in Russia's 
strategic concerns. A motivation arising frum tbe demand side 
of Russian policy in Central Asia - tbat of Central Asian 
leaders' demand for a Russian engagement in the region - was 
also considered. It was concluded that although Russia's 
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partners also shaped Russia's policy in Central Asia, strategic 
concerns were more important in the policy as it developed 
after 9111. 
The second aim was to examine a set of implications of the 
findings: how the Russian response to the establishment of 
Western bases in Central Asia influenced Russian-American 
relations. This discussion considered Russian-American 
relations in Central Asia in relation to the overall bilateral 
relationship, and how they affected it in the period under 
study. Another point here was the prospects for a strategic 
partnership between Russia and the United States. 
I shall now discuss the most important findings and 
conclusions. 
Russia's response to Western bases in Central 
Asia 
The strategic alignment between Russia and the United States 
in the war on terrorism was controversial to a substantial part 
of Russia's political elite. In the political elite, criticism of the 
Western bases in Central Asia was used instrumentally, as a 
way of criticising the strategic alignment indirectly. The room 
for criticism of the strategic alignment narrowed throughout 
autumn 2001 and spring 2002, much as a result of what 
seemed to be a conscious policy of co-optation of the political 
elite by the Kremlin. This was connected to the role played in 
the domestic debate by President Putin. In the debate on the 
Western bases in Central Asia, he was conspicuous by his 
absence, and there were remarks from the political elite about 
his lack of an explanation of his choice of a strategic 
alignment. However, his forceful, uncompromising presence 
when he did engage with the elite in efforts at co-optation 
considerably narrowed the scope for criticism of his foreign 
policy line. If the intention had been to reassure the political 
elite, Putin's efforts were too little, too late. 
This led to the Russian political debate on the Western 
bases in Central Asia being constricted to a Ilarrow range of 
topics, with the basic premise that there was a zero-sum game, 
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a competition for influence in the region. This finding 
supports the view that the Russian political elite is still firmly 
committed to a realist, even geopolitical world view, seeing 
spheres of influence as central to a state's power. 
At the same time, Russia's policy in Central Asia was 
characterised by substantial activity from 9/11 onwards, and 
on account of this, the views of the political elite gradually 
came to be reflected in the Kremlin's policy in Central Asia. 
However, Russia's policy in Central Asia was now firmly set 
within the framework of the war on terrorism. This 
reassertion may have been based on a rationale for CIS 
security integration that had been developed in the Kremlin 
before 9/11, as argued hy Wilhelmsen and Flikke.327 This 
view is compounded by a finding here, that the reassertion 
was not motivated directly by the views of the political elite, 
although the elite's scepticism towards US intentions in 
Central Asia gradually may have influenced it. A considerable 
part of the reassertive activity appeared shortly after 9111, and 
it was consciously placed within the framework of the war on 
terrorism. Russian policy in Central Asia was conducted under 
the cloak of an international campaign shared with the United 
States. The policy had an emphasis on military and strategic 
ties, although it was complemented by a growing engagement 
in energy. The establishment of Russian-controlled bases in 
the region was explicitly, especially in the case of Tajikistan, 
tied to economic agreements. In contrast to the rhetoric of 
Russian-American cooperation in the war on terrorism, the 
Russian-sponsored structures in the region did not include the 
West. 
Accordingly, Russia's ambitions in Central Asia were 
clearly present in Russian policy in Central Asia a few weeks 
after 9/11. In addition, there was a correspondence between 
the dominance of military and security-related ties in Russia's 
Central Asia policy and the emphasis on security and strategic 
327 Wilhclrnsen and Flikke, "Copy That ... ", p. 25. 
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considerations in the domestic political debate. Russia's 
relations with the Central Asian states were also 
comprehensive, with day-to-day contact. 
Again, there was a contrast to how relations with the US 
were conducted. Russian ambitions in Central Asia appeared 
only gradually in the bilateral relationship with the United 
States. This was accompanied by a discrepancy between the 
Russian domestic political debate and official policy towards 
the West: the policy towards the West did not reflect the 
debate in Russia at all. There was also an absence of everyday, 
comprehensive contact at several levels between Russia and 
the United States. 
Reassertion motivated by strategic interests 
The findings in this study support the view that strategic 
interests were an important motivation for Russia's policy in 
Central Asia after 9111. This was accompanied by the 
observation that the lack of support in the political elite for 
the strategic alignment with the West, as well as the demand 
from Central Asian leaders for a Russian engagement in the 
region contributed to the development of the policy. Strategic 
interests were defined as maintaining a Russian-oriented 
stability in Central Asia, securing the unrestricted use of the 
Central Asian transit potential to maintain partner relations 
with China, India and Iran, maintaining a commOn economic 
expanse with Central Asia, using the region's geostrategic 
potential to preserve Russia's status as a world and regional 
power and gaining international recognition of Russia's 
leading role in the region. 
It was argued that Russia's military presence in Central 
Asia is essential to support a Russian-oriented stability, 
although neither military bases, nor an engagement in energy 
unequivocally secures this stability. On the contrary, it was 
suggested that there is also a danger of great power rivalry in 
the region. However, for Russian policymakers, this is not 
necessarily an argument against Russia's engagement in the 
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region. One can expect that should great power rivalry 
develop, it may be used in Moscow to argue for strengthened 
Russian engagement. 
Central Asia's transit potential is first and foremost secured 
through Russia's energy engagements, especially if access to 
China, India and Iran is controlled by Russian, not Western, 
companies. The common economic expanse with Central Asia 
is also promoted by a Russian energy engagement. The 
engagement is further strengthened by a political connection 
to the establishment of the Russian-controlled bases in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and likewise to the establishment of 
a strategic partnership between Russia and Uzbekistan. It is 
significant in this respect that the establishment of the bases, 
especially the one in Tajikistan, was accompanied by a set of 
energy and economic agreements. 
The region's strategic potential for Russia was enhanced by 
the increased military engagement as well as by Russia's 
comprehensive energy engagement. This includes both the 
strategic relevance of the military and energy engagement to 
Russia, i.e., through the location and capabilities of the new 
bases and the size of the energy engagement, as well as the 
importance of these types of engagement as a signal to other 
powers and to contestants for dominance inside the region on 
Russia's central position in Central Asia. 
When it comes to Russia's status as a regional and global 
power and the aim of achieving international recognition for 
its leading role a military and an energy engagement are 
necessary. Bur they are not in themselves sufficient. Russia's 
position as a security guarantor in the region is strong. The 
region's instability in 2005 has strengthened this position. 
However, Russia's position is also dependent on other powers' 
actions. As long as the United States refrains from expanding 
its presence in the region, and China restricts itself mainly to 
economic ties with the Central Asian states, Russia remains a 
regional power. There are no guarantees that this situation 
will last. 
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The events of 2005 have given us a glimpse into the future 
development of the strategic balance in Central Asia. The 
increasing instability in the region, with a change of regime in 
Kyrgyzstan and unrest in Uzbekistan, especially in the 
Ferghana Valley, has been followed by even closer 
cooperation between the Central Asian states and Russia. The 
Kant Base in Kyrgyzstan is being expanded, and before the 
Kyrgyz elections in March, Moscow tried to exchange support 
for Akaev's regime in return for Kyrgyzstan's rejection of 
American plans for a regional security organisation without 
Russia, China or Iran, and of US plans to station aircraft with 
the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) at 
Manas.328 Russia, unlike the United States, met the Uzbek 
authorities' violent crack down on protests in Andijan with 
considerable understanding. The cooperation between Russia, 
China and the Central Asian states most notably led to a 
Russian-initiated call from the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) in July 2005 for the coalition forces to set 
a date for withdrawal from the bases in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, notably supported by both Uzbekistan's president 
Islam Karimov as well as the newly elected Kyrgyz president 
Kurmanbek Bakiev.329 Russian Defence Minister Sergei 
lvanov also aired the idea of establishing a Russian military 
base in Uzbekistan with President Karimov. The initial 
response was negative, but Karimov opened up for Russian 
use of ten Uzbek air bases in the case of an emergency.330 The 
US, on the other hand, faced a decision in June 2005 by the 
Uzbek government to restrict flights by heavy aircraft and ban 
nighttime flights from the Khanabad Base, in what seemed to 
be a move motivated by Russian concerns.33 ! Also in June, 
the US House of Representatives excluded Uzbekistan from 
the list of countries which receive American military aid. In 
328 Mikhail Zygar, "Kirgiziiu poprosili byt poostorozhnee 5 Amerikoi" 
[Kyrgyzstan asked to be somewhat morc careful with America], 
K01llmersallt, 12 February 2005. 
329 RFElRL NCUlslinc, 7 July 2005. 
330 Viktoriia Panfilov3 and Vladimir Mukhin, "Meniaiu Vashington na 
Moskvu" [I change Washington for Moscow], Nezauisimaia gazeta, 30 
June 2005. 
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late July, the Uzbek government gave the US 180 days to leave 
the Khanabad Base. Though Andijan led to condemnation of 
Karimov's regime in the West, for Russia, new opportunities 
for regional influence opened. 
A temporary strategic alignment 
The Russian-American bilateral relationship is characterised 
by an emphasis on security and strategic issues, and it is 
dependent on top-level, even presidential level, contact. One 
of the conclusions in this study is that the shock of 9/11 and 
the war on terrorism reinforced the existing mechanisms and 
priorities in the bilateral relationship. In the campaign, 
security and strategic considerations dominated, and this fitted 
well with the existing bias in the bilateral relationship towards 
security and strategic issues. 
The war on terrorism also overshadowed the lack of shared 
values and everyday contact in the bilateral relationship. The 
campaign was a framework for the Russian-American 
relationship, and added direction and emphasis to it. 
However, as the shock of 9/11 wore off, so did the impulse to 
the Russian-American relationship. At the end of 2003, the 
bilateral relationship was at a standstill. This was due 
especially to the disagreement over Iraq. The period of 
standstill is not over yet, and with both Vladimir Putin and 
George W. Bush in their second periods, and with plenty of 
other issues on their agendas, it is doubtful whether the 
situation will improve in the next few years. 
The Russian reassertion in Central Asia only appeared 
gradually in the bilateral relationship with the United States. A 
few critical Russian comments on the Western bases in 
Central Asia emerged at the level of the bilateral relationship 
in January-February 2002. The first occasion on which 
Central Asia was referred to as a sphere of Russian interests in 
statements directed towards the international community was 
331 RFElRL News/ine, 16 June 2005. Kyrgyzstan immediately opened its 
airspace for such flights. Sce Vladimir Mukhin, "Shagrenevaia kozba 
oboronnogo prosrranstv3" (The shrinking hide of the common defence 
space], Nezauislmaia gazeta, 23 June 2005. 
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in June 2002. Russia's strategic reassertion in Central Asia, 
and especially Russia's ambjtioIlS in the region, were only 
mentioned at the level of the Russian relationship with the 
West in October 2003. Between June 2002 and October 2003, 
the bilateral relationship became increasingly hollow. This 
holJowness was connected to the gap that appeared between 
the American and Russian policies in Central Asia, where their 
relationship was competitive, and the rhetoric of cooperation 
in the war on terrorism that was emphasised on the top 
political level in the bilateral relationship. The competitive 
aspects of the relationship gradually moved into the overall 
bilateral relationship, and it is difficult to see how this can be 
overcome in the relationship at present. 
In the wider strategic context, the US military presence in 
Central Asia gave an example of how Western interest in the 
former Soviet space entailed a diversification of the security 
choices for the affected states. To parts of the Russian political 
elite, this diversification meant a loss of influence, a setback in 
a competition for spheres of influence, as well as a realisation 
that the impact of neighbouring states' policies on Russian 
securiry was less controllable than had previously been 
believed. American unilateralism in Central Asia exacerbated 
this impression. Unilateralism also confirmed Moscow's fears 
that securiry structures and organisations not firmly contrulled 
by Russia were of an adversarial nature, and that a 
competition for influence did indeed exist. As the temporary 
Western deployment in Central Asia turned into permanent 
bases, Russia's reassertion in the region also became a long-
term policy. There was also a certain modernisation, an 
evolution in the approach. In Central Asia, policy after 9111 
has included an emphasis on security and strategic aims, 
military and energy engagement, and a combination of 
multilateral and bilateral arenas. This has been a success. The 
reassertion seems likely to continue. 
Literature 
All online references were last accessed on 23 August 2005. 
All online references are verbatim text of a printed original. 
There are two exceptions: 
1. Sources from the online news services of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFElRL), gazeta.m, st!"ana.ru and 
smi.m, which are originals. 
2. Transcripts of speeches, which are either transcripts of spo-
ken originals or written speeches. 
Akaev, Askar: Trudnaia doroga k demokratii (Pa11liatlloe 
desiatiletie) [The Difficult Road to Democracy (A 
Memorable Decade)] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia, 2002). 
Allison, Roy: "Strategic reassertion in Russia's Central Asia 
policy", Internatiol1al Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2 (March 2004): 
277-293. 
Belkin, Alexander A.: "US-Russian Relations and the Global 
Counter-Terrorist Campaign", Joumal of Slavic Military 
Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2004): 13-28. 
Blank, Stephen: "The United States and Central Asia" in 
Central Asian SeCltrity. The New Intematiol1al Context, 
eds. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (London: RlIA, 2001), 
pp. 127-151. 
Borovskii, lurii: "Energeticheskaia bezopasnost Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v ramkakh SNG" [Russia's Energy Security in 
the Context of the CIS], Analiticheskie zapiski NKSMI 
MGIMO no. 4 (6) (March 2005) (MGIMO [online]). 
Burnashev, Rustam, and lrina Chernykh: "Vooruzhennye sily 
respubliki Tadzhikistan" [Tajikistan's Armed Forces], 
Tsentrai1taia Aziia i Kavkaz, no. 6, (2002). 
Corn ell, Svante E.: "America in Eurasia: One Year After", 
Current History, vo!. 101, no. 657 (October 2002): 330-
336. 
Cutler, Robert M.: "The Caspian Energy Conundrum", 
Journal of International Affairs, vo!. 56, no. 3 (Spring 
2003): 89-102. 
Goldgeier, lames M., and Michael McFaul: Power and 
Purpose. U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
jonson, Lena: Russia alld Celltral Asia. A New Web of 
Relations (London: RIIA, 1998). 
jonson, Lena: "Russia and Central Asia" in Central Asian 
Security. The New Intemational Context, eds. Roy Allison 
and Lena jonson (London: RIIA, 2001), pp. 95-126. 
jonson, Lena: Vladimir Putin and Central Asia. The Shapillg 
of Russian Foreigll Policy (London: LB. Tauris, 2004). 
Kleveman, Lutz: The New Great Game. Blood alld Oil ill 
Central Asia (London: Atlantic Books, 2003). 
Kryshtanovskaia, Olga: Anatomiia rossiiskoi elity [Anatomy 
of the Russian Elite] (Moscow: Zakharov, 2005 (2004)). 
Legvold, Robert: "U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan" in 
Thillking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, 
and the Central Asia" Nexus, ed. Robert Legvold 
(Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences/ 
MIT Press, 2003), pp. 67-106. 
Light, Margot: "Foreign Policy Thinking" in Internal Factors 
in Russiall Foreign Policy, Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy 
Allison and Margot Light (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/RIIA, 1996), pp. 33-100. 
Litvinsky, Inga, Matt London, and Tanya Shuster: "U.S.-
Russian Trade and Investment: Policy and Performance" in 
Russia's Uncertain Economic Future. Compelldium of 
Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee 
(Washington, D.e.: Congress of the United States, 2001), 
pp. 411-424. 
Lo, Bobo: Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. 
Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002). 
La, Bobo: Vladi",ir Putill mzd the Evolution of Russian 
Foreign Policy (London: RIIA, 2003). 
Lynch, Dov: Russian Peacekeepillg Strategies ill the CIS. The 
Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan (London: 
Macmillan Press/RIIA, 2000). 
MacFarlane, S. Neil: "The United States and regionalism in 
Central Asia", Intemational Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3 (May 
2004): 447-461. 
Malcolm, Neil, and Alex Pravda: "Introduction" in Illtemal 
Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Neil Malcolm, Alex 
Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press/RIIA, 1996), pp. 1-32. 
Mathisen, Werner Christie: "Diskursanalyse for statsvitere; 
Hva, hvorfor og hvordan" [Discourse Analysis for Political 
Scientists: What, Why, and How], Research paper 110. 1/ 
1997 (Oslo: Department of Political Science, University of 
Oslo, 1997). 
Naumkin, Vitalii: "Russian Policy Toward Kazakhstan" in 
Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, 
and the Central Asian Nexus, ed. Robert Legvold 
(Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences/ 
MIT Press, 2003), pp. 39-65. 
Ordeshook, Peter c.: "Re-examining Russia: Institutions and 
Incentives", Joumal of Democracy vol. 6, no. 2 (April 
1995): 46-60. Reprinted in COl1temporary Russiall Politics. 
A Reader, ed. Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
Plater-Zyberk, Henry: Kyrgyzstan - Focusilzg on SeCllrity 
(Camberley: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 
Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2003). 
Plater-Zyberk, Henry: Tajikistan. Waiting For A Storm? 
(Camberley: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 
Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2004). 
Trenin, Dmitri: "Through Russian Eyes and Minds. Post-9/11 
Perceptions of America and its Policies" in Visions of 
America and Europe, eds. Christina V. Balis and Simon 
Serfaty (Washington DC: CS IS Press, Significant Issues 
Series, 2004). 
Trenin, Dmitri: "Russia and anti-terrorism" in What Russia 
sees, ed. Dov Lynch (Paris: Institute of Security Studies, 
2005), pp. 99-114. 
Trofimov, Dmitry: "Russia and the United States in Central 
Asia: Problems, Prospects, and Interests", Central Asia a1ld 
the Caucasus, no 1 (19) (2003): 72-82. 
Wilhelmsen, Julie, and Geir Flikke: "COIJY That ... ": A 
Russian "Bush Doctri1le" ill the CIS? in the series Nupi-
ratJtJort (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International 
Affairs, 2005). 
Zviagelskaia, Irina D., and Dmitrii V. Makarov: "Vospriiatie 
Rossiei politiki Zapada v Tsentralnoi Azii" [Russia's 
Perception of Western Policy in Central Asia] in Iuzlmyi 
f/a1lg SNG. Tsentrai1laia Aziia - Kaspii - Kavkaz: 
VOZ11loz/mosti i vyzovy diia Rossii [The Southern Flank of 
the CIS. Central Asia - the Caspian Sea - the Caucasus: 
Possibilities and Challenges for Russia], eds. Mikhail M. 
Narinskii and Artem V. Malgin (Moscow: Logos, 2003), 
pp. 103-127. 
Sources 
StJeeches a1ld documents 
Bush, George W.: "Remarks by the President at 2002 
Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy 
(West Point, New York)" 1 June 2002 (White House 
[online]). Verbatim transcript of spoken origina!. 
Coli ins, James: "The United States and the Caucasus States: 
Working Together Toward Constructive Cooperative 
Development", Dispatch [online] (US State Department), 
vo!. 7, no. 45 (4 November 1996). 
Ivanov, Igor: "Stenogramma vystupleniia Ministra 
inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii I.S. Ivanova v 
Stenfordskom universitete v San-Frantsisko 6 maia 2002 
goda" [Shorthand report of the speech of the Russian 
foreign minister, I.S. Ivanov, at the Stanford University in 
San Fransisco, 6 May 2002], 6 May 2002 (MID RF 
[online]). Verbatim transcript of spoken origina!' 
Ivanov, Sergei: "Vystuplenie na soveshchanii v Ministerstve 
oborony RF" [Speech at Conference in the Russian 
Ministry of Defence), 2 October 2003 (MO RF/mil.ru 
[online)). Written speech. 
Jones, A. Elizabeth: "Testimony Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and 
the Caucasus", 13 December 2001 (US Department of 
State [online)). Verbatim transcript of spoken original. 
Margelov, Mikhail: "Pobeda po ochkam", Rossiia v globalnoi 
po/itike [online) vol. 1, no. 3 (July-September 2003): 8-16. 
Margelov, Mikhail: "Victory on Points: Pragmatism in 
Foreign Policy", Russia ill Global Affairs [online) vo!. 1, 
no. 3. 
"Mezhdunarodnyi terrorizm: pozitsiia Rossii" [International 
Terrorism: Russia's Position); 13 February 2002 (MID RF 
[online)). 
"The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America", September 2002 (White House [online)). 
Pressley, Donald: "Testimony Before the International 
Relations Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives", 30 April 1998 (US House of 
Representatives, Committee on International Relations 
[online)). Verbatim transcript of spoken original. 
Putin, Vladimir: "Zaiavlenie Prezidenta Rossii" [Stotement of 
the President of Russia), 24 September 2001 (Kremlin 
[online)). Verbatim transcript of broadcast original. 
Putin, Vladimir: "Vystuplenie v Bundestage FRG" [Speech in 
the German Bundestag), 25 September 2001 (Kremlin 
[online)). Verbatim transcript of spoken original. 
Putin, Vladimir: "Vystuplenie na rasshirennom zasedanii 
prezidiuma Gossoveta" [Speech at the extended session of 
the State Council Presidium), 22 May 2002 (Kremlin 
[online)). Written speech. 
Putin, Vladimir: "Vystuplenie i otvety na voprosy v 
Kolumbiiskom universitete" [Speech and question and 
answer session at Columbia University) 26 September 2003 
(Kremlin [online)). Verbatim transcript of spoken original. 
Putin, Vladimir: "Zaiavlenie dlia pressy po itogam rabochego 
vizita v Kirgizskuiu Respubliku" [Statement to the press on 
the results of the working visit to the Kyrgyz Republic] 23 
October 2003 (Kremlin [online]). Written speech. 
Putin, Vladimir: "Vystuplenie na rossiiskoi voennoi baze v 
Tadzhikistane" [Speech at the Russian military base in 
Tajikistan] 17 October 2004 (Kremlin [online]). Written 
speech. 
Rice, Condoleezza: "Promoting the National Interest", 
Foreign Affairs, vo!. 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 
45-62. 
Sestanovich, Stephen: "Testimony Before the International 
Relations Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives", 30 April 1998 (US House of 
Representatives Committee on International Relations 
[online]). Verbatim transcript of spoken origina!. 
Sestanovich, Stephen: "Testimony Before the Asia-Pacific 
Subcommittee of the International Relations Committee of 
the u.s. Congress", 17 March 1999, as quoted in Legvold, 
"U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan". 
Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike (SVOP): Novye vyzovy 
bezopasllosti i Rossiia [New Security Challenges and 
Russia] [online], 10 July 2002. 
Talbott, Strobe: "A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia", Dispatch, vo!. 8, no. 6 (21 
July 1997). 
"U.S. Assistance to the Countries of Central Asia (Taken 
Question)", 11 February 2002 (US Department of State 
[online]). Verbatim transcript of spoken origin a!. 
Written media sources ill English 
APMC en ligne 
RFEIRL Newsline 
Washington Post 
Goldgeier, James: "Relations with US wither", jarzc's 
Intelligence Review, July 2005: 56-57. 
Daly, John C. K.: "Sino-Kyrgyz relations after the Tulip 
Revolution", Asian Research China Brief, 7 June 2005 
(Association for Asian Research [online]). 
Parshin, Konstantin: "Tajikistan: The Russians Are Coming 
Back," Transitions Olllille, 3 November 2004. 
Dubovoi, Alexander: "Advantages and Disadvantages of the 
Russian-Tajik Military Cooperation", WPS Defellse alld 
Security Report, no. 314, 22 October 2004 (What the 
Papers Say (WPS) [online]). 
Blua, Antoine: "RussialUzbekistan: Presidents Sign Strategic-
Partnership Agreement", RFEIRL [online], 17 June 2004. 
"'Too early' for Tajiks to take over border control- Russian 
envoy", ltar-TASS, 1 June 2004. Reproduced in Jolmsoll's 
Russia List, #8232 (Center for Defense Information 
[online], available from www.cdi.orglrussia/johnson). 
Diamond, Todd: "US Unilateralism Fuels Great Power Rivalry 
in Central Asia", Eurasia I1Isight, 1 October 2003 
(EurasiaNet [online]). 
"RAO UES chief sees Russia as liberal empire", Russia 
Journal [online], 26 September 2003. 
Pannier, Bruce: "Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Hope 
Gazprom Deals Will Make Their Winters Warmer," RFEI 
RL [online], 22 May 2003. 
Lelyveld, Michael: "Turkmenistan: Niyazov Seals Energy, 
Security Contracts With Russia", RFEIRL [online], 11 
April 2003. 
Najibullah, Farangis: "Central Asia: Why Is Russia Suddenly 
Paying So Much Attention To Dushanbe And Bishkek?" 
RFEIRL [online], 18 March 2003. 
Burke, Justin: "Russian deployment in Kyrgyzstan could 
prompt growing domestic turmoil", Eurasia blsight, 11 
December 2002 (EurasiaNet [online]). 
Eshanova, Zamira: "Central Asia: Diplomatic Visits Highlight 
U.S., Russian Competition", RFEIRL [online], 3 December 
2002. 
Kozlova, Marina: "Russian military to remain in Kyrgyzstan", 
UP!, 13 June 2002. Reproduced in Jolmsolt's Russia List, 
#6308 (Center for Defense Information [online], available 
from www.cdi.orglrussia/johnson). 
"A Heavyweight's Forecast", Moskovskii Komsomolets, 17 
May 2002. Reproduced in Jolmsol1's Russia List, #6250 
(Center for Defense Information [onIine], available from 
www.cdi.orglrussia/j oh nson). 
Cohen, Ariel: "CIS Remains Top Priority In Russian Foreign 
Policy", Cel1tral Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 24 April 2002 
(Central Asia and the Caucasus Institute [online], available 
from www.cacianalyst.org). 
"Fun::ign minister denies Russia making concessions to USA", 
RIA Novosti, 16 March 2002. Reproduced in J0I1S0"'$ 
Russia List, #6139 (Center for Defense Information 
[online], available from www.cdi.orglrussia/johnson). 
Pushkin, Pavel: "Tajikistan begins cooperation with NATO," 
WPS Defel1se al1d Security Report, 191, 8 March 2002 
(What the Papers Say (WPS) [online]). 
"Russian minister calls on USA to put cards on table over 
Central Asia", Itar-TASS, 2 March 2002. Reproduced in 
JOI111S011'S Russia List, #6110 (Center for Defense 
Information [online], available from www.cdi.orglrussia/ 
johnson). 
"Central Asia: Franks Says No Permanent U.S. Bases In 
Region", RFEIRL [online], 23 January 2002. 
"Russia wants West's stay in Tajikistan short", Reuters, 17 
January 2002. Reproduced in Jolmsolt's Russia List, #6027 
(Center for Defense Information [online], available from 
www.cdi.orglrussia/j ohnson). 
"There is no other way", Obshchaia gazeta, 22 November 
2001. Reproduced in jolmsoll's Russia List, #5562 (Center 
for Defense Information [online], available from 
www.cdi. orglrussia/j 0 hnson). 
Verlin, Yevgeny: "Some advice for the president", Vrenzia 
MN, 2 November 2001. From WPS MOllitoring, 
reproduced in JOI111S01l'S Russia List, #5521 (Center for 
Defense Information [online], available from www.cdi.orgl 
russia/johnson). 
Ingram, Judith: "Russian Military: U.S. Goals Hazy", AP, 19 
October 2001. Reproduced in Johsoll's Russia List, #5501 
(Center for Defense Information [online], available from 
www.cdi.orglrussia/j 0 hnson). 
"Zyuganov to urge Putin to prevent Russia from being pulled 
into war", l1lterfax, 24 September 2001. Reproduced in 
Jolmson's Russia List, #5459 (Center for Defense 
Information [online], available from www.cdi.orglrussia/ 
johnson). 
Zarakhovich, Yuri: "Russia Joins Coalition", Time [online], 
23 September 2001. 
Isamova, Lidia: "Tajikistan: Won't Allow Afghan Attacks", 
AP, 16 September 2001. Reproduced in JOI111S01I'S Russia 
List, #5446 (Center for Defense Information [online], 
available from www.cdi.orglrussia/johnson). 
Lathem, Niles: "U.S. May Sock Bin Laden From Russian 
Bases", New York Post, 14 September 2001. Reproduced 
in Jolmsoll's Russia List, #5443 (Center for Defense 
Information [on line], available from www.cdi.orglrussia/ 
johnson). 
Transcripts of other media sources in English 
"Russia will lose Central Asia if it gets involved in 
Afghanistan", NTV Intematiollal, 2 October 2001. 
Verbatim transcript/translation of broadcast original. From 
BBC Monitoring, reproduced in Jolmsoll's Russia List, 
#5473 (Center for Defense Information [online], available 
from www.cdi.orglrussia/johnson). 
i"/ritte" media sources ill Russiall 
Panfilova, Viktoriia, and Vladimir Mukhin: "Meniaiu 
Vashington na Moskvu" [I change Washington for 
Moscow], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 30 June 2005. 
Mukhin, Vladimir: "Shagrenevaia kozha oboronnogo 
prostranstva" [The shrinking hide of the common defence 
space], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 23 June 2005. 
Zygar, Mikhail: "Kirgiziiu poprosili byt poostorozhnee s 
Amerikoi" [Kyrgyzstan asked to be somewhat more careful 
with America], Kommersant, 12 February 2005. 
Chudodeev, Aleksandr: "Prishla na bazu" [Arrived at base], 
Itogi [online], 26 October 2004. 
Tsepliaev, Vitalii: "Vostochnaia diplomatiia" [Eastern 
diplomacy], Argumenty i Fakty [online], 20 October 2004. 
Mukhin, Vladimir: "Voennye igry na fone teraktov" [War 
games on a background of terrorist acts], Nezavisimoe 
VOe1l1lUe obozrenie [online], 6 August 2004. 
Dikaev, Turko: '''Absoliutnyi bred' generala Manilova" 
[General Manilov's 'complete gibberish'], Tribulle-
Uzbekistml [online], 27 May 2004. 
Shvarev, Vladimir: "'Shkvali' iz Bishkeka" ['Squalls' from 
Bishkek], Nezavisimoe VOe1l1l0e obozrel1ie [online], 31 
October 2003. 
Reut, Andrei: "Putin otkryl pervuiu rossiiskuiu voennuiu bazu 
v Tsentralnoi Azii" [Putin opens the first Russian military 
base in Central Asia], Gazeta Gzt.m, 24 October 2003. 
Streshnev, Roman: "Shchit dlia Tsentralnoi Azii", Krasllaia 
Zvezda [online], 24 October 2003. 
Shishkunova, Elena: "Baz NATO bolshe ne nado" [The 
NATO bases are no longer necessary], gazeta.ru [online], 
10 October 2003. 
"Rossiia potrebuet svernut inostrannye bazy v Srednei Azii" 
[Russia demands a rollback of the foreign bases in Central 
Asia], gazeta.m [online], 10 October 2003. 
Sedelnikov, Sergei, Elena Shishkunova and Boris Sapozhnikov: 
"My briatsaem oruzhiem" [We are rattling our sabres], 
gazeta.,." [online], 2 October 2003. 
"Putin gotov sotrudnichat s SShA v reshenii problem Srednei 
Azii" [Putin is ready to cooperate with the US in solving 
Central Asia's problems], gazeta.tu [online], 26 September 
2003. 
"Rossiia otkryvaet aviabazu v Kirgizii" [Russia opens airbase 
in Kyrgyzstan]' Gazeta Gzt.ru, 22 September 2003. 
Trubnikov, Viacheslav: "Vneshnepoliticheskii front Rossii" 
[Russia's foreign policy front], Nezavisimaia gazeta 
[online], 15 September 2003. 
Huddle, Franklin P.: "Ni snom, ni dukhom" [Neither heard 
nor seen], Nezavisimoe VOe1l1lOe oboztellie [online], 8 
August 2003. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia: "Tiazhelo v tadzhiksko-rossiiskom 
uchenii ... " [Tough Tajik-Russian studies], Nezavisimaia 
gazeta [online], 6 August 2003. 
Labetskaia, Katerina: "'Rech ne 0 tom, kogo Rossiia 
predpochtet - Japoniiu ili Kitai'" ['The question is not 
about whom Russia prefers, Japan or China'], Vtemia 
novoste; [online], 24 July 2003. 
Plugatarev, Igor: "Moskve predlozhili pokinut Tadzhikistan 
iz-za milliarda dollarov" [Moscow was offered a billion 
dollars to leave Tajikistan], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 
16 July 2003. 
Mukhin, Vladimir: "Rossiia sozdaet krupnuiu voennuiu bazu 
v Tsentralnoi Azii" [Russia will establish a major military 
base in Central Asia], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 21 
May 2003. 
"Rossiia ispolzuet SShA v kachestve bufera v Tsentralnoi 
Azii" [Russia uses the US as a buffer in Central Asia], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 30 April 2003. 
Glikin, Maksim: "V Dushanbe sozdali 'vostochnyi blok'" 
['Eastern bloc' created in Dushanbe], Nezavisimaia gazeta 
[online], 29 April 2003. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia: "Rossiia ukrepit svoe voennO-
politicheskoe vliianie v Tadzhikistane" [Russia will 
strengthen its military-political influence in Tajikistan], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 25 April 2003. 
Mukhin, Vladimir: "Moskva pokupaet soiuznikov" [Moscow 
buys allies], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 21 April 2003. 
PanFilova, Vikroriia: "Moskva za nimi" [Moscow is after 
them], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 14 March 2003. 
"Sergei Lebedev: tot fakt, chto deistvuiushchii president -
professionalnyi razvedchik, pomogaet mne kak direktoru 
SVR" [Sergei Lebedev: the fact that the present president is 
a professional intelligence officer helps me as the director 
of the Foreign Intelligence Service], siralla.1"U [online], 20 
December 2002. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia, and Natalia Melikova: "s beregov Ganga 
v tumannyi Bishkek" [From the banks of the Ganges to 
misty Bishkek], Nezavisi11laia gazeta [online], 6 December 
2002. 
Sokut, Sergei: "Grozit terroristam budem iz Bishkeka" [We 
will threaten the terrorists from Bishkek], Nezavisimoe 
Voe1l1lOe obozrcnie [online], 6 December 2002. 
Bogatyrev, Aleksandr: "Iuzhnyi rubezh" [The southern 
frontier], Krasllaia Zvezda [online], 5 December 2002. 
Vernidub, Attem: "Istrebiteli Putina seli v Kirgizii" [Putin's 
fighters have landed in Kyrgyzstan], gazeta.m [online], 5 
December 2002. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia, and Sergei Sokut: "Putin spaset Akaeva" 
[Putin will save Akaev], Nezavisi11laia gazeta [online], 2 
December 2002. 
Vasileva, Vasilina: "Strany Sodruzhestva promeniali starshego 
brata na zaokeanskogo diadiu" [The commonwealth states 
changed their big brother for an uncle from overseas], 
Nezavisi11laia gazeta [online], 2 December 2002. 
Belkovskii, Stanislav: "Poslednie dni sodruzhestva" [The 
commonwealth's last days], Nezavisi11laia gazeta [online], 8 
October 2002. 
"Rossiiu zhdet konflikt s NATO" [Conflict with NATO 
awaits Russia], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 23 September 
2002. 
Andrusenko, Lidiia, and Olga Tropkina: "Mezalians s 
Amerikoi" [Misalliance with America], Nezavisi11laia 
gazeta [online], 11 September 2002. 
"Interviu kitaiskoi gazete 'ZhCI1l11in zhibao'" [Interview with 
the Chinese newspaper 'Zhenmin zhibao'], Kremlill 
[online], 4 ] une 2002. 
Nagornykh, Irina: "Prezidium Gossoveta vyshel na 
mezhdunarodnyi uroven" [The State Council Presidium 
goes out on the international level], KommCfsant, 23 May 
2002. 
Zakatnova, Anna: "Prezidium Gossoveta zanialsia vneshnei 
politikoi" [The State Council Presidium engages in foreign 
policy], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 23 May 2002. 
"Mikhail Margelov: Prezident pokazal bespretsedentnyi 
urOven otkrytosti v priniatii vneshnepoliticheskikh 
reshenii" [Mikhail Margelov: Thepresident shows 
unprecedented openness in making foreign policy 
decisions], VVP.ru, 22 May 2002. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia, and Armen Khanbabian: "Uzbekistan ne 
zhelaet druzhit armiaiami" [Uzbekistan does not want a 
friendship in armies], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 16 May 
2002. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia, and Armen Khanbabian: "Patrushev, 
Totskii i Ramsfeld sovershaiut palomnichestvo" 
[Patrushev, Totskii and Rumsfeld carry out a pilgrimage], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 25 April 2002. 
Kvachkov, Vladimir: "Afgan: istoriia dvizhetsia po spirali" 
[Afghan: History moves in spirals], Nezavisimoe voelllloe 
obozrellie, 29 March 2002. 
K ulagio, Vladimir: "'Dvoevlastie' vo vneshnei politike" ['Dual 
power' in foreign policy], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 27 March 
2002. 
Khodarenok, Mikhail: "Ozherele iz amerikanskikh baz" [A 
necklace of American bases], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 
25 March 2002 (Nezavisimoe voe11110e obozrellie 29 
March). 
Zolotarev, Pavel: "Kholodnyi dush v zvezdnuiu polosochku" 
[A cold srarry-striped shower], Nezavisimaia gazeta 
[online], 22 March 2002. 
"Otvetstvenny za sudby mira" [Responsible for the world's 
fare], KmSllaia 2vezda [online], 13 March 2002. 
"Sergei Ivanov: "Rossiia i SShA mogut sotrudnichat v 
Tsentralnoi Azii" [Russia and the US can cooperate in 
Central Asia], strana.ru [online], 13 March 2002. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia: "Na zapad - vsled za Moskvoi" [To the 
West - following Moscow], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 4 
March 2002. 
Vernidub, Artem: ''rutin pozhelal udachi amerikantsam V 
Gruzii" [Putin wished the Americans luck in Georgia], 
gazeta.ru [online], 1 March 2002. 
"Vladimir Putin: podderzhka stranami SNG 
antiterroristicheskoi koalitsii - edinstvenno vozmozhnyi 
shag" [Vladimir Putin: support for the anti-terrorist 
coalition from the CIS countries is the only possible step], 
stral1a.rt< [online], 1 March 2002. 
"Sergei Ivanov: Rossiia ne sobiraetsia ukhodit s voennykh baz 
v Srednei Aziilt {Sergei Ivanov: Russia is nut going to leave 
its military bases in Central Asia], stral1a.TU [online], 27 
February 2002. 
Streltsov, Vasilii: "Gruziia, kotoruiu my poteriali" [Georgia 
that we lost], Nezavisimaia gazeta [ollline], 20 February 
2002. 
Orlov, Aleksandr: "Sergei Ivanov: Rossiia sposobna zashchitit 
sebia i svoikh soiuznikov" [Sergei Ivanov: Russia is capable 
of defending itself and its allies], stral1a.rtI [online], 19 
February 2002. 
"Rossiia stroit svoiu politiku v Tsentralnoi Azii iskhodia iz 
realii" [Russia formulates its policy in Central Asia un the 
basis of realities], stral1a.1'U [online], 11 February 2002. 
Khodarenok, Mikhail: "'Starshego brata' sdali za milliard 
dollarov" [They sold their elder brother for a billion 
dollars], Nezavisimoe voe1111Oe obozreuie [online], 8 
February 2002. 
Khanbabian, Armen: "Pri iavnom ravnodushii Moskvy" 
[With Moscow's obvious indifference], Nezavisimaia 
gazeta [ollline], 6 February 2002. 
Khanbabian, Armen: "Amerika vystraivaet svoiu vertikal 
vlasti" [America builds its power vertical], Nezallisimaia 
gazeta [online], 4 February 2002. 
GOrI1ostaev, Dmitrii: "SShA zariadili myshelovku dlia liderov 
Srednei Azii" [The US has set a mousetrap for Central 
Asia's leaders], straua.TU [online], 28 January 2002. 
"Zamestitel Gossekretaria SShA nazval slukhi ob 
amerikanskikh planakh sokhranit bazy v Tsentralnoi Azii 
lozhnymi" [The US deputy secretary of state called the 
rumours of American plans to keep the Central Asian bases 
lies], strana.TlI [online], 26 January 2002. 
Abramova, Evgeniia: "SShA v predelakh byvshikh sovetskikh 
respublik" [The US within the former Soviet republics], 
s111i.1"1I [online], 24 January 2002. 
"MID RF: v Moskve veriat zaiavleniiam Vashingtona 0 
vremennom kharaktere voennogo prisutstviia SShA v 
Tsentralnoi Azii" [Russian MFA: Moscow believes 
Washington's statements on the temporary character of the 
US military presence in Central Asia], strana.rll [online], 24 
J an uary 2002. 
Volkhonskii, Boris: "SShA na meste SSSR" [The US instead of 
the USSR], K011111lersant, 23 January 2002. Reproduced in 
translation in JOI111S011'S Russia List, #6036 (Center for 
Defense Information [online], available from www.cdi.orgl 
russia/johnson). 
Egorov, Vladimir: "Amerikanskii general provodit konsultatsii 
v Tashkente i Dushanbe" [American general carries out 
consultations in Tashkent and Dushanbe], slratla.ru 
[online], 22 January 2002. 
Khodarenok, Mikhail: "Nenuzhnyi soiuz" [An unnecessary 
union], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 21 January 2002. 
"Rossiia i SShA dolzhny razvivat politicheskii dialog, schitaet 
Anatolii Kvashnin" [Russia and the US should develop a 
political dialogue - Anatolii Kvashnin], strmta.tu [online], 
19 J an uary 2002. 
Ulianov, Nikolai: "U politiki Rossii v SNG mogut poiavitsia 
novye niuansy" [New nuances may appear in Russia's CIS 
policy], strana.ru [online], 9 January 2002. 
"Voennaia baza SShA poiavitsia na territarii byvshego SSSR" 
[A US military base appears on the territory of the former 
USSR], Izvestiia [online], 8 January 2002. 
Sokut, Sergei: "Dushanbe Moskvu ne vygoniaet" [Dushanbe is 
not expelling Moscow], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 26 
December 2001. 
"U Rossii v Tadzbikistane poiavitsia voennaia baza" [Russia 
to have a military base in Tajikistan], stra71a.m [online], 26 
December 200 l. 
Grigorev, Aleksandr: "Soiuznikov vybiraiut" [Choosing 
allies], Izvestiia [online], 24 December 200l. 
"Sergei Karaganov: Rossiiu ne dolzhno pugat prisutstvie SShA 
v Srednei Azii" [Sergei Karaganov: Russia should not fear 
the presence of the US in Central Asia], stral1a.nt [online], 
20 December 200l. 
"Leonid Ivashov: 'Likvidatsiia baz za rubezhom -
strategicheskaia oshibka'" [Leonid Ivashov: The 
elimination of the bases abroad Was a strategic mistake], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18 December 200l. 
"Puti Putina" [Putin's courses], Versty, 27 November 200l. 
"Sergei Ivanov, 'Rossiia gotova k sotrudnichestvu s NATO na 
ravnopravnoi osnove'" [Sergei Ivanov: Russia is ready for 
cooperation with NATO on the basis of equals], stral1a.rtI 
[online], 22 November 2001. 
"'Nezavisimaia gazeta' mnogo znaet pro generalskie interesy" 
[Nezavisimaia gazeta knows a lot about generals' interests]' 
smi.r" [online], 13 November 200l. 
Solovev, Vadim: "Generaly ukhodiat v oppozitsiiu Kremliu" 
[Generals go into opposition against the Kremlin], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 13 November 200l. 
"Andrei Nikolaev: SShA ispolzuiut slozhivshuiusia situatsiiu, 
chtoby zakrepitsia v Tsentralnoi Azii" [Andrei Nikolaev: 
the US is using the situation to strengthen its positions in 
Central Asia], strana.m [online], 9 November 200l. 
Zamiatina, Tatiana: "Kak daleko idti Rossii v podderzhke 
SShA?" [How far should Russia go in supporting the US?], 
stral1a.rtI [online], 5 November 200l. 
Andrusenko, Lidiia: "Politologi daiut nakaz Putinu" [Political 
scientists give instructions to Putin], Nezavisimaia gazeta 
[on line], 26 October 2001. 
Riabov, Andrei: "Putin ushel v otryv" [Putin has lost contact], 
Vek, 42, 26 October 200l. 
Ilichev, Georgii: "Doroga na Krouford" [The road to 
Crawford], Izvestiia [online], 25 October 2001. 
"V Dushanbe sostoialas vstrecha Vladimira Putina, Emomali 
Rakhmonova i Burkhanuddina Rabbani" [Vladimir Putin, 
Imomali Rakhmonov and Burkhanuddin Rabbani met in 
Dushanbe], strana.m [online], 22 October 200l. 
"My mozhem sdelat shag nazad" [We risk taking a step back], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 20 October 200l. 
"Elita ne pospevaet" [The elite does not keep up pace], 
Vremia novostei [online], 19 October 2001. 
Georgiev, Vladimir: "Uzbekistan prodalsia Vashingtonu za 8 
mlrd. dollarav" [Uzbekistan sold itself to Wahington for 8 
billion dollars], Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 19 October 
2001. 
"Chernoe i beloe posle 11 sentiabria" [Black and white after 
11 September], Rossiiskaia gazeta [online], 17 October 
2001. 
Novoprudskii, Semen: "Nasha voina" [Our war], Izvestiia 
[online], 8 October 2001. 
Sokolov, Viktor: "Mark Urnov: Rossiia torguetsia s SShA - i 
slava Bogu!" [Mark Urnov: Russia is negotiating with the 
US - and thank God!], strana.m [online], 26 September 
2001. 
"Viacheslav Igrunov: 'Rossiia dolzhna poluchit ot NATO 
garantii sobstvennoi bezopasnosti'" [Viacheslav Igrunov: 
Russia should receive security guarantees from NATO], 
strana.TU [online], 26 September 2001. 
Panfilova, Viktoriia: "Skazano - sdelano" [Said and done], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [online], 23 September 2002. 
Chernogaev, Iurii: "Vladimir Rushailo zamiril Tsentralnuiu 
Aziiu" [Vladimir Rushailo pacifies Central Asia], 
Kommersal1t [online], 22 September 200l. 
Dubnov, Arkadii: "Bazovyi vopros" [The base question], 
Vremia novostei [online], 18 September 200l. 
Khanbabian, Armen, and Igor Rotar: "Vas bombili, vy i 
voiuite" [You were bombed, so you should go to war], 
Nezavisimaia gazeta [on line], 18 September 2001. 
"Tadzhikistan vyrazil gotovnost sotrudnichat s SShA v borbe 
s terrorizl11om" [Tajikistan expresses readiness to cooperate 
with the US in the war against terrorism]' stra/la.m 
[online), 17 September 2001. 
Safonov, Dmitri: "Soglasie molchat" [Consenting to silence), 
Izvestiia [online], 16 September 2001. 
"Sergei Ivanov otverg vozmozhnost operatsii NATO na 
territorii sredneaziatskikh gosudarstv SNG" [Sergei Ivanov 
rejects the possibility of NATO operations on the 
territories of the Central Asian states of CIS], strana.rtI 
[online), 14 September 2001. 
T1"tl1tscripts of other media sou.rces in Russian 
"Rossiia vozvrashchaetsia?" [Russia returns?), Radio Svoboda 
[transcript on line), 25 October 2003. Verbatim transcript 
of broadcast original. 
"Ataka na Ameriku. Mneniia: Rol Tsentralnoi Azii" [Attack 
on America. Opinions: the role of Central Asia), Radio 
Svoboda [transcript online], 20 September 2001. Verbatim 
transcript of broadcast original. 
List of interviews 
Aleksandrov, Dmitrii, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 
19 November 2004. 
Khrustalev, Mark, Moscow State Institute for International 
Relations, 18 November 2004. 
Kurtov, Azhdar, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 19 
November 2004. 
Lukianov, Fedor, Russia in Global Affairs, 19 November 
2004. 
Mikheev, Sergei, Centre for Political Technologies, 16 
November 2004. 
Narinskii, Mikhail, Moscow State Institute for International 
Relations, 18 November 2004. 
Saidov, Zoir, Tajikistan's en1bassy to the Russian Federation, 
20 November 2004. 
Skakov, Aleksandr, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 19 
November 2004. 
Institutt for forsvarsstudier 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
HA Crucial Sphere for Our Security". 
Russia in Central Asia after 9/ I I 
Mter 11 September 2001, Russia entered into a strate-
gic alignment with the United States and the West in 
the war against terrorism, and the alignment included 
Russian support for a Western military presence in 
Central Asia. 
At the same time, Russian policy in Central Asia 
focused on military and security cooperation, and 
Russian or Russian-led military bases were established 
in the region. 
This study investigates the Russian response to the 
appearance of Western bases in Central Asia. What has 
influenced Russia's policy in Central Asia after 9fll? 
In addition the author considers the implications of 
Russia's policy for the Russian-American bilateral 
relationship. 
Ingerid M. Opdahl 
Ingerid M. Opdahl is a research fellow at 
the Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies. She holds a cand. polite degree 
(Political Science) from the University of 
Oslo, and an MSc in Russian and Post 
Soviet Studies from the London School 
of Economics and Political Science. 
Institutt for forsvarsstudier 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
